is in substance this: It represents that God beheld all mankind through Adam's fall imputed to them as their sin, rendered obnoxious to his eternal wrath, and utterly unable to escape it; that although he saw no reason to extend favour to any of them, rather than to all, yet he arbitrarily and absolutely determined to have mercy on a few only, leaving the far greater part under the dire necessity of perishing, for the offence of their forefather Adam, committed long before they had a being. This is the light in which the doctrine is exhibited by Whitby, its ablest opposer.

To all who are in any measure acquainted with controversy, it must have frequently occurred, that men of subtle minds can, by the assistance of perverse misstatement, very easily distort and entangle a moral or theological subject; and that much care and labour are often pecessary to unravel the perplexity, and present the subject in a fair and unexceptionable light. The misstatements frequently made of the doctrine of election are involved in difficulties peculiarly hard to be removed, and very hurtful to unwary minds, because they contain an imposing compound. Part of the ideas really contained in the doctrine are united with others, which are foreign and heterogeDeous. So many ideas of the former kind are introduced, as may lead one to suppose that the statement exhibits the real doctrine in its own form; and yet so many of the latter are interwoven, as to give the whole the appearance of absurdity and

error.

To the summary statement of the doctrine above mentioned, there are several weighty objections. 1. The statement sig nifies that the reason why God did not include, in his gracious purpose, the salvation of those who are to be finally excluded from heaven, is the offence of Adam. But although the confused manner, in which some Calvinistic writers have expressed themselves, has given occasion for such a statement, we utterly reject it. The supposition, that the guilt of Adam's sin is transferred to his posterity, is deemed an absurdity too palpable to need refutation. The connexion between the first man and his descendants, though exceedingly important in its nature and consequences, implied nothing inconsistent with the nature of things, or with the unchangeable rule of righteousness. But on this particular subject, which has been so ably and satisfactorily treated by Edwards and others, I shall not enlarge.

2. The statement given of the doctrine intimates, that the moral condition of mankind is rather unfortunate, than criminal; that future punishment will be the effect of sad necessity, rather than of voluntary transgression; an unavoidable evil, rather than a just recompense. Here our complaint of misrepresentation might be urged very strongly.

3. In such a statement, as that now under consideration, it is signified, that God's decree of election was arbitrary, or that he had no proper reason for it, aside from mere will. Here we repeat the charge of misstatement.

It is indeed a sentiment clearly taught in scripture, that God's gracious choice of his people did not proceed on the ground of any moral good, by which they were, in themselves, distinguish ed from others. But we think it an impeachment of God's infinite perfection to say, that any part of his scheme was adopted without sufficient reasons, What those reasons were, in the case before us, we pretend not to know. These are the secret things which belong unto God. But that he had sufficient reasons is clearly deducible from his attributes, and from those passages of scripture, in which bis sovereignty is most highly exalted. When Jesus expressed his acquiesence in discriminating mercy, he evidently hinted at the reasonableness or wisdom of the divine conduct. "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." If it seemed good to divine wisdom, there were suffir cient reasons for it. So the apostle: "Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, accorde ing to the good pleasure of his will." It was a matter of choice, being ascribed to his will; and the choice made was founded on reasons perfectly satisfactory to his wisdom, so that it was proper, suitable, or as the original word signifies, well pleasing in his sight. The choice, though to us inscrutable, was in his view perfectly reasonable; though sovereign, it was not arbitrary,

4. According to the above mentioned statement, the doctrine of election implies, that only a small part of the human family is destined to salvation, and that by far the greater part

is absolutely precluded from it. But this, by no means, belongs to the doctrine, as revealed in scripture, or as stated by its most respectable advocates. It is evident from scripture, that the number of good men at particular times, and indeed through all past ages, is small, in comparison with those of the opposite character. But according to the opinion of many of the ablest Calvinistic writers, the Bible clearly countenances the idea, that a large majority of the whole family of man will be the subjects of future happiness; and few respectable authors can be found, who advance any thing to the contrary.

Now take away from the doc. trine under consideration the frightful notion of Adam's transgression being transferred to his posterity, and their being doomed to perdition for what he did; take away the notion of any per son's being put involuntarily under the dire necessity of perishing forever; separate also every idea of any thing arbitrary in the divine purpose, or contracted in divine goodness; divest the doctrine of all these heteroge neous appendages, so adverse to the tenor of the Bible and to the best views of Christians, and present it in the pure light of revelation; and what heaven taught soul will not see its certainty and its beauty? God, in his infinite benevolence, determined to bestow everlasting life on a part of the human family, through the mediation of Christ. Their salva, tion was eternally included in the all comprehensive scheme of divine wisdom. Who can object to such a sentiment? In what respect is it more incompatible

with the perfection of God, than any of his eternal purposes? If the actual salvation of the saints manifests the infinite excellence of God; how can it be viewed as inconsistent with infinite excel lence, to consider their salvation as divinely predetermined? Among men a fixed design to perform a work of extensive utility is always accounted an honour. The longer such a design is entertained, the greater, it is commonly thought, is the proof of benevolence. How, then, does the grace, which saves sinners, become less honorary to God, by being previously designed? Why is it less valuable, because it was made certain by an immutable divine purpose? Why is it not rather a matter of pious joy, that a good so unspeakably precious, as the salvation of all Christ's people, rests not on fallible causes, but on the unchangeable counsel of God?

But an objection occurs. Such an unchangeable divine purpose is inconsistent with the moralagency, freedom, and accountability of man. In the minds of many this objection has great weight, and is indeed the main difficulty. It is the same objection, which was urged by the opposers of Paul, Rom. ix. 19. To enter fully into the consideration of this objection would not be consistent with the design of this number. It is deemed sufficient to offer the following brief remarks. We utterly disclaim the idea, that the purpose of God respecting the salvation of his people is in any degree incompatible with the freedom and moral agency of mankind. That they enjoy as much liberty, and exercise as

much moral agency, as they could upon any other supposition, yea, as much as is really desirable, or even possible, is what we believe and defend. It is abundantly evident, that the scripture always addresses itself to men, as being perfectly free from constraint; as suffering no diminution of their moral agency from the predetermination of God, or from any other cause. Indeed, what is there in the nature of God's purpose, which can be thought to interfere with man's intellectual and moral freedom? Suppose God has chosen men to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth. How can this choice be considered, as at variance with the highest degree of moral liberty in those who are chosen? Cannot God execute his purpose, without precluding the voluntary exertion of his creatures? Be

cause God, according to his eternal purpose, sanctifies men, and disposes them to believe the truth, does it necessarily follow, that in the exercise of faith and holiness, they are not free and voluntary? It has, we are sensi ble, been often asserted with confidence and triumph, that the hypothesis of a divine immutable decree, and of a divine, efficacious influence is not reconcileable with free agency. But, ex

cept reiterated, confident asser tion, what proof of this has ever been produced? Who has clearly pointed out an unavoidable inconsistency between the most fixed, unalterable purpose of God, and the consummate moral agency of man? Who has given a full and exact description of man's free agency, and of God's

eternal purpose, and then showed in what particular respect, or on what account they cannot consist together? In other words, who has made it clearly appear, that God's having and executing an unchangeable purpose necessarily destroys that, in which man's free agency consists? Till this is fairly and unanswerably done, we shall have a right to treat every statement which implies it, as misrepresentation.

Perhaps the most popular objection of all, against the scripture doctrine of election is, that it would have an unkind and injurious influence upon those who are not elected. This objection has been referred to in previous remarks.

But it may be proper to consider it more particularly.

In order to support such a charge of unkindness and injury, it must be proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that God's purpose of election either deprives those who are not elected of advantages to which they are entitled, or exposes themto evils from which they might otherwise be free; or in some way renders their state less favourable, or more dangerous, than it would be, if there were no such divine purpose.—Let us attend briefly to these particulars.

1. Does God's gracious election of some to eternal life deprive others of any advantages, to which they are entitled? To say that transgressors of God's law -are entitled to any advantages whatever, is a virtual impeach ment of that law. What astonishing ingratitude, then, would it be for sinners under the dispensation of God's mercy, to overlook the undeserved blessings, which his goodness has bestow

ed, and presume to claim others, which his justice has withheld. Let it not be forgotten, that God's determination to save his people, instead of depriving others of privileges to which they are entitled, is the occasion of their enjoying ten thousand privileges, to which they have no title, and which they would not otherwise enjoy. The work of God's sav. ing grace brings numberless blessings upon mankind at large. It has occasioned a suspension of their merited punishment, and introduced a dispensation of di vine forbearance, compassion, and proffered forgiveness.

of

2. Does God's purpose mercy toward his people expose others to any evils, from which they would otherwise be free? If any one affirms this, let him show what those evils are, and how God's gracious purpose introduces them? To set aside the purpose of God, respecting. the salvation of his people, would be, in effect, to set aside the work of redemption. For it is prepos. terous to suppose that God would give his Son to redeem the world, unless it were his unalterable purpose to bestow salvation on

some.