Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and VirtueIn previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology. |
Què en diuen els usuaris - Escriviu una ressenya
No hem trobat cap ressenya als llocs habituals.
Continguts
Dependent and corrupt rational agency | 15 |
Constraints on any possible Kantian account of virtue | 49 |
A Kantian account of virtue | 80 |
A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility | 107 |
The Kantian virtue of humility | 133 |
Humility and selfrespect | 163 |
The humble person | 193 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue Jeanine Grenberg Previsualització no disponible - 2010 |
Frases i termes més freqüents
able accept achieved action admit affective affirm agency agent already Alyosha appeal appreciation approach aspects assertion attitude avoid awareness become belief capacity central chapter character claim commitment concern condition consider demands dependent and corrupt desires discussion duty engage equal evil example expression face fact feelings finite further ground happiness hope human nature humble humble person humility ideal important individual inferiority interest internalization judgments Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge least less limits maxim mean moral disposition moral principles motives necessary O'Neill object one's oneself perfect perhaps person perspective picture possible practical present proper pursuit question radical rational reason recognition recognize reflections rejects relative respect result seek self-knowledge self-love self-other comparison self-respect sense simply situation social sort speaks specific standard suggests superiority things traits true turn ultimately understanding virtue virtuous Wood worth