Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue

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Cambridge University Press, 24 de febr. 2005 - 269 pàgines
In previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.
 

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Continguts

Dependent and corrupt rational agency
15
Constraints on any possible Kantian account of virtue
49
A Kantian account of virtue
80
A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility
107
The Kantian virtue of humility
133
Humility and selfrespect
163
The humble person
193
The humble pursuit of selfknowledge
217
The humble pursuit of respect for persons
242
Conclusion
252
References
259
Index
263
Copyright

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Referències a aquest llibre

Kant and the Power of Imagination
Jane Kneller
Previsualització limitada - 2007

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