1735-36. Anno9. Gec. II. have a Sum of 4 or 500,000l. fent yearly out of the Nation, in order to pay the Intereft due to them, every Farthing of which is entirely loft to us; because the whole is spent by them in their own Countries, or converted into Principal here, to increase their future yearly Demand. Another Paradox, advanced against the Question now before us is, That the reducing the Intereft of Money in general, would bring great Difficulties upon all Ranks of Men in the Kingdom. This, Sir, is evidently contrary to another established Maxim, which is, That the lower the Intereft of Money is in any Country, the more flourishing it must be in its Trade and Commerce: I fhall grant, that it would diminish the Revenue of our publick Creditors, as well as of all other Money-Lenders, but it would not diminish their Capital, and thofe that could not live idly upon the Intereft of their Money, would be obliged to betake themselves to Trade, or to fome other industrious Employment, which might be a Service to themselves, and a certain Advantage to their Country. As to the Landed Gentlemen, I am furprized, Sir, to hear it faid, that the reducing of Intereft would be a Hardfhip upon them, confidering how many, I am afraid too many of them, are like their Country, involved in Debts and Mortgages. On the contrary, it would be a great Advantage to every Landed Gentleman in the Kingdom, becaufe, befides reducing the Intereft he is to pay for the Debt he owes, if he has any, it would greatly increafe the Value of his Lands, as well as of all the Lands in the Kingdom; and as for his younger Children, he would be under no Neceffity to give them any greater Fortunes than before; but, if he were, a Mortgage of 6000l. at 3 per Cent. is no greater Burthen upon an Eftate, than a Mortgage of half that Sum at 6 per Cent. Intereft; and if any Part of the Eftate were to be fold for the raifing of that Money, as the Price of Lands will always rife in Proportion as the Interest of Money falls, when Money comes to be at 3 per Cent. Intereft, the fame Parcel of Land to be fold, will then fetch 6000l. which would have fold but for 3000l. when Money was at 6 per Cent. I do not know what the honourable Gentleman means by enabling younger Children to live in a genteel Manner; unless he means in an idle and extravagant Manner; and the fewer there are of fuch Perfons in any Country, I am fure it is the better for the Country', which would be the Confequence in the prefent Cafe: For as few Gentlemen could propofe that their younger Children fhould live upon the Intereft of the Fortunes they could give them, they would breed them all up to fome Trade or Bufinefs; fo that instead of a great Number of idle and extra vagant Gentlemen, we fhould have a great Number of induftrious and frugal Tradefmen or Merchants; and which would be of moft Advantage to the Country, is very easy to determine. It is, Sir, a very great Mistake, to imagine that there can be in any Country too great a Number of Merchants and Tradefmen, or that any Sort of Trade, which deferves that Name, can be overstocked. Shopkeeping, or any other Bufinefs, which tends to fupport the Luxury of a People, may, 'tis true, be overstocked; and it is always a Difadvantage to the People to have too great a Number of fuch among them; but as for Merchants, Manufacturers, and Mechanicks, there can never be too great a Number of them in any Country; because the more there are of them, the more foreign Trade the Nation will have, the greater its Exports will be, and the more eafy will it be for every particular Man, if he be induftrious and frugal, to provide a Support for himself and Family. This is justified by Experience in all Countries, and in all Times; and therefore among the many other Misfortunes attending our publick Funds, this may be reckon'd as one, that a great Number of our People are thereby enabled to live idly upon the Intereft of their Money, which must neceffarily diminish the Number of our Merchants, Manufacturers, and Mechanicks. • To imagine, Sir, that the reducing of Interest to 3 per Cent. would bring any Distress upon those who have Occafion for Money, is fomething very new; for the more Trade there is in a Country, the more Money there will always be to be lent at Intereft; and those who have more Money by them than they can make use of in their Trade, will always lend it upon good Security, even at 1 per Cent. rather than keep it in their own Coffers. But upon this Occafion I cannot omit taking Notice, that in this Respect too, our publick Funds are of great Detriment to the Trade and private Credit of the Nation, because the monied Men of the Kingdom have fo ready a Way of getting an Intereft for their Money by Means of these Funds, that they never think of lending their Money to private Men, but at an extravagant Intereft or Premium; by which Means our private Credit between Man and Man is very much leffened, and great Sums of Money drawn out of Trade, which is therefore a very ftrong Argument in favour of the Question now before us. The People, Sir, never grudge the contributing what is neceffary for the Support of the Government in Time of Peace, no more than they grudge what is neceffary for the Support of the Government in Time of War: The only Thing they grudge is, to find the Nation loaded with a Expenc Anno 9. Geo. II. 1735-36. Expence that is not neceflary, or the Money they contribute That no new Office or Officer has lately been created may be true, but, Sir, we know that a very great and a very grievous Office, and a great Number of Officers, were lately revived in Pursuance of the fame Measures now pointed at; [The Salt-Tax. See VOL II. p. 159] and we likewife know that the collecting of our Taxes, and the managing of our Funds, coft the Nation a moft prodigious Sum of Money yearly, a much greater Sum, I believe, than is neceffary for that Purpofe; for if a narrow Scrutiny were made into that Affair, I am convinced it would be found, that the Bufinefs of two or three Offices might be managed by one, without employing a greater Number of Officers and Clerks in that one, than is now employed in any one of the three; fo that ⚫ feveral Offices, and a great Number of Officers and Clerks might be laid afide, by which a very large Sum of Money might be faved yearly to the Publick. This would contribute greatly towards preventing our loading the People with new or additional Taxes, or running the Nation in Debt, by creating new Funds, or perverting the old; and this the People would certainly infift on, if they were every Year made 1735-36. made fenfible of the Sums neceffary for the publick Service; Anno 9. Geo. II. but this, it may be prefumed, will always be avoided by thofe who have the Difpofal of fuch lucrative Pofts and Employments. It has been infinuated, as if it were an Advantage to the People to run the Nation in Debt yearly, rather than raife the Sums neceffary within the Year; because the Money is thereby faved in every private Man's Pocket; of which he may, as long as he keeps it in his own Poffeffion, make an Intereft or a Profit of 5 per Cent. perhaps more; whereas the Publick may borrow at 3 per Cent. or 4 at moft; and from the fame Way of Reasoning, it may be argued, that it will be an Advantage to the People to run the Nation every Year into fome new Debt, and never pay off one Shilling of the old. But do not we know, Sir, that in all Countries, People look upon the publick Taxes as a Part of their yearly Expence; when those Taxes are high, every Man muft contract his yearly Expence in other Articles, and when the publick Taxes are low, every Man may, and generally does launch out a little into Expences upon other Articles, which he would otherwise have faved; fo that if by borrowing a Sum of Money upon the publick Credit for the Service of this Year, we should prevent our being under a Neceffity of impofing a Tax of Ten Shillings upon every Man in the Kingdom, that Ten Shillings would not be faved and laid out at Intereft by any Man in the Kingdom, at least not by any Man, I believe, with a View to answer his Share of the Principal and Intereft of that Sum that had been borrowed by the Publick: No, Sir, every Man would live in his ufual Way, as if no fuch Ten Shillings had been, or were ever to be paid; no Man would contract his usual annual Expence on account of his Share of that Sum borrowed by the Publick; fo that the Sum fo borrowed by the Publick, and the Intereft thereof, would remain a Charge upon every Man's Pofterity, without their having any Thing left them by their Ancestor for anfwering that Charge. Even the Pofterity of the most frugal Man in the Kingdom would not be One Shilling the richer, on account of that Ten Shillings which was faved in the Pocket of their Ancestor; because he might have faved Ten Shillings of his yearly Expence in any one Year, and would certainly have faved it, if he had found himself under a Neceffity of paying a Tax of Ten Shillings to the Publick. Sir, we have feen of late Years several Attempts made to throw a Divifion, and to breed a Diffenfion between the Landed Interest and the Trading Intereft of this Nation; but fuch Attempts will, I hope, always prove fruitless, for their Interefts are infeparable, and will always be thought fo 1735-36. Anno 9. Geo. 11. fo by every Man who has a Refpect for either. There is not a Landed Gentleman of any Senfe in the Kingdom, but knows how greatly the Rents of his Eftate would be diminished, if our Trade fhould be undone; and therefore he will never confent to the throwing of any unneceffary Barthen upon it. There is not a Trading Man in the Kingdom, of any Confequence, but has a View to fettle himself or his Pofterity in a Land-Eftate, and therefore he will never agree to the throwing of any unneceffary Burthens upon Land: But, Sir, there has been lately a third Intereft reared up in this Kingdom, inconfiftent with both: I mean, Sir, the Intereft of thofe concerned in our public Funds: This is an Intereft for the Support of which both our Landed Intereft, and our Trading Intereft are now greatly diftreffed; and it is an Intereft which fome Gentlemen feem to have a much greater Regard for than for either of the other two: Such Gentlemen will, I believe, always be for creating new Funds, as long as we have any Thing left unmortgaged, or any Thing upon which a new or additional Tax can be laid; because the creating of new Funds will always increase that Interest which they seem to have fo much at Heart; and will prevent its being ever in our Power to diminish those Annuities we are obliged to pay them; but they ought to confider, that the Number of Men concerned in our Landed and Trading Intereft, muft always be much greater than the Number of thofe concerned in our Funds; fo that if People find that either our Landed Interest, and our Trading Intereft must be destroyed, or our publick Fund Intereft annihilated, it is eafy to fee upon whom the Ruin muft fall; and therefore, if thofe Gentlemen confider right, they must conclude , that it is against the Intereft of the Proprietors of our Funds to make any Additions to them, or to divert that Money which is appropriated, and ought to be applied yearly, to the diminishing of them. Whether or no it may be neceffary to impofe any new Taxes, I fhall not determine, I hope not, but if it thould be found neceffary, the Produce of a new Tax may be appropriated to the current Service, as well as the Produce of an old; becaufe if any Deficiency happen, it may and ought to be made good out of the Grants of the fucceeding Year; for our present Debts did not proceed from appropriating the Produce of any new Tax, but from not taking Care to make good in every fucceeding Year the Deficiencies, which had happened in the Grants for the Service of the former. all know, Sir, how dangerous it is to have Money lying in the Exchequer unappropriated; we know what a Temptation it is for fome Gentlemen to form extravagant Projects, and to put the Nation to a needless Expence: Nay, we know We how |