When the King moved up to Aulis the Roman party in Chalcis were cowed and the city opened its gates. Micythion, Xenoclides and their partizans fled. The Achaean and Pergamene forces, as well as the survivors of the Romans, entrenched themselves in the little towns on the mainland opposite, but were compelled to evacuate them on the King's promising to let them depart unmolested. The fall of Chalcis was immediately followed by the submission of the whole of Eubœa.1 The Roman commissioners were now unable to prevent the movement in Antiochus' favour spreading like fire throughout Greece. Elis, by tradition associated with Aetolia and hostile to the Achaeans, notified him of its adherence. The Epirots thought it prudent to secure themselves on both sides by offering their alliance, but offering it on condition that Antiochus should move into their country.2 Boeotia ranged itself definitely at last on his side and received him at Thebes with popular acclamations. His statue was erected by the League in the temple of Pallas Itonia at Coronea.1 A more useful ally than any of these Greek states Antiochus had in Amynander, the king of the Athamanians, one of the semi-barbarous peoples, akin to the Hellenes, who inhabited the mountain regions on the confines of Aetolia and Thessaly. Amynander was now to a large extent under the influence of an adventurer, who played a somewhat conspicuous part in the events of that time, a certain Philip of Megalopolis. This man was of a Macedonian family settled in Arcadia, and he made no less a claim than to be descended from Alexander himself.5 His sister, who bore the royal name of Apama, was married to Amynander, and Philip accompanied her to the Athamanian court as a convenient place whence he could 1 Liv. xxxv. 50, 5 f.; App. Syr. 12; Diod. xxix. 1. 2 Liv. xxxvi. 5, Polyb. xx. 3. 4 Liv. xxxvi. 20, 3. 3 Liv. xxxvi. 6; Polyb. xx. 7. 5 Niese (ii. p. 693, note 2) suggests that his reputed ancestor was Heracles, the illegitimate son of Alexander. It is equally possible that it was the young Alexander. When princes are secretly made away with, it is almost the rule for stories to go abroad that they really survived unknown. Is it not the case that to-day in France there is some one who induces a number of people to believe him the descendant of Louis XVII ? blazon his pretensions to the Macedonian throne. Even if he was not taken altogether seriously by the world at large, Antiochus and the Aetolians thought it worth while, in order to secure the co-operation of Amynander, to encourage Philip's ambition, If they still had any hopes of the real King Philip's help, this was hardly the way to make him their friend.1 He The King's heart was lifted high by these successes. was of too unsteady a judgment to feel how unsubstantial they were. He had seized the object of his ambition in the absence of the competitor; the real bout would not begin till Rome turned to recover what it had lost. The adhesion of Eleans and Boeotians, in the moment that he possessed the field, meant little. Their co-operation was a feeble quantity, even if it were assured, and it would be assured only so long as it seemed to pay. To achieve the first part of the task, to occupy Greece (and even that Antiochus had done so far very imperfectly), was futile in the extreme, unless the second part of it, the repulse of Rome, was to be achieved in its turn. A commander of any sense in the position of Antiochus would have subordinated every consideration to that of checking the Roman attack which must come with the opening spring. The natural barriers which defended Greece on the side of Rome were, first the sea, and secondly the mountains of Epirus, in conjunction with the dominions of Philip. Instead of using every effort to gain command of these, Antiochus called a council of his allies at Demetrias to form plans for the occupation of Thessaly. Hannibal, since the influence of Thoas had been in the ascendant with Antiochus, had been relegated to the background. On this occasion, however, our account says, the King asked his opinion. Then amidst the extravagances of courtiers a sane voice made itself heard. Hannibal tried to open the King's eyes; it was with Rome he had to do. The plan he proposed included the establishment of a naval base at Corcyra, to command the sea on the west; the occupation in strength by the King himself of the valley of the Aous, to prevent the Romans throwing troops 1 Liv. xxxv. 47; App. Syr. 13. across the mountains of Epirus from Apollonia, and, above all, an alliance with Philip, without which the Romans could move troops from Apollonia into Greece by way of western Macedonia. The alliance of Philip would be the greatest weight in the scales; and if it could not be procured, Philip must at least be rendered harmless by the King's son, Seleucus, making a diversion on his Thracian frontier. Besides this, since Antiochus had, against Hannibal's advice, chosen as the battle-ground between himself and Rome a country such as Greece, which could furnish him but poorly with provisions or troops, he must remedy these disadvantages by importing men, material and food on a large scale from Asia, and use all the naval force available for keeping the army in Greece in touch with its source of supplies. The only part of this scheme which the Seleucid council thought fit to adopt was the dispatch of Polyxenidas to bring up reinforcements from Asia.1 Whether an alliance with Philip, as Hannibal advised, was really a practicable policy may be questioned. Hannibal, looking at the situation solely in reference to a conflict with Rome, was, of course, perfectly right from his point of viewthe strategical. But the political difficulties of such a course were probably insuperable-that is, if Antiochus intended to retain an ascendancy in Greece. The house of Antigonus could never do anything to help the house of Seleucus to that. It seems that Philip afterwards asserted that Antiochus had at one time offered him as the price of his alliance 3000 talents, 50 decked ships, and all the Greek states which he had formerly dominated.2 If this was true it was certainly not disinterested attachment to Rome which made Philip refuse the offer.3 But whilst Antiochus was debarred from an alliance, to induce Philip to remain a passive spectator was probably possible by careful management. A difficulty was, no doubt, constituted by Philip of Megalopolis. To countenance him perhaps appeared necessary in order to retain the Atha 1 Liv. xxxvi. 6 f.; App. Syr. 14. 2 Liv. xxxix. 28. 3 As Flathe (Geschichte Macedoniens, ii. p. 424, note) observes, it is difficult to believe, dass Antiochos seine Bedingungen in der That so, wie Philipp sagt, gestellt hat. Was würden dazu alle Griechen und die Aetoler gemeint haben!" |