From Blackwood's Magazine.
FRANCE BEFORE THE WAR.

PARIS, October 20, 1875.

It will not perhaps be altogether useless to give an outline of the situation of the French army at the moment when the late war broke out; for, though important changes have been introduced since into the system which then prevailed, old habits still continue to exist in sufficient force to lead a good many onlookers to imagine that some at least of the same results might be produced again by the same causes. As regards the year 1870, very detailed evidence of both causes and results has been supplied to the world; and though that evidence has been brought forward in a fashion which most Englishmen cannot help deploring, it has, at all events, the merit-for the object which is in view here- of unfolding a complete story of what happened.

and convicted. A variety of measures were adopted in consequence of this clamour: the Bazaine trial and the two parliamentary inquiries into the contracts made during the war, and into the proceedings of the government of the 4th of September, were instituted mainly in order to satisfy it; the nation astonished and afflicted Europe by the savage delight which it seemed to take in dragging into daylight all the secrets of its disgrace; and, to make the confession thoroughly complete, nearly all the more important actors in the war wrote books, describing fully their own merits and each other's sins. By these strange means the whole inner history of the preparations for war was laid bare. It was a sad sight for the friends of France; they have mournfully remembered it: but in France itself it really seems to have become almost forgotten; it appears to have half vanished No foreign spectator has forgotten that, from popular memory and to have left no directly the war was over, the French ex- manifest trace behind it, except, indeed, hibited a fierce desire to localize the blame some unslaked hatreds which are silently of their defeat-to remove it from the biding their time. In one sense, therepeople at large, and to allot it specifically fore, the tale has become prematurely to certain persons. There was a hot long- old; but as, to foreign eyes, the value of ing in the air to destroy somebody-a its teaching is in no degree diminished by resistless need to select victims as a sacri- the indifference with which, according to fice to the national pride; so that, when appearances, the mass of the French have public punishment had been brought now grown to regard it; as, indeed, to our down on a few chosen heads, all the rest view, that teaching looks, in some reof the population might soothingly com- spects, to be almost as much needed by fort itself with the conviction that it was them at this present time as it was before proved to be innocent of all participation, the war,- it may be worth while to group direct or indirect, in the faults which had together a few of the facts which it prebrought about the wreck. The idea sents. The revelations made are, howwhich was suggested in certain English ever, so extensive, the questions which newspapers, that the causes of disaster they raise are so complicated and so vamight perhaps be, not exclusively individ- ried, that it would be impossible to conual, but, to some extent at least, national sider all their aspects here: the insuffias well-that they might be, in fact, a ciency of military preparation is the only result of weaknesses and infirmities proper one at which we propose to look; and to the generation as a whole — was con- though the details of it are scattered temptuously rejected as preposterous. It through a hundred volumes, it will not be was declared to be impossible that so difficult to pick out the more important of utter a discomfiture could be in any way them. attributable to reasons common to the But in order to obtain a general view entire land; it was asserted, with all the of the material conditions under which confidence of rage, that it resulted solely France commenced the campaign, it is esfrom the personal incapacity and folly of a sential to look back a little and to see few guilty individuals, and a shout arose what had been passing during the years that those individuals must be discovered | which preceded 1870. The other wars of

the Second Empire had brought to light | ty; a universal feeling jumped into exist ence that the army was not strong enough, and that immediate measures must be tak en to increase it. It was not generally imagined that the entire military organization of the country needed to be changed

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so many faults of organization and such incredible disorder of management, that it was scarcely possible to suppose that the government had not attempted to remove some at least of the defects which had been revealed. It was not reasonable to that unsatisfactory conviction was, at imagine that a system could have been that time, limited to a few wise men; but left entirely unchanged which—to refer everybody became convinced that the to one single class of examples only number of soldiers must be instantly had allowed 75,000 men to die in the Cri-doubled. Yet notwithstanding the unamea of disease and privations, while only nimity of this feeling, a strange delay oc20,000 were killed or died of their wounds; curred; the emperor and his advisers which, though of course on a much smaller could not agree between themselves as to scale, had reproduced in Lombardy nearly the plan to be adopted; they disputed the same proportions of mortality; and over it so long that it was not until nearly which, according to Dr. Champouillon's eighteen months after Sadowa that Mareport, had left badly wounded men so réchal Niel, at that moment minister of utterly without food during the Solferino war, was ready to bring forward his bill campaign that many of them crawled from for enlarging the army; and that bill, their beds into the roads in order to beg which was waited for so long, was limited for bread. And yet it turned out that to the creation of the Garde Mobile. And these "imperfections," as they were grace- then, as if it wished to proclaim to Eufully called, had produced no effects at all; | rope that, in the eyes of France, number that routine had kept things as they were; was everything in war and organization that no reforms whatever had been en- nothing, the Chamber refused to allow the forced or even proposed. The various minister to drill this new Mobile for so army services remained exactly in their exorbitant a period as eight days at a old condition; the teachings of the Rus- time as he proposed; it reduced the pesian, Italian, and Mexican wars were for- riods of instruction to twelve hours, thinkgotten in victory; the French had con- ing, apparently, that as every Frenchman quered; a system which had provided tri- was born a soldier, that length of teaching umph was taken to be, if not faultless, at was quite sufficient for him. And the all events quite good enough, notwith- minister bowed down his head before this standing its "imperfections:" and so childish folly, and told the Chamber that, everything went on unaltered. Indeed, though it really was a pity to so restrict so convinced was France of the ample the education of men who knew absolutesufficiency of her military arrangements, ly nothing, he would do what he could all that in 1865 the Corps Législatif called the same: "it is for this reason,” he addfor a reduction of the army, and the gov-ed, "that I see with less regret the supernment did not dare to refuse it, for it pression of the eight days of drill, and I was just beginning to struggle out of the fatal expedition to Mexico, which had cost £14,000,000 of confessed outlay, and nobody knew how much more of unavowed expenses. Considerable diminutions were effected: 2 regiments of heavy cavalry, 32 squadrons of other regiments, and 221 companies of infantry were supMaréchal Niel did, however, make an pressed; 1,268 officers were put on half-effort to introduce a few small improvepay. But the very next year the Sadowa ments into the active army; unfortunatecampaign occurred; France woke up ly the effort did not last he died in abruptly to a sense of impending danger; 1869; and though after the appearance victory ceased suddenly to seem a certain- of General Trochu's celebrated book in

add that, without them, we will do the best we possibly can." In this prodig ious fashion was established the new force which was to render France a match for Germany! From that time forth the Garde Mobile was counted as representing some 500,000 available soldiers.

1867, a commission had been appointed to | tude of a subordinate, had given him to select a new system of infantry manoeuvres understand that if he made complaints his fitted to the changes which had arisen in promotion would be delayed. It should the art of war, that commission, of course, be added, however, that, thanks to M. declared in substance that no modifica- Blondeau's visit, the condition of this tions were required, and things were kept park was altered before 1870. as they were before.

there M. Blondeau, chief of the intend- ing that he recognized the justice of my ance of the army, who spoke to me in a observations, and that he would attend to tone which proved how little he knew of them. Soon afterwards M. de la Valette the truth. He said, that if my impres- informed me that he too had written, but sions and those of General Ducrot were with no result; and he asked me to comcorrect, it followed that the minister of municate officially with General de Failly, war was the only person who was igno- who commanded the corps d'armée, saying rant of the facts of the case; for if they that he (La Valette) would do the same to really were as I supposed, the minister the ministry of war. This was done. I would certainly have spoken to him about got a reply stating that before wagons them. That was conclusive; there was could be sent to us it was necessary to see nothing more to be said. As I was leav- if we could provide shelter for them. ing M. Blondeau, he observed that I did There the matter remained until the war not seem to be satisfied. I answered broke out. I had spent five years in askthat, even if General Ducrot and I exag- ing uselessly for indispensable objects." gerated the dangers of the situation, it was painful for me to return to Strasburg without having obtained anything whatever."

These two stories supply good illustrations of what was manifestly the general condition of the French army. The ministry was convinced that its management was excellent; it would listen to no complaints, it would follow no advice; it calmly continued its habits and traditions, the essential principle of which was to leave things as they were.

After this indication of the situation during the period which preceded the war, we will now give details of what occurred at the moment when the war began.

As regards the numerical force of the army, which is naturally the first question to consider, no absolutely exact data are obtainable. The various official statements which have been published are not only incomplete, but disagree frequently with each other. It is, however, quite possible to group the figures according to the seeming probabilities of the case, and so arrive at an approximative result.

The

Then appeared General Ducrot, who gave the commission the following information : "I commanded the Strasburg division for five years. When I first arrived there I wished to know what was in store, for there were large magazines full of objects. I found 2,000 cannon, of which about 400 or 500 were fit for use. All the others were old bronze. There were stone cannon-balls of the time of Louis XIV., and an enormous quantity of flint-muskets. I wrote at once (in 1865) to the minister of war, calling his attention to the fact that all this was very much out of place in a frontier fortress, and asking that the useless objects should be transported into the interior of France, that they should be replaced by serviceable stores, and that the cannon should be put on carriages. I found that we had cook-nominal peace footing was 400,000 men, ing-pots for 2000 men and water-flasks and the reserve of the active army stood for 15,000, and so on with everything else. at 165,000; so that, on this showing, there Many absolutely indispensable articles ought to have been 565,000 men immediwere altogether wanting. There were no ately disposable. But the very first thing halters or picket-ropes for horses; but we discover is, that the 400,000 men who there was black cloth enough to dress were counted in the budget were not unmore than 100,000 men. der the colours; and, though it is not possible to determine with precision the number who really were there, we shall find good reason for presuming that, on 15th July 1870, it could not have exceeded 300,000 altogether the other 100,000 having evidently been sent away on leave, so as to economize their pay and rations. It is true that, at the plebiscite of the 8th of May, 330,000 soldiers had apparently voted in France and Algeria; but it will be seen directly that we cannot find that number in July. It is therefore probable that, directly after the plebiscite, 30,000 more men were sent home, in addition to the 70,000 who were already evidently absent in May. These figures do not pre

"I wrote to the minister that all this was inadmissible, and I insisted on the necessity of relieving us of our useless stock and of sending us what we needed. I talked about it all to M. de la Valette, who was then my intendant. He drew up a statement of what was wanted for a corps of 30,000 men, with a reserve of 10,000, showing exactly what we had in excess and what we had not got at all. We verified this statement together, and I sent a copy of it to M. Blondeau. I remember particularly that we required 144 wagons, and that we had only 18; and I begged M. Blondeau to remedy this at once. He replied by a polite letter, say

at about

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60,000 men.

93,000

tend to be strictly exact; but as to the And the depots, which are put
main fact that the effective force of the
French army had been reduced to a very
low ebb indeed in the summer of 1870, no
doubt is possible; for General de Palikao,
who was minister of war from 10th Au-

So giving a general total of

Consequently, we can only discover, altogether, about 293,000 men (which we have previously put roundly at 300,000) as having been under arms before the declaration of war, instead of the 400,000 voted in the budget.

gust to 4th September 1870, uses the following words in his book, "Un Ministère de Vingt-quatre Fours." In speaking of the plebiscite he says: "The result of this political act was to show Europe that the total number of men present in our To this original basis of 293,000 men army was only 250,000." This figure is, we have now to add the 107,000 who (to however, too low, and was used probably make up 400,000) must evidently have as expressing the number of fighting men, been on leave, and also the 165,000 of the after deducting the non-combatants. Still, reserve. The former were of course solreduced as the army was in fact, the theo-diers, but the same cannot possibly be retical number of disposable men stood, as we have said, at 565,000. Let us see what this produced in reality on the outbreak of war.

said of the latter. All the reservists, it is true, had been in the army, and had consequently received a military education; but since they had finished their term they had never been called out for exercise, and scarcely any of them had ever seen a chassepot, for that arm had been introduced into the service after the greater part of them had left it. Furthermore, most of them considered themselves to be virtually freed from any further obligations towards their country; and it was proved by thousands of lamentable examples, that it was not with any lively feeling of discipline or duty that they found themselves called upon to rejoin. It is worth while to quote one instance out of many, of the disorder which reigned amongst them. We will take it from an interesting book on the action of the railways during the war, which has been published by M. Jacqmin, manager of the Eastern Company. He says: "From the third or fourth day (after the declaration of war), our stations, like those of every line in France, were encumbered with soldiers of the reserve belonging to every regiment in the army; they were grouped by the district intendants under the orders of non-commissioned officers, but the latter had no authority over their detachments, and knew nothing of the men who composed them. The result was that men kept dropping off on the way, and that these isolated soldiers soon formed a floating mass which wandered about the roads and railway stations, living at the cost of any charitable persons they could find, but never reaching their corps. At 14,500 men. the end of August the station at Reims had to be defended against an attempt at pillage made by a band of 4,000 or 5,000 of these men, who had given up all idea of joining their regiments." It is fair, however, to add that, in many cases, these

In his evidence before the commission
of the Chamber, Maréchal le Bœuf put in
a written statement, from which it results
that, on the 2d of August, the entire army
of the Rhine, including the troops of
M.Mahon, and even the corps of Canro-
bert, which was not then really formed,
amounted to 244,000 men; and that fig-
ure is confirmed by General Frossard in
his book on the operations of the corps
which he commanded. But this included,
necessarily, such of the men on leave, and
such of the reservists, as had had time
to reach their regiments since they were
called out on the 14th of July, nineteen
days before. It may be guessed, under
all the circumstances, that the men of
these two classes who had managed to
join their corps by the 2d of August must
have represented somewhere about 44,-
coo; so that, if that estimate be correct,
the number of men of the Rhine army
who were with the colours before the war
was about 200,000. If the number of
leave-men and reservists exceeded 44,000,
then the 200,000 must of course, be propor-
tionately diminished, which would make
the previous situation worse still; for it
appears in the evidence that all the other
troops in France, in Algeria, and at Ci-
vita Vecchia, irrespective of those incor-
porated in the army of the Rhine, did not,
on or about the 20th of July, exceed
93,000, made up as follows:-
:-
Eleven regiments of the line,
Three battalions of African in-
fantry,

Eight regiments of cavalry,
The part of Canrobert's corps
which had remained at
Chalons, .

2,500 6,000

10,000

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