but on private happiness. All selfish love to mankind is false love, because it does not terminate on them, but on private interest. All selfish love to our own persons is false love; because it does not regard our own persons, either on account of their worth or according to their worth. But if all false love is selfish, and all selfish love is false, then true love is disinterested. And since all holy love is disinterested, true be nevolence must consist in disinterested good will.

NUMBER X.

[Continued.]

SUSPENSION OF THE SELFISH PRINCIPLE."

Ín my last number, I considered the nature of true benerlence, and showed, that it consists in disinterested good will. But, as the doctrine of disinterested benevolence is of fundamental importance, it ought not only to be explained, but to be defended from objections. Nor will a defence of this doctrine against objections, be irrevelant to my present purpose. For the doctrine of disinterested benevolence saps the very foundation of Dr. Taylor's scheme. I will therefore consider the most plausible objections which occur to me.

Objection 1. It has been said, that true benevolence cannot be disinterested, because disinterested benevolence implies entire indifference toward every object in existence.

Answer, This objection is founded on a misapprehension of terms. Disinterested does not mean the same thing as uninterested. The term uninterested, denotes indifference; but the term disinterested is opposed to selfishness. A person may be said to be uninterested in a thing, when he has no choice respecting it; but he is disinterested, when he has a choice, which is not influenced by any mercenary or selfish consideration: Disinterested benevolence pecessarily implies

choice; but entire indifference is the absence of all choice. There is, therefore, no more propriety in saying, that disin terested benevolence implies indifference, than there is in say ing, that choice implies the absence of all choice.

Objection 2. It is said, that disinterested benevolence implies, that the subjects of it are unhappy. For, if they take no interest in the objects of their affection; then they take no enjoyment in them; and to suppose, that they do not enjoy the objects of their love, is the same as to suppose, that they are destitute of happiness.

Answer. This objection is founded on a false assumption. It assumes that a person, in order to exercise disinterested benevolence towards an object, must take no interest in that object, and derive no enjoyment from it. This is not true, Disinterested benevolence takes an interest in every object on which it terminates. But this by no means implies, that private interest is the ultimate end of every benevolent choice. The benevolent person takes an interest in the good of others, and places his own happiness, in their happiness. But it is one thing for a person to take an interest in the good of others; and quite another thing for him to make his own interest the ultimate end of his good-will towards them. It is one thing to enjoy the glory of God; and a very different thing to desire his glory, merely for the sake of that enjoyment. It is one thing to delight in the happiness of our fellow-beings; and a very different thing to desire their happiness, merely for the sake of that delight. The truth is, the benevolent person desires the glory of God, for its own sake, and takes an interest in it for its own sake, and enjoys it for its own sake. Just so with respect to his fellow-beings. He desires their holiness and happiness, takes an interest in them, and enjoys them for their own sake. Their happiness makes him the happier; but yet he does not desire them to be happy, merely for the sake of being happier himself. A person, therefore, may be truly disinterested, and still be truly happy.

Indeed, disinterested benevolence necessarily implies disinter ested enjoyment. A disinterested person must necessarily be far happier, than a selfish person can be. For a selfish person enjoys nothing but self-interest; but a disinterested person enjoys all the holiness and happiness which he sees.

The term interested, however, is used in three senses. It sometimes denotes merely a high degree of attention. In this sense it is opposed to indifference. It sometimes denotes personal benefit or enjoyment; and it sometimes means the same thing as selfishness, which consists in one's loving himself merely because he is himself, and seeking his own interest merely because it is his. It is only in the last of these senses, that interested is opposed to the term disinterested. Let this distinction be borne in mind, and the above objection will lose all its force, and all its plausibility.

Objection 3. It is often said, that disinterested benevolence requires us to disregard our own personal good.

Answer. This objection against disinterested benevolence, is founded either on a misapprehension, or misrepresentation of its nature. Holy beings exercise disinterested benevolence toward their own persons, as really as toward other persons. They love themselves, but not because they are themselves. They seek their own personal good, but not because it is theirs. They regard themselves as well as others, on account of their worth, and according to their characters and capacities. They desire, that their fellow-beings should be holy and happy, because holiness and happiness are desirable in themselves considered; and they desire to be holy and happy themselves, for the same reason. They mean, however, to regard every thing not only according to its nature, but according to its comparative importance. They always prefer a greater good to a less; and when one of two evils is unavoidable, they prefer the existence of the less evil to the existence of the greater. There is, therefore, no more propriety in representing disinterested benevolence as requiring one to disregard

his own personal good, than as requiring him to disregard the good of others.

Objection 4. It is sometimes said, that disinterested benev olence requires men to give away all their property, and take no more concern for their own families than for those of their neighbors; and this is not required in the word of God.

Answer. It is true, that disinterested benevolence requires men to give away all their property, if the glory of God, and the greatest good demand; but not otherwise. Just so in respect to other things. There is no personal sacrifice, whatever, which disinterested benevolence does not require, whenever the glory of God and the greatest good demand that sacrifice. The Word of God, likewise, requires the same things.

It is not true, however, that disinterested benevolence requires men to take no more concern for their own families, than for those of their neighbors. Every man ought to provide for his own family, not because it is his, but because God has entrusted it to his care. For the same reason he ought to take care of his property and employ it all in the service of God. Disinterested benevolence requires nothing, but what a regard to the glory of God and the greatest good requires. Disinterested benevolence requires men to do all the good in their power. It, therefore, requires them to render universal obedience to the Divine will, and to fulfil all the personal and domestic, as well as public duties of life. Disinterested benevolence regards every thing according to its nature and known importance. That is, it regards every thing as it ought to be regarded. To say, therefore, that it requires us to neglect our families and abuse our stewardship, is the same as to say, that a universal regard to duty requires the violation of important duties.

Objection 5. It is sometimes said, that disinterested benevolence is impossible in the nature of things.

Answer. This is a groundless assertion. We have seen, that the benevolence of God, is disinterested, that the benevo

lence of Christ is disinterested; and that disinterested benevolence is required by the Divine law, by the Gospel, and by every man's conscience. God exercises no natural impossibility; Christ exercises no natural impossibility; the Divine law requires no natural impossibility; the Gospel requires no natural impossibility; and our own consciences require no natural impossibility. It is just as easy to love God for what he is, as to love him at all. It is just as easy to love our fellow-beings according to their characters and capacities, as to love them at all. It is just as easy to love our own persons on account of our own worth, as to love ourselves merely because we are ourselves. There is something plainly absurd and ridiculous in the supposition, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, for a man to regard a thing as it ought to be regarded.

Objection 6. It is sometimes said, that Christ was not entirely disinterested. "Who for the joy, that was set before him, endured the cross despising the shame." "He shall see

of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied." These passages are supposed to prove, that Christ was not altogether disinterested; and if he was not disinterested, we are not required to be.

Answer. The joy that was set before Christ was a disinterested joy. It was the joy of securing the salvation of souls, the highest glory of God, and the greatest good of the universe. It was in these, that he saw of the travail of his soul and was satisfied. The passages which have been quoted, therefore, serve to illustrate and confirm, but not to disprove the doctrine of disinterested benevolence.

Objection 7. It is written of Moses, that he had respect unto the recompense of reward. It is thought, that this single passage is sufficient to disprove the doctrine of disinterested benevolence.

Answer. The reward to which Moses had respect, was not a selfish but a disinterested reward. Though he sought eter