all Occafions fhew ourfelves fo mighty officious as to do it Anno 8. Geo. H. for them. It is an eafy Matter, Sir, for any Man, who has a quick Invention and a ftrong Imagination, to form imaginary Dangers. In Time of Peace we are frightened with Invafions, because our Neighbours have their Troops quartered upon their Coafts, and have nothing else to do with them; and in Time of War, because our Neighbours have great Armies in the Field, tho' no Power in Europe has any Quarrel with us. In Time of Peace we must keep up a more numerous Army than is confiftent with the Liberties of a free People, in order to prevent a War's breaking out; and in Time of War we muft add to that Army, and put ourfelves to great Expence, in order to restore the publick Tranquility, and preserve the Balance of Power, tho' no other Nation in Europe appears to be in the leaft apprehenfive of its being in Danger. Thus, Sir, we are always in a Fright, and, for what I know, our Apprehenfions may at laft become fo extravagant; that if Angria, the Eaft-India Pirate, fhould fit out any greater Number of Grabs than ufual, we must fit out a Squadron and augment our Land-Forces, for fear of his coming to make an Invafion upon us. By this, Sir, I do not mean to infinuate that we are now in no Danger; I do not know but we may: But whatever Danger we may be in, I am very fure it does not appear from any Circumftances yet publickly known, nor from any Thing that hath as yet been communicated to this House; and therefore I cannot Lagree to load the People with any new Charge. If the Danger is fuch as cannot be immediately communicated, it must be fuch as cannot be immediately apprehended; and if we are only like to be in Danger, we ought to follow the Example of our wife Neighbours the Dutch, in putting our People to no Expence, and in referving our whole Strength to be vigoronfly exerted against thofe, whofe future Defigns fball feem any way to threaten the Safety of Europe. We have been told, Sir, that the Danger of not agreeing to what is propofed is infinitely great; but that in agree. ing to it there is no Danger; Sir, in my Opinion, it is directly otherwife. It is certain, that the Regard we are to expect from Foreigners must always depend upon the Efteem they have of the Strength of the Nation, and of the Wif dom of thofe Councils by which that Strength is to be directed. The Strength of the Nation does not furely confift only in the Troops we have on Foot, or the Squadrons we have at Sea, but upon the Number of Troops we are able to raise and maintain, and the Squadrons we are able to put to Sea. Therefore it is certain that the Adding 7 or 8000 Men to our Land-Forces, or to the Squadrons we have already 1734-35. 1734-35. Anno 8. Geo. II. fitted out, can add nothing to the Opinion Foreigners have of our Strength: But the putting ourselves to fuch needlefs Expence, when no Man can fay that we are in any real Danger, will certainly give Foreigners a very mean Opinion of our Councils. The Armaments we have made can oblige neither of the Sides engaged in War, but may probably give great Offence, by which we may draw a War upon ourfelves'; our Armaments may very probably unite several of the Powers of Europe against us, while by the Inaction of thofe Armaments we may be deprived of every Ally. But, Sir, with regard to our domeftick Affairs, the Danger is more apparent and much more terrible. The keeping up of a numerous Standing Army, in Time of Peace, is abfolutely inconfiftent with the Liberties of this Nation. The Gentlemen, or at least some of them, who fupported this Motion, talk of an Army of 18,000 Men as always neceffary to be kept up within this Ifland. This, Sir, is the true Secret of this Day's Motion; thofe Gentlemen know that when Peace is restored, the Nation will infist upon a Reduction's being made, therefore, think they, let us now increase the Army, that when Peace is restored we may stop the Mouths of the Difaffected, (as they call them) by making a Reduction of the Troops we are now to add : And thus, Sir, we shall have a Standing Army of 18,000 Men faddled upon us for ever. As I am of Opinion, that an Army of 18,000 Men is at least 10,000 more than we ought to have in Time of Peace; as I am of Opinion that fuch a numerous Army can be neceffary for no End, but that of enabling a Minifter to trample upon the Liberties of his Country; therefore I think the Motion ought to be rejected with Disdain. As for Minifters, they muft not expect Regard and Efteem from their Equipage, but from the Wisdom and Addrefs of their Negotiations; for a Minister with a blundering Head, or one that is fent upon ridiculous Errands, will make as forry a Figure with an Equipage of regular Troops, as an Equipage of Footmen; and I am afraid the Afs's Ears will appear much more confpicuous under a wellburnished Head-piece, than ever they did under a well powder'd Peruke. The other Parallel, Sir, that has been drawn is very much to the present Purpose, if it had been properly related. We are in the very Cafe of a Gentleman, who is told by his Steward and the Workmen employed by that Steward, that his Eftate is in great Danger of being overflowed by the Breach in thofe Dykes and Mounds, which, as they fay, were made to prevent Inundations. The Gentleman is furprifed at this, knowing that there were never any Dykes or 1734-35. or Mounds made upon his Eftate for preventing Inundations, Anno 8. Geo. II. but what were made by Nature; and that his Eftate could not be overflowed without fome artificial Inlets made, or even Windmills or Fire-Engines prepared and fet up for that Purpofe. He answers, you really furprise me, I can hardly believe there is a Poffibility in what you relate; however, I'll go along with you and examine every Part of my Estate, and will then take fuch Measures as may be proper for preventing the Danger: Upon this the Steward and his Workmen are in a Fright, they know that the Inlets were made or the Windmills fet up, either by themselves or by fome of their Master's Neighbours, with their Connivance; and therefore they reply, O Lord, Sir! you must not examine into Particulars, the Breaches are of fuch a Nature that if you but look upon them they will become irreparable; give us but a finall Sum of Money, and an Order for fuch of your Tenants as we shall name, to attend and affift us, we can now eafily make up the Breach; but if you delay, or offer to examine into it, the Reparation will coft you more than the Value of your Eftate: If fuch a Gentleman fhould comply blindly with fuch a Demand, I am fure, Sir, it must be granted, that if he was not mad, he was very much under the Management of his Steward. While the Dutch, and all the other States of Europe not yet engaged in the War, fhew fo little Concern about it; while even the Princes of Germany fhew fo little Inclination to exert their whole Strength upon the Occafion; I cannot think the Balance of Power in any imminert Danger: And if any Danger threatens this Nation in particular, in God's' Name let it be told; when we know what it is, or from whence it is to be apprehended, we may easily take fuch Measures as may prevent it; but do not let us, under imaginary Pretences of diftant foreign Dangers, fubject our Confitution to a real, an imminent domeftick Danger; for what will it avail us to preferve the Liberties of Europe, if under that Pretence we deftroy our own?' To this it was replied by the fame Members who fupported Mr Andrews's Motion, as follows: Sir, Whatever Advantage we may draw from the Tranquility of others, it is certain we must always draw great and many Advantages from our own; and it is as certain, that let the Defigns of the Parties engaged in War be at present what they will, we may be deeply concerned in its Event, If either the prefent Defigns fhould be pushed too far, or new and ambitious Defigns encouraged and fet up by Suctefs, we must neceffarily at laft be involved; and this is what Sir W. Yonge. 4734-35. Anno 8. Geo. II. what we ought if poffible to prevent. This I take to be the true and only Defign of the Augmentation now propofed; it is fo fmall that I cannot look upon it as defigned to engage us in the War, but to prevent our being engaged; and for this Reason, I think, we may the more easily agree to it. • Whether the Balance of Power be now in Danger, or whether this Nation in particular be now in Danger, is not the Question before us; but whether both may not be in Danger by the Event of the prefent War, and this I really think can't be made a Question. In fuch a Cafe we are not to be directed by the Behaviour of other States: At least, I am fure, the Refolutions of this Houfe ought as little to be regulated by the Example of the Dutch, or of the Princes of Germany, as they ought to be regulated by the Advice of our own Minifters. In the War which was commenced before the Death of the late King William, I believe it will not be denied but that the Balance of Power was really in Danger, and yet, for fome Time after it commenced, the Dutch feemed, to all publick Appearance, as quiet as they feem at prefent; the Princes of Germany feemed as little concerned, nay, fome of them actually engaged against the Liberties of Europe, and of their Country. 'Till we declared ourselves, no Prince in Europe would venture to ftir to the Relief of the House of Auftria; and therefore I must think, that the outward Behaviour of all, or any of the Princes of Europe, can never be made ufe of as any Argument in this Debate. Befides, Sir, the other Princes and States of Europe have no Occafion to make any Augmentation of their Forces till they are juft ready to take the Field: They have, all of them, great Bodies of LandForces in continual Pay; there is hardly an Electoral Prince of Germany, but what maintains as great a Number of Land-Forces as are now in this Island; and yet, I hope, it will not be faid, but that if we were to engage, we not only could, but ought to take the Field with a much greater Army than either of them can maintain; for which Reason we are always under a Neceffity to begin to prepare much fooner than any of our Neighbours. We may talk what we will of the Number of Men in our Country, and the Numbers of Ships in our Harbours ; but from fuch Calculations the Strength of a Nation is not now, to be computed. It is from the Number of regular, well-difciplin'd Troops, and from the Number of Men of War provided with experienced Seamen, that the Strength of a Nation is always now computed: A Number of regu lar well-difciplined Troops is now become as necessary, either for Offence or Defence, as a well-difciplined, well-armed Militia 1734-35. Militia was of old; and the Regard a Nation is to expect Anno 8. Geo. II. from its Neighbours, depends now as much upon the former, as it depended of old upon the latter. 'Tis true, Regiments may be foon raifed, Regiments may be foon augmented; but a Regiment newly raised must be exercised for mamy Months, before it can expect to engage fuccefsfully againft an old, well-difciplined Regiment; and even an old Regi ment newly augmented, cannot pretend to enter upon immediate Action, it must have some Time to difcipline the new Men that have been incorporated. This is the Reason, 3 Sir, and, in my Opinion, a convincing Reafon, why we fhould always begin to increase our Land-Forces, at least, fome Months before there may be a Neceffity for entering upon Action: And by what is now proposed, the Increase is to be made in the most proper, and the leaft expenfive Way; that is, by adding a Number of private Men to each Company in the Service, without raifing any new Regiments or Companies, which could not fo fpeedily be made fit for Aftition, and would, by increafing the Number of Officers, be more expenfive to the Nation. I am none of thofe, Sir, who imagine that Germany, Poland, and Mofcovy, can be conquered in one Campaign; and much less do I imagine that France, Spain, and Italy, can be conquered in one Campaign. And yet I do verily believe, that a compleat Victory or two, gained in the very Beginning of a Campaign, efpecially by that Side which has hitherto had the beft Succefs, might be attended with fuch Confequences, and might bring the unfortunate Side so low, if they met with no Relief or Affiftance before the Beginning of the next Campaign, that to recover the Loffes of that Campaign, and compel the Conquerors to accept of reasonable Terms, would most certainly cost this Nation a vaft Expence of Blood and Treafure; even though we were immediately joined by Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, neither of whofe Affiftance, even in fuch a critical Conjucture, we can pretend to depend upon with Certainty. For upon fuch an Occafion, fome of them might expect to make an Advantage by joining the victorious Side; and if we fhould be obliged to engage fingly, and without the Affiftance of either of the three Powers I have mentioned, one unfortunate Campaign might involve us in a tedious, an expensive, and even a doubtful War: Whereas, if we put ourfelves in fuch a Condition as to be able to give immediate Relief to the unfortunate Side, or to engage immediately againft that Side whofe Views fhall hereafter be discover'd to be inconfiftent with the Safety of Europe, we may then cafly caft the Balance, and give Law to the Conquerors. 'I |