1734-35. ble either to affift us, or to defend themselves. As to the Anno 8. Geo. II. particular Interest of this Nation, whether it be in Danger or not from the present War, muft entirely depend upon our ate Negotiations; and therefore it is, at prefent, impoffible or me to form any Judgment in that Refpect, because I am ntirely ignorant of our Situation, fo far as relates to our oreign Affairs: But from our not having joined in the Beinming of the War, I must conclude, that the particular ntereft of this Nation is no way concerned in it; and thereore I must think it was quite unneceffary to put ourselves o any Charges on that Account. As for the Balance of Power, it ought certainly to be referved: In this, Sir, all the other Princes and States of Europe are as much, nay, more nearly concerned than we; herefore they ought to bear their Share in the Expence, nd will certainly do fo when they find it neceffary. But f, upon this Pretence, we run ourselves headlong into every Broil that happens in Europe, the Dutch, as well as the eft, will very probably leave the whole Charge upon us : They will neglect providing in Time even for their own Deence, when they find us fuch Dupes as to be ready, upon Il Occafions, to make that Provifion for them. Whether ur late Preparations have given them any Ground to think , I fhall not pretend to determine; but as I look upon the Dutch to be a very wife People, I must either conclude that hey think fo, in which Cafe we ought not, by any new Augmentation, to encourage them in that Opinion; or I auft conclude, that the Balance of Power is not in any Daner: For though it could be fuppofed that the chief Magitrates in Holland were inclined to facrifice the Intereft, or he Safety of their Country, to their own Safeties, or their wn little private Views; yet, if the Balance of Power were in any Danger, the People would force them to join in the Var. The Magiftrates of that Republick are not protected ither by Riot-Acts, or by regular Troops quarter'd in the ery Bowels of their Country; and therefore the People night and certainly would force them to do their Duty, or would maffacre them as they have done heretofore: For this Reason I am inclined to think, that the Balance of Power is ot yet in any Danger, and if the Balance of Power be as et in no Danger, nor the particular Intereft of this Nation n any Danger, there was no Occafion for our being at any Expence on account of the prefent War; much lefs is there ny Occafion for our putting ourselves to the Expence of he Augmentation propofed; for which Reafon I must be gainst it.' To this it was replied by the Members, who were for the st Motion for 30,000 Men, as follows, Sir M: Anne 8. Geo. II. 1734-35. Sir, • Gentlemen have of late fallen into a Method of de parting from the Queftion in Hand, and throwing out a great many Things no way relating to the Subject they speak to. This I fuppofe they do with Defign to make an Impreffion upon fome that hear them; and confcious that they cannot convince by Reason, they endeavour to perfuade by Oratory, and by florid Expreffions no way relating to the Affair in Difpute. Tho' it be irregular even to follow them in these Deviations, yet, as fuch Things ought not to pass without fome Sort of Answer, I hope the House will give me Leave to make a few Remarks upon fome Things that have been faid, notwithstanding their having no Relation to the Affair now before us; but first I fhall endeavour to fpeak to the Queftion in Hand. The only proper Question now before us, Sir, I take to be, What is the Number of Seamen neceffary for the Security of this Nation during the enfuing Year? Which is a Question that, in my Opinion, no way relates to our paft Conduct, to the Conduct of any of our Allies, nor to the Queftion, whether or no we ought to take a Share in the present War? With relation to the Queftion now before us, his Majefty has given us, from the Throne, all the Information that is proper or neceffary, and all the Information that can, I think, be defired by any Man who wishes well to his Country. He told us at the Beginning of laft Seffion of Parliament, that he was no way engaged in the prefent War, nor had any Part, except by his good Offices, in those Tranfactions, which had been declared to be the Causes and Motives of it: But that he could not fit regardless of the Events of this War, nor could he be unconcerned for the future Confequences of it; and I am fure no Man, who has a Regard to the Welfare of this Nation, or to the Security of his Majesty's Perfon and Government, can defire he fhould. At the Beginning of this Seffion his Majefty told us, that he is not yet any farther engaged, than by employing his good Offices, in Conjunction with the Dutch, for restoring the Peace of Europe; but that his good Offices have not as yet had the defired Effect: We are therefore in the prefent Queftion to fuppofe, that this Nation is not as yet any way engaged in the War; but, as his Majefty has told us, the bad Confequences, that may arise and affect us by the War's being carried on, are obvious; and they ought certainly to be provided againft, let the Charge be what it will. Where Facts are notoriously known to the whole World, where Confequences are obvious to every Man of common Capacity, furely Gentlemen do not expect that his Majefty, either in his Speech, or by particular Meffage, fhould 1734-35. fhould give this House a long and particular Detail of fuch Anno 8. Geo. 11. Facts or of fuch Confequences; the bare Mention of them is enough, and that his Majefty has fufficiently done, both at the Beginning of the laft, and at the Beginning of the prefent Seffion of Parliament. The Balance of Power in Europe may perhaps not be as yet in Danger: Nay, Sir, we are to fuppofe it is not in Danger; for if it were, his Majefty would certainly have acquainted his Parliament with it, and we fhould have been now providing for a vigorous War, instead of providing only for our Security and Defence. Both Parties as yet profess their fincere Difpofition to put an End to the present Troubles, upon honourable and folid Terms, and these Profeffions may at prefent be truly fincere; but the Events of War may make them alter their Profeffions, or may render their Profeffions infincere; and these Events may be so sudden and fo extraordinary, that without our joining immediately in the War, one of the Parties engaged may be utterly undone: Two or three fignal and entire Victories might, in a few Months, have fuch Confequences, as might put it out of our Power to relieve the Party conquered, or to ftem the Torrent of Success on the Side of the Conqueror. And I am fure it cannot be pretended, that in a few Months we could raise and difcipline fuch Armies, and fit out fuch Fleets, as would be necessary, both for the Defence of our own Dominions, and for affifting effectually the Party in Danger of being quite undone : Armies, 'tis true, may be foon raised; but according to the exact Difcipline now obferved, it requires many Months before those Armies can be made fit for Service, or proper to engage against an Army of veteran well-difciplin'd Troops. I fhall likewife grant, that our Ships of War may be manned with one Third Land-Men or Marines, but even these Land-Men or Marines must be fome Time on Board, before they can either know or perform their Duty in the fighting of a Ship; for, I believe, a Man of War, with a third Part of her Men just taken from the Plough, would make but a poor Figure against a Ship of equal Force, provided with able Sailors and well difciplined Marines. For this Reafon, Sir, when the Affairs of Europe are brought to fuch a Crifis, that an unlucky Accident may render it abfolutely neceffary for us to engage immediately, and without Delay, in the War, I must think it is incumbent upon us to provide in Time, in order to have a fufficient Number of well-difciplined Men, both for Sea and Land-Service, fo ready and fo much at Command, as to enable us to perform immediately that Part, which a fudden Emergency may make requifite, both for our own Safety and the Safety of Europe; and this cannot VOL. IV. F be Anno 8. Geo. II. be done but by Augmentations seasonably made, both to our Fleets and Armies. 4734-35. As the Prefervation of the Balance of Power is of fo much Confequence to this Nation, and fo intimately connected with our Safety, it is very certain, that whatever Power in Europe may project the overturning of that Balance, that Power muft expect to have Great Britain for her Enemy, as foon as her Project comes to be discover'd: We may therefore be affured, that when any one of the Powers of Europe begins to entertain fuch ambitious View, they will of courfe endeavour to make a Diversion, by invading this Island; and this they will the more readily attempt, becaufe we have always a ftrong Party among us, who are ready to fecond any foreign Attempts, for the Accomplishment of their own felfish Views, especially if at any Time they find us not properly provided for our own Defence. B.caufe one of our neighbouring Powers is engaged in War with another, we are not from thence to conclude, that neither of them will make any Attempts upon this Ifland; for if either of the Parties engaged in War has really a Defign to overturn the Balance of Power, they will certainly conceal that Defign, and endeavour to cover it with Profeflions of Juftice and Moderation as long as they can : But when they find they can conceal it no longer, when they find that we begin to fmoke what they aim at, can we believe they will wait till we attack them, or join with their Enemies against them? On the contrary, ought we not to expect that they will endeavour to divert us, by giving us fome Bufinefs at Home? and how do we or can we know but this may be the Cafe at prefent? Ought not we therefore to provide against such Attempts in Time, that we may be at Liby to do our Duty, when we find the Balance of Power is really ftruck at ? • Gentlemen cannot, it feems, diftinguish, or at least, Sir, I find they will not diftinguish between thofe Events which might have happened, and Events which, by proper Care and Precaution, were perhaps prevented: If by not providing in Time for our Defence, fome fignal Misfortune fhould happen to the Nation, fuch Men would then have a juit Reafon for finding Fault with thofe employed in the Adminiftration. And if any fuch Thing had lately happened, I do not doubt but that it would have been propagated with great Industry, that our Surprize was entirely owing to the two blundering Brothers; but when all fuch Accidents are prevented by the prudent Meafures that have been pursued, and by making feasonable and proper Provifions for our Defence, then it is pretended we never were in any Danger; and from thence they take Occafion to find Fault with the Expences 1734-35 Expences that have been wifely and neceffarily incurred by Anno 8. Geo. 11. the making of fuch, feasonable and proper Provifions; and thus, Sir, fome Gentlemen will always find plaufible Pretences for decrying those Measures that have been pursued, let them be what they will. However, I fhall always think they act the best and the wifeft Part, who chufe to give us Time and Leifure to roast them in this Houfe, for their expenfive and extravagant Measures, rather than to have our Attention diverted from them by a civil War kindled up, or a foreign Army actually landed in the Island. And when a War was broke out, in which this Nation might very probably be involved; when our Neighbours, and thofe Neighbours too from whom we have most to fear, were leading out great Armies, and fitting out powerful Squadrons, I muft think that it was at least prudent in us to make those Provisions for our Security which were made last Year; and as we are in the greater Danger of being inIvolved the longer the War continues, I cannot be against the fmall Augmentation now proposed. To pretend to tell us, Sir, what France and Spain in tended to have done last Year, or to pretend to tell us what they intend to do this next Year, with the Ships of War they have continued in Commiffion, is, I think, fomething extraordinary. We may perhaps guefs at fome of their Defigns, but I fhall always think it very imprudent, to leave the Peace and Quiet of this Nation to depend upon fuch Guefs-work; efpecially when we confider, that they have no Occafion to fit out any great Fleet against any Power in Europe but ourselves; and therefore it is not to be prefumed, that they would put themselves to fuch a great Expence, unless they were fufpicious that the Measures they have refolved to purfue, may make this Nation engage ́in the War; and in fuch a Cafe, I think it is natural to believe, they would take the first Opportunity to invade or disturb us: They have fuch an abfolute Command over all the Seamen of their Country, they have always fuch Numbers of regular Troops upon their Coafts, or within a few Days march of their Sea-Ports, that when they have their Ships ready equip'd and fit for failing, it would be eafy for them to clap Seamen and Land-Forces on Board; and they might arrive upon the Coafts of this Kingdom, before it would be poffible for us to man and fit our Fleet fufficient to engage them, if we had not made fome extraordinary Provifion beforehand: This every Man must be convinced of, who knows the Difficulty we had to procure Seamen enough for the Squadron we fitted out last Summer, notwithstanding the long Time we had to look for them, and the Method of Preffing which we were even then obliged to make ufe F 2 of. |