casuists of the order have brought to such perfection, that any given action which may occur in human life, may be pronounced either a heinous sin, or a trifling offence, if not a blameless act; nor will in either case authorities be wanting to support the decision. By means of this contrivance, the individual may at any time persuade himself, that that which his passions or desires prompt him to do, may safely be done; and, lest this licence should be interfered with, the Confessors of the order are directed to take

either opinion, even the less safe, and the less probable, provided it be truly probable." (Gil. de Coninck, Comm. ac Disp. in Univ. Doctr. D. Thomæ, disp. 34, dub. 10, n. 84. Extr., p. 90.)

"Of two contradictory probable opinions touching the lawfulness or the unlawfulness of any human action, every one may follow in practice or in action that which he prefers, although it may appear to the party himself less probable in theory. Of two probable sides of such a question it is also lawful to follow that which is the less safe; that is, the opinion which seems less remote from every kind of sin than the other which is opposed to it." (Paul Laymann, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, cap. v., § 2, n. 7, ass. 1, 2. Extr., p. 96.)

"Among many probable opinions, can there be one more safe than another? that is to say, can there be a greater danger of committing sin in adhering to one opinion rather than to another? I answer in the negative; for since every probable opinion renders the conscience safe in acting, the agent will not be less safe in following one opinion rather than another. Indeed, when I perceive so many different opinions maintained in matters of morality, I seem to see the brightness of divine foresight; because through the variety of opinions the yoke of Christ is pleasantly borne." (Ant. Escobar, Univ. Theol. Mor., tom. i., lib. ii., s. 2, cap. ii., n. 22, 23. Extr., p. 105.)

"Albeit one opinion be more probable and more safe than another, and seem to you also more probable and more safe, yet it is lawful for you to abandon that opinion in practice, and to follow the less probable opinion, even though you do not abandon your speculative judgment of the matter." (Sim. de Lessau, Prop. Dict.; De Præc. Decal., cap. i., art. 4. Extr., p. 106.)

"Whether it is lawful to follow one probable opinion at one time, and a different probable opinion at another time, upon the same subject. It is probable, for instance, that a tax has been unjustly imposed; it is also probable that it has been justly imposed. May I, then, to-day, in my capacity as the King's tax-gatherer, exact the said tax, and to-morrow, or even on the same day, in my capacity as a merchant, secretly defraud it? Again, it is probable, that pecuniary compensation may be made for defamation; it is also probable that it cannot be made. May I, then, to-day, being defamed, demand pecuniary compensation from my defamer; and to-morrow, or even on the same day, I myself defaming another, refuse to make pecuniary compensation for my neighbour's good name which I have taken away? ....I affirm that it is lawful to do, at pleasure, sometimes the one and sometimes the other." (Thom. Tamburin, Expl. Decal., lib. i., cap. iii., § 5, n. 1, 2, 5. Extr., pp. 108, 109.)

"There will never be any danger of corruption, if a man follow what shall appear to him more convenient, provided a probable opinion teach it not to be unlawful." (Georgii de Rhodes Disp. Theol. Schol., tom. i.; De Act. Hum., disp. 2, qu. 2, s. 3, § 3. Extr., p. 116.)

We are never more free from the violation of the law, than when we persuade ourselves that we are not bound by the law. For it is rather he who says that the law is binding, that exposes himself to the danger of sinning. For he who has thus persuaded himself, will, perhaps, sin; but he who says that the law is not binding, cannot sin.......... Consequently, he who follows the less strict and the less probable opinion, cannot sin." (Car. Ant. Casnedi Chris. Theol., tom. ii., disp. 10, s. 2, par 2, n. 47. Extr., p. 120.)

"It is lawful to follow the less probable opinion of another, in opposition to our own more probable opinion, which we still retain." (M. Stoz, Trib. Pœnit., lib. i., p. 5, qu. 2, art. 3, n. 112. Extr., p. 121.)

"Even at the point of death it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, rejecting the more probable." (Ibid., n. 120. Extr., p. 123.)

*

this doctrine of moral probability for the rule of their determinations in administering the "sacrament of penance," and that to such an extent as to make the decision of the penitent himself, if supported by a probable opinion, binding upon the Confessor.* But however great might be the latitude allowed in following probable opinions, it would have been of little avail, unless it could be made to appear, that those opinions had some reasonable foundation: it became therefore necessary so to define the nature of sin, as to make every individual act of sin susceptible of palliation by a variety of subtle distinctions. This was accomplished on the one hand by requiring for the establishment of sin, in the true and proper sense, such a concurrence, not only of the outward act and the inward

"It may be asked whether a Confessor may give advice to a penitent, in opposition to his own opinion..........I answer, that he lawfully may; because he may follow the opinion of another in his own practice; and therefore he may advise another person to follow it. Still it is better, in giving advice, always to follow the more probable opinion, to which a man is ever accustomed to adhere; especially when the advice is given in writing, lest contradiction be discovered. It is also sometimes expedient to send the consulting person to another Doctor or Confessor, who is known to hold an opinion favourable to the inquirer, provided it be probable." (Joann. de Salas, Disp. in Primam Sec. D. Thomæ, tom. i., tr. 8; Disp. Un., s. 9, n. 84. Extr., pp. 87, 88.)

"A Doctor may give advice to a person who consults him, not only according to his own opinion, but even according to the opposite probable opinion of others, if the latter should be preferable or more favourable to the inquirer;.........although the same Doctor should be certainly persuaded that the opinion is false in theory, so that he could not follow it in his own practice..........And hence it appears, that a learned man may give contrary advice to different persons, according to contrary probable opinions, provided discretion and prudence be observed." (Paul Laymann, Theol. Mor., tr. i., cap. v., § 2, n. 9. Extr., pp. 96, 97.)

"If the Confessor be the parish Priest, or ordinary Confessor of the penitent, he ought to absolve the penitent whom he perceives to follow a probable opinion, whether it be in the refusal of restitution, or in doing any other thing which should seem, in the opinion of the Confessor, to be sinful, but which the penitent himself thinks lawful." (Gabr. Vasquez, Comm. ac Disp. in Prim. Sec. D. Thomæ, tom. i., disp. 62, q. 19, cap. vii., art. 6. Extr., p. 93.)

"A Confessor may lawfully follow the probable opinion of his penitent, and reject his own.......... And this is true, although the probable opinion which the penitent follows should be injurious to another, as in withholding restitution. For although Adrian asserts, that a Confessor is bound to advise his penitent to abandon his opinion when it is prejudicial to another, yet it seems not to be said with reason; since the Confessor, in the act of confession, is not bound to consider the advantage of a third person; and the penitent will not sin in following the probable opinion, even in withholding restitution." (Nic. Baldel, Disp. ex Mor. Theol., lib. iv., disp. 13, n. 5, 6. Extr., pp. 101, 102.)

"If a penitent should err only in the opinion of his Confessor, and err, perhaps, unquestionably, but still pursue an opinion which is truly probable, his Confessor is not obliged to reprove him; neither can he deprive him of the right which he possesses of following a probable opinion; and he should be judged according to it by the Confessor, if he choose to persevere in it..........After he has once heard him, he is obliged by his duty to absolve him, if he be in a suitable disposition of mind, provided there be no reasonable cause for delaying absolution; the resolution of adhering to a truly probable opinion, although the contrary opinion may be more probable, or more safe, or more remote from sin, not being in itself a sufficiently valid reason for deferring it." (Joh. Martinon, Disp. Theol., tom. v.; De Pœnit., disp. 53, s. 15, n. 190. Extr., p. 103.)

"A Confessor.........is bound, under pain of mortal sin, to absolve a penitent who follows a probable opinion, which the Confessor himself considers false." (Georg. de Rhodes, Disp. Theol. Schol., tom. i.; De Act. Hum., disp. 2, qu. 2, s. 3, § 3. Extr., p. 118.)

disposition, but of deliberate forethought and wilful design,* as is but rarely met with; the great majority of transgressions being the result of an evil instinct in man, and of the excitement of his passions; and on the other hand, by admitting as pleas in mitigation of sin a variety of collateral considerations, and among them not unfrequently such as constitute manifest aggravations of the original offence. The character of sin, which is thus stripped of its intrinsic heinousness, is made to depend mainly upon the circumstances under which it is committed, and upon the view which the transgressor himself takes of it; he may have such particular occasions and motives of sin, he may be so hurried and so thoughtless, as to do away almost entirely with the sinfulness of his action; nay, he may, by an obstinate, an "invincible" persuasion in his own mind, however erroneous in itself, turn wrong into right, and sin into virtue ; and lest so precious

"There is no deadly sin in the consent of the will, unless some thought or express consideration have preceded it....... Therefore, for a man to sin mortally, it is necessary that he should consider either that the action itself is evil, or that there is danger of sin, or that he should have some doubt upon it, or at least a scruple. But if none of these have preceded it, his ignorance, inadvertence, or forgetfulness, are accounted perfectly natural and invincible." (Thom. Sanchez, Op. Mor. in Præc. Decal., lib. i., cap. xvi., n. 21. Extr., p. 124.)

"As long as the understanding does not reflect upon the wickedness of that which is offered to the will......... the consent of the will is not a sin, because the sinfulness of it was not known; unless the inadvertence should have arisen from gross negligence, or from a depraved inclination to sin." (Valer. Reginald, Praxis fori Pœnit., lib. xi., cap. v., s. 3, n. 46. Extr., p. 125.)

"Suarez, Sanchez, and Vasquez, are right, who maintain that, for an action to be imputed unto man for sin, which is sinful and forbidden by some law, it is necessary that the agent reflect, or have reflected, upon the sinfulness of the action or the danger of the sin.” (Paul Laymann, Theol. Mor., lib. i., tr. 2, cap. iv., n. 6. Extr., p. 126.)

"If a man commit adultery or murder, reflecting, indeed, but only very imperfectly and superficially, upon the wickedness and great sinfulness of these crimes, however heinous may be the matter, he still sins but slightly. The reason is, that as a knowledge of the wickedness is necessary to constitute sin, so is a full and clear knowledge and reflection necessary to constitute heinous sin." (Georg. de Rhodes, Disp. Theol. Schol., tom. i.; De Act. Hum., disp. 2, qu. 2, s. 1, § 2. Extr., p. 131.)

+ As for instance, drunkenness: "The sins of blasphemy, perjury, and unfaithfulness, committed in a state of drunkenness, either are not, or are, to be imputed unto sin. I think the former opinion sufficiently probable:.........to be guilty of such things in a state of intoxication is not sin, but the effect of sin." (Ant. Escobar, Univ. Theol. Mor. recept. absque Lite Sentent. necnon Problem. Disquis., tom. i.; De Vit. Capit., lib. iv., s. 2, pr. 30, n. 246. Extr., p. 159.) Compare, also, the case of a son murdering his father while in a state of intoxication, note 9, p. 78, several of the cases of simony mentioned in note 9, p. 76, and the doctrine, that the injustice of his sentence exempts the Judge from the obligation of restoring the bribe by which he was induced to pass it, note 1, 78.

"It is certain that a full knowledge of the wickedness of the sin is required to constitute mortal sin. For it would be unworthy the goodness of God to exclude a man from glory and to reject him for ever, for a sin done without full deliberation ; but if the perception of its wickedness be only half full, there is no full deliberation; and, consequently, no mortal sin." (Georg. de Rhodes, Disp. Theol. Schol., tom. i.; De Pecc., disp. i., qu. 3, s. 2, § 3. Extr., p. 132.)

"So far from being false, I hold it to be most true, that a man sins not when he does that which he considers to be right, without any remorse or scruple of conscience." (Car. Ant. Casnedi Chris. Theol., tom. i., disp. 7, s. 3, § 2, n. 149. Extr., p. 134.)

“The converse law, as it really exists in God, is this: Obey an invincibly erroneous dictate of conscience; as often as you believe invincibly that a lie is commanded, lie............... Let us suppose some Catholic to believe invincibly that the

a privilege should be placed in jeopardy, the Confessor is again specially enjoined to be careful how he disturbs his penitent from that salutary state of ignorance which neutralizes the sinful character of his actions.*

By dint of these various fallacies and facilities, the casuists of the order, writing under its directions, and subject to its approbation, have managed to accumulate a mass of rules and decisions, one more iniquitous than another, the enormity of which surpasses all belief. They have discarded the first and great commandment, the love of God, in so many words, as superfluous; they have distinctly abrogated the obligation of believing in God; they have boldly proclaimed the lawfulness of idolatry; they

say,

worship of images is forbidden: behold, in that case the Lord Christ will have to say, 'Depart, thou cursed, &c., because thou hast worshipped my image.'.........So, on the other hand, it is no ways absurd to suppose, that the Lord Christ should 'Come, thou blessed, &c., because thou hast lied, invincibly believing that I, in such a case, commanded thee to lie.'" (Ibid., disp. 6, s. 2, § 2, n. 78; s. 5, § 1, n. 165. Extr., p. 146.)

*"A Confessor perceives that his penitent is in invincible ignorance, or at least in innocent ignorance; and he does not hope that any benefit will be derived from his advice, but rather anxiety of mind, strife, or scandal. Ought he to dissemble? Suarez affirms that he ought; because, since his admonition will be fruitless, ignorance will excuse his penitent from sin." (Ant. Escobar, Lib. Theol. Mor., xxiv. ; Soc. Jesu. Doctor. reser., tr. 7; Sacr. Ex., iv.; De Pœnit., cap. vii., n. 155. Extr., p. 130.)

+An entire love of God is not due to him as a matter of justice, nor is even any due; though all love is due as a matter of decency and credit; because God is of himself worthy of love, and a measure of it is due to him either through charity or some other virtue." (Joh. de Salas, in Prim. Sec. D. Thomæ, tom. i., qu. 3, tr. 2, disp. 2, § 5, n. 40. Extr., p. 156.)

"I think that the time in which this precept (the love of God) is binding, cannot easily be defined. It is certain, indeed, that there is an obligation; but at what precise time, is sufficiently uncertain." (Jac. Gordon, Theol. Mor. Univ., tom. ii., lib. vi., qu. 13, cap. iv., art. 2, n. 8. Extr., p. 156.)

"In order to our justification, we are obliged to love God. If the sacrament of penitence be not received, I grant this; if it be received, I deny it. And this is the privilege of the new grace which Christ has added, that, by virtue of the sacrament, justification may be obtained, even without love." (Busembaum, Theol. Mor. aucta a R. P. Cl. Lacroix, tom. vi., lib. vi., p. ii., tr. 4, cap. i., dub. 2; De Contrit., qu. 119, n. 865. Extr., p. 168.)

+ "An unbeliever who is persuaded that his sect is probable, although the opposite sect may be more probable, would certainly be obliged, at the point of death, to embrace the true faith which he thinks to be the more probable. But except under such circumstances he would not......... Add to this, that the mysteries of faith are so sublime, and the Christian morals so repugnant to the laws of flesh and blood, that not any degree of greater probability may be accounted sufficient to enforce the obligation of believing." (Th. Sanchez, Opus Mor. in Præc. Decal., lib. ii., cap. i., n. 6. Extr., p. 90.)

"It is probable to an unbeliever, that he holds the true religion, although the contrary may be more probable: there does not seem to be any obligation that he should renounce his error. But since at the point of death there remains no longer time to examine the question, he is not on that account obliged to relinquish a safe way to follow one which is more safe; but only to examine the question with greater care, as far as the time will allow." (Ferd. de Castro Palao, De Virt. et Vit. Contr., pars i., tr. 4, disp. 1, p. 12, n. 14. Extr., pp. 99, 100.)

"The more true opinion is, that all inanimate and irrational things may be legitimately worshipped." (Gabr. Vasquez, De Cultu Adorat., lib. iii., disp. 1, cap. 2. Extr., p. 168.)

"Without regarding in any way the dignity of the thing created, to direct our thoughts to God alone, while we give to the creature the sign and mark of submission, by a kiss or prostration, is neither vain nor superstitious, but an act of the purest religion." (Ibid. Extr., p. 170.)

have declared an unworthy participation of the holy communion to be a sufficient compliance with Christ's command;* they have thrown the door wide open to simoniacal practices, under every circumstance of aggravation; they have made theft a venial offence, and superseded the duty of restitution, with special provisions for the encouragement of servants to rob their masters,§ and children their parents; they have

"The divine positive precept which enjoins communion, ordains that it be received in a state of grace. This I deny. For that precept is fulfilled by an unworthy communion." (Franc. de Lugo, Tract. de Septem Eccl. Sacr., lib. iv. ; De Euchar., cap. x., qu. 3, n. 30. Extr., p. 148.)

"It is not simony to pay what another has advanced or promised, to procure ordination for you, without your knowledge or against your will, or if the money have been given without your concurrence.' (Emm. Sa, Aphor. Confess. v. Simonia. Extr., p. 137.)

99

"Neither is it simony to give a benefice not principally, but secondarily, for a temporal advantage." (Ibid. Extr., p. 138.)

"A doubt arises in the case in which a man should promise to give money for a benefice, not with an intention of really giving it, but feignedly; and if he should thus take the benefice, whether there would be simony. Sotus and Cajetan say that there would not, because the outward act partakes of the inward intention; wherefore, though the feigned promise were confirmed by a bond, there would be no simony.' (Franc. Tolet, Instr. Sacerd., lib. v., cap. xc., n. 11. Extr., p. 139.) "If the payment be made in counterfeit money, the simony will not then be complete; because counterfeit coin is not a true payment." (Busembaum, Theol. Mor. aucta a R. P. Cl. Lacroix, tom. ii., lib. iii., p. 1, tr. 1, cap. ii., dub. 3, qu. 46, n. 212. Extr., p. 142.)

Si res sacra detur tanquam pretium actus venerei, non autem ex gratitudine vel benevolentiâ tantummodo, tunc esset Simonia et Sacrilegium: sicut si quis conferret beneficium, vel eligeret, vel præsentaret aliquem tanquam pretium actus venerei habiti cum sorore. Dixi, Non autem ex gratitudine, quia tunc nec Sacrilegium ullum esset, nec Simonia, sed tantum irreverentia quædam ad summum, re sacrâ et Deo dicatâ remunerando actum turpem et profanum. (Vincent Filliucius, Mor. Quæst. de Christ. Offic. et cas. Consc., tom. ii., tr. 30, cap. vii., in VItum Præc. Decal., n. 130. Extr., p. 140.)

"Although," as Lessius says, "it may seem difficult that theft should become venial, by reason of imperfect deliberation, yet it may sometimes happen. For some persons are so addicted to it through habit, and, as it were, determined to thieve, that they bear away the thing stolen before they fully reflect upon what they are doing. The same thing may happen through the violence of temptation, especially when it is committed with so much precipitancy, that there remains no time for deliberation." (Joh. de Dicastille, De Just. et Jure, lib. ii., tr. 2, disp. 9, dub. 2, n. 48. Extr., p. 129.)

"It is not a mortal sin to take secretly from him who would give if he were asked, although he may be unwilling that it should be taken secretly; and it is not necessary to restore.' (Emm. Sa, Aphor. Confess. v. Furtum, n. 7. Extr., p. 198.)

"He who has stolen to a considerable amount, is not obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to restore the whole; but it is sufficient if he restore as much as will secure his neighbour from considerable loss." (Franc. Amicus, Curs. Theol., tom. v., disp. 38, s. 4, n. 47. Extr., p. 203.)

"Trifling thefts committed on different days and at different opportunities, against one man or against many, however great may be the amount which has been stolen, will never become mortal sins." (Steph. Bauny, Somme des Péchés; des Larcins, cap. x. Extr., p. 204.)

§ "Servants are excused both from sin and restitution if they take for just compensation; if, for instance, when they are not furnished with necessaries for food and clothing such as in other houses usually are and ought to be provided for similar servants, they take so much and no more of their master's property as is necessary to compensate such an injury." (Valer. Reginald, Praxis Fori Panit., tom. ii., lib. xxv., cap. xliv., n. 555. Extr., p. 200.)

"A son who robs his father, is not accounted to sin mortally; 1. When he