fires, is not to be hoped for here; and the greatest precaution, wisdom; and virtue, are not fufficient to preferve us from all vexation and uneafiness. Our cafe is fo much worfe than that of the brutes, that a drachm of prefent pain or forrow, in our eftimate, outweighs many pounds of past gratifications, and that we forefee and anticipate evils; at leaft, that our wishes extend our defires and efforts very far beyond the greatest happiness and good fortune that is attainable in this life. And though the whole courfe of human life were tranquil, fortunate, and happy; yet the nearer it approaches towards death, the idea of a certain determined period or conclufion, would naturally embitter it with anxiety and terrour.

I now speak of man, confidered abftractly from religion, in order to fhew that no degree of wisdom or virtue will content our nature, unless we elevate our minds to the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and his defigns in creating the world. For as, without this knowledge, the understanding never can difcover a fatisfactory caufe and the connection of things, nor the perfection of the world; fo neither can the human mind be eftablished in a folid tranquility without being poffeffed with love and reverence towards our Creator, a thorough reliance on his gracious providence, and the hope of a more perfect and endless mode of exiftence for which the Supreme Being has defigned us. Therefore it will not be foreign to my purpose to establish these two great truths, namely, the doctrine of a Divine Providence, and the Immortality of the Soul, as the bafis of our contentment, and tranquility of mind; and to conclude with fhewing in the clearest manner, how very much our happiness is influenced by religion.'

In the two last differtations our Author confutes the objec tions against providence, treats of the immortality of the foul, and the advantages of religion. These differtations are written with an excellent fpirit; and though they contain nothing new, will afford no fmall pleasure to every thoughtful reader. Mr. Reimarus concludes his work with fhewing briefly how religion promotes and improves the pleasures of the mind. What he fays on this head cannot fail of being agreeable to our Readers : Since religion, fays he, has received light from the knowledge of nature, of languages, of hiftory and philosophy, it feeks more and more to improve and propagate these several branches of knowledge; but chiefly employs them for the illuftration and fupport of the most fublime and important truths.

Who can but be pleafed, that it is given to him to know the peculiar advantages and privileges of his own nature, and the noble end for which he was created? but religion is the Only fource from which fuch knowledge can be derived. As the atheift looks upon himfelf to be no better than a brute, a plant,

or a machine, and accounts his foul a non-entity, or at moft the most subtle part of the brain, which derives its origin from mere matter, and with fuch a gloomy profpect before him, finds that his whole effence will foon return to duft; he not only greatly debafes the dignity of his nature, but becomes melancholy, pufilanimous, and uneafy. But religion, on the contrary, acquaints us with the dignity of the rational foul, impreffed with the image of God, and with our approaching future ftate of boundless perfection and infinite duration; which cannot but yield an exquifite fatisfaction to a rational felf-love, and excite us to nobler views and higher efforts, that will give us a fore-tafte of a fuperior happiness. Religion carries a man through a uniform and chearful discharge of whatever duties are incumbent on him, from his ftation in life; fince he is affured, that it is the poft affigned him by his Creator, and has the comfortable teftimony of a good confcience, that he acquits himself with uprightness and fincerity to the best of his power. But to the man of irregular defires, the practice of virtue and his duty is a galling burden; and when he outwardly complies with them, it is with reluctance and murmuring, fince his heart is taken up with objects of a very different nature; fo that even his good actions yield fuch a man no fatisfaction. On the other hand, it is an inward reward annexed to virtue, that a man performs what he is bound to do, with alacrity and pleasure; and that he feels the fatisfaction refulting from a regular behaviour, and the comfortable affurance, that the most perfect of beings is pleased with his affiduity and faithfulness in the discharge of his duty. Thus, like an ingenuous and dutiful fon, he not only takes delight in his intellectual improvements in knowledge and wifdom; but has the additional fatisfaction to know, that his fincere and conftant application gains him the love and affection of the univerfal Parent of mankind. Nay, the external rewards of diligence, probity, peaceableness and fidelity, feldom fail. Increase of happiness, domeftic profperity, the love and efteem of others, have a natural and neceffary connection with virtue and piety. As pride, felf-conceit, envy, hatred, anger, calumny and difcord, find no place in the foul of a good man; it is the better adapted as an habitation for meeknefs, benevolence, fympathizing humanity; and the more cordial friendship it entertains for the wife and good, the greater happiness it procures to civil fociety. Man is born for love and benevolence; and he who cordially practices it towards others, and meets with a reciprocal return, guards himself as much as poffible from turbulent paffions and outward enmity, and acts agreeably to this

nature.

Indeed, it is not within the power of the moft eminently pious to regulate profperous and adverfe events according to their Rev. May, 1766.

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own will; and in this refpect, the good and virtuous feem to have little or no advantage above the wicked and prophane. But thefe events affect our tranquility and happiness according to the frame of mind of the perfon who is fubject to them. Now, I would afk, which has moft fatisfaction in temporal profperity, he that looks on it as the effect of mere chance, and expects that it will fatisfy his boundlefs defires; or he that receives it as the extraordinary bounty of the Supreme being, and is refigned to every state or event which falls to his lot? which of the two will beft accommodate himself to afflictions, he that has nothing to truft to but a fatal neceffity, and has no hopes beyond this life; or he that, in every event which happens to him, acknowledges a wife and gracious Providence, according to whofe direction the prefent evil fhall work for his good, by preparing him for a blefied eternity? Lafly, Which is moft unconcerned about impending ftorms, he that, without rudder or pilot, commits himself to the boisterous fea of life; or he who, with wellgrounded confidence, refigns himself to the guidance of a kind, judicious, and omnipotent hand? To conclude, though from our childhood, we have daily before our eyes the certainty of our death; yet as the manner and time of it is involved in impenetrable darkness, no fyftem of philofophy is fufficient to enable us compofedly to meet that awful change. It is religion alone which can impart that fortitude. For, to him who does not extend his views beyond this life, death muft neceffarily be terrible, fince it puts a period to his whole being. This muft embitter all his temporal enjoyments; and the melancholy idea of a great impending evil, damps the fruition of the prefent good, and reprefents human life as vain, of no value, and even miferable; fince our nature does not reft fatisfied in fuch short, grovelling, and imperfect enjo; ments. Religion alone, by exhibiting to us the certainty of a future ftate, renders our whole life ferene, eafy, and happy; it enhances our prefent pleasures by the comfortable hope of a much happier and ever-during flate; it alleviates our temporal fufferings by the expectation of eternal blifs; it makes us wait for death with patience and refignation, as an entrance into a more exalted and perfect life; and, in every refpect, fully fatisfics our nature and its boundlefs defires after an ever-growing felicity and perfection, for which it was defigned and adapted by the great Author of our Being.'

R.

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England; concluded. See Review for February last.

Nour laft account of this work, we left the learned Writer

IN

at that very emphatical part of his introduction, where, after

having traced the foundation of what we call Ethics, or natural law, he very juftly and nobly concludes, that no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this.'

He then proceeds to obferve that as our reason, the medium by which natural law is applied to the particular exigencies of each individual, is corrupt, and our understanding full of ignorance and error, it hath pleafed Divine Providence at fundry times and in divers manners, to difcover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct Revelation. The doctrines thus delivered, we call the revealed or divine law and upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of Revelation, all human laws depend. If man, he adds, were to live in a ftate of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occafion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the laws of God. But, he continues, as man was formed for society, and as it is impoffible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great fociety, they muft neceffarily divide into many, and form feparate ftates, commonwealths and nations; from whence he traces a third kind of law, called The law of

nations.'

6

Having explained the foundation of these three laws, he proceeds to treat more fully of the municipal or civil law, which he thus defines. Municipal law, fays he, is- A rule of civil conduct prescribed by the fupreme power in a ftate, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.' He then enters into an explanation of the feveral properties arifing out of this definition, which leads him into a fhort enquiry concerning the nature of fociety and civil government, wherein he takes into confideration the three feveral forms of government, that is, Monarchy, Ariftocracy and Democracy; and after pointing out the feveral perfections and imperfections in each, he obferves that the antients had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but these three; for though Cicero declares himself of opinion,' effe optime conftitutain rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo,& populari, fit modice confufa, yet Tacitus treats this notion, of a mixed government, formed out of them, and partaking of each, as a visionary whim; and one, that, if effected, could never be lafting or fe

cure.

But our Author continues, happily for us of this island, the British conftitution has long remained, and I truft will long continue, a ftanding exception to the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the advantages of ftrength and dif patch, that are to be found in the most abfolute monarchy; and, as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three diftinct powers, entirely independent of each other; firft, the king; fe

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condly,

condly, the lords spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocra tical affembly of perfons felected for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chofen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different fprings, and attentive to different interefts, compofes the British parliament, and has the fupreme difpofal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, fufficient to repel any innovation which it shall think inexpedient or dangerous.

Here then is lodged the fovereignty of the British constitu- . tion; and lodged as beneficial as is poffible for fociety. For in no other shape could we be fo certain of finding the three great qualities of government fo well and fo happily united. If the fupreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches feparately, we must be expofed to the inconveniences of either abfolute monarchy, ariftocracy, or democracy; and so want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wifdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for inftance, in the king and houfe of lords, our laws might be providently made, and well executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view: if lodged in the king and commons, we fhould want that circumfpection and mediatory caution, which the wifdom of the peers is to afford: if the fupreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only, and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolith the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally deftroy) the ftrength of the executive power. But the conftitutional government of this island is fo admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the reft. For if ever it should happen that the independence of any one of the three fhould be loft, or that it should become fubfervient to the views of either of the other two, there would. foon be an end of our conftitution.'

Though we pay great deference to the judgement of the learned Writer, yet we cannot agree with him that the British conftitution has long remained an exception to the truth of the obfervation made by Tacitus. It is only fince the happy revolu tion that we have had a form of government, so settled and recognized as to deferve the name of a conflitution. Our history before that time fufficiently fhews the miferable instability of a mixed government: and even fince the revolution, there have b. times when the three ingredients of virtue, wisdom and power,