the illusion was performing, to employ and fill a great measure of time, we now carefully examine the scenes which were exhibited; the objects which were presented; the business which was transacted, or the frolics which occurred.

When we have taken an accurate review of all these, and have calculated the portion of time which might have sufficed for the completion of all which we remember, we shall be satisfied that every impression received by the mind, of scenery and of object; of frolic in which she had been wantoning, and of business wherein she had been occupied; might easily and perfectly have been made in the lapse of a few minutes. The probability is, that the mind is sporting in the fantasy and illusion of dream, only at the near approach of her awaking, or when the person is almost arrived at that state, when he is said to be half asleep, half awake; in a condition, as it were, of mental delirium. But, not only is a very scanty measure of time equal to the comprehension of "such stuff as dreams are made of;" but if all the component parts of which a seemingly long-continued dream is formed, could be embodied, and fashioned into realities; if whatever the

dream has represented were to be exhibited in waking life, a very narrowed allowance of time would suffice for the performance.

So far, I venture to conclude, that we have proceeded safely; such, we apprehend to be the true character and anatomy of dream. What remains must be left to the physiologist and philosopher.

MEMORY.

Tuts inexplicable faculty, or power, should seem to present one among the strongest evidences of an immaterial principle existing in man. Memory remains, and operates acutely and perfectly, notwithstanding the perpetual change of matter in the component parts of the animal or corporeal texture. The individual who has measured the extent of "three-score years and ten," may fairly be calculated to have parted with, and to have renovated every particle of his animal substance, ten times; but he will distinctly remember certain situations in which he was placed, and circumstances which occurred, while as yet he had not advanced beyond his fifth or even his fourth anniversary. How is this to be explained by the materialist? Oh! he will tell us, that as the process of decay and regeneration is at work, the impressions which had been received by the matter which is dispersing, are committed,

in security and distinctness, to that which is collecting; and thus the transfer of impression is explained, and the phenomena of memory illustrated. He will tell us this; but does he expect us to admit it? Impressions! what does the materialist intend by impressions, in this instance? has he any distinct idea, depicted and settled in his imagination, when he employs the term; or is it adopted to signify something or other, of which he cannot form a definite conception? Is it any thing more, in his mouth, than a proclamation of difficulty, a subterfuge of baffled and disappointed science? Does it imply any thing more solid and circumstantial than metaphor and figure? if it does not, it exemplifies and elucidates nothing on the character and quality of matter. If it bears reference to matter, it must be capable of ascertainment, of intelligible description, of formal and mechanical explication. What are these? Be they what they may, whether is it easier to conceive, that the faculty of memory, if residing in a material substance, should continue through all the decays and renovations, the entire changes of that substance; or that an immaterial principle should exist