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the same cause does uniformly produce the same effect: concerning this there is not, nor can there be any dispute. But we have shown, that in the case of a deviation from the laws of nature, there is no need of calling this first principle at all into question. It is not alleged, that the miraculous fact is produced by the simple operation of the laws of nature; but the very contrary is asserted and believed, in every such case. Let the fact be, that some combustible substance, when cast into a hot fire, is not touched by the flame; or, to use the author's favourite illustration, that a piece of ice remains for an hour in a hot fire without being melted. Now, if it was maintained or believed, that no cause operated here but the fire, according to its common properties, there would be an absurdity in the supposition; a cause on one day produces a different effect from what the same cause does on another day. To-day a hot fire melts ice; to-morrow a fire of the same kind does not melt ice. But we venture to affirm, that this is a supposition which was never made by the most credulous of mortals. We believe that no persons, however rude, ever believed in a fact as miraculous, who did not suppose that some other than the common natural cause was in operation to produce that effect. Indeed, this idea enters into every definition of a miracle: it is an effect produced by some supernatural power. How then does such a belief mili tate with the principle of the uniformity of causation? So far from this, it recognises the axiom, and therefore ascribes the effect not to an ordinary but to an extraordinary cause. Whether, in any given case, the testimony is sufficient, to induce an impartial man to believe in the existence of such a supernatural operation is altogether a different question. The point, and the only point now under discussion is, whether the uniform sequence of effects creates an insuperable bar in the way of our believing in a miracle, or in an event which is a deviation from the common course of nature. And we trust that we have-with some repetition perhaps made it evident, that this principle of common sense, that the same cause operates uniformly, or as long as it is the same produces the same effects, is, in no degree violated by the belief in miracles; because, in every miracle, it is not only supposed, but explicitly taught, that the effect owes its existence, not to the same cause which operates in the usual course of the laws of nature, but to a divine and supernatural agent, by whose interposition the laws of nature are suspended or counteracted. That an agent capable of producing such an effect

exists in the universe, none but an atheist will deny; and that the Creator of the world will never choose so to interpose as to give a striking evidence of his power aud providence, is what no one has any right to assert. What would be our conclusions in regard to this matter, if we were left to reason on the subject, may be doubtful; but when facts are seen by ourselves, or reported to us by a sufficient number of faithful and intelligent witnesses, there remains no rational alternative, but to give due credit to what is thus clearly made known. Multitudes of events which are not miraculous, are, prior to experience, altogether improbable; but when they actually occur before our eyes, or when hundreds of disinterested persons assure us that they have witnessed them, we never make the abstract improbability of their occurrence a reason for disbelieving them. The very same principle applies to miracles. There may be, to our apprehension, a great improbability that the laws of nature will ever be suspended by divine power, but when we ourselves see events by, which these laws are contravened, or, when a sufficient number of witnesses agree in attesting such facts, we cannot but receive as true, what we see with our own eyes, and what is reported by men of truth and intelligence. What kind and degree of testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, or a real deviation from the laws of nature, is a thing not to be ascertained by abstract reasoning; but when the evidence is exhibited, and the circumstances of any particular fact understood, no man needs to be informed what he should believe or disbelieve. Indeed, he has no choice in the case, if he only suffers the evidence to be fairly presented to his mind; for, as this writer has abundantly shown, belief in such a case is involuntary, whatever may be said or reasoned, abstractly, respecting the impossibility of believing in a fact which involves a departure from the course of nature; yet, if such a fact be clearly and repeatedly presented to our sight; or if it be attested by hundreds and thousands of persons who have no conceivable motive to assert what is false in the case, we should be constrained in such case to yield our assent; and the man who should in such circumstances, declare that he disbelieved what he saw with his eyes, or was attested by such a number of veracious witnesses, ought to be suspected of falsifying his own convictions, rather than disbelieving his own senses, or rejecting the testimony of a multitude of sensible and impartial witnesses.

When this author asserts, that our belief in testimony arises

from our having observed, that witnesses of a certain character and in certain circumstances do invariably speak the truth, and may therefore itself be resolved into the law of uniform causation, he does but revive Mr. Hume's principle, that our belief in testimony is the effect of experience; an opinion which has been refuted by Doctor George Campbell, of Aberdeen, in his work on Miracles, with a clearness and force, which leaves nothing to be done or desired in regard to this matter. It is there shown that belief in the testimony of others is an ultimate law of our nature, and is prior to and independent of experience; and that the effect of experience on our belief in testimony is rather to weaken it; which is confirmed by the fact that children are more credulous than adults; and prior to the experience of the want of veracity in many, receive indiscriminately as true every thing which is told them. It might, we think, be demonstrated, that if belief in testimony depended on experience, it would be impossible for man to acquire knowledge; but it is not to our purpose, at present, to discuss this subject. We shall, therefore, bring our review of this volume to a close, by an illustration drawn from Sacred History. It is related in the book of Daniel, iii. 20, that Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, "commanded the most mighty men in his army to bind Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, and to cast them into the burning fiery furnace. Then these men were bound in their coats, their hosen, and their hats, and their other garments, and were cast into the midst of the burning fiery furnace. Therefore, because the king's commandment was urgent, and the furnace exceeding hot, the flame of the fire slew those menand these three men Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, fell down bound, into the midst of the burning fiery furnace." While the king surrounded by an immense multitude of people was looking into the furnace, to his astonishment he observed, that the men were walking about unhurt in the midst of the fire, and when they were called, they came forth; and "upon their bodies the fire had no power, nor was a hair of their head singed; neither were their coats changed, nor had the smell of fire passed on them." Now, it is not our object to express any opinion respecting the credibility of this fact; but merely to use it by way of illustrating the views which we have given, respecting the effect which would be produced by witnessing such a miracle; or by having it attested in a certain way. We will now suppose, that the facts here recorded did actually take place, and that they were witnessed

by the king and all his courtiers and officers, and by the vast multitude assembled from all the provinces of his empire to worship the golden image which he had erected. A solitary man may be deceived even by his own senses; or rather, his nervous system may be so deranged, that he may take his own imaginations for realities; or the visual organ may be diseased, or the medium through which the light is transmitted may be deceptive; but when we find thousands of people concurring with us in the impression made on their senses, then we are sure that we are not mocked by an apparition, or mere illusion. In the case just stated, the fact was of a nature to be judged of by all; and all are supposed to have seen these men cast into the fiery furnace. We ask, whether in such circumstances any man could disbelieve or doubt? No one will assert it. True, some philosopher might have made a wise speech on the occasion, and might have reasoned abstrusely respecting cause and effect, and the invariable uniformity of causation; he might have cautioned the king and all his counsellors, and the people, not to give credit to what they saw, for it could not be true, since it contradicted an acknowledged axiom; and even if the evidence of their senses appeared ever so clear and convincing, it ought to have no other effect than to bring their minds to an exact equipoise, or perfect suspense of all belief; because the evidence on the other side was equally strong and convincing, being no other than a self-evident truth, to disbelieve which would be "a logical absurdity." What effect may we suppose such philosophical reasoning would have had, when arrayed against the plain testimony of all the senses?

But it may be alleged, that neither Mr. Hume nor his anonymous disciple has asserted, that we could not believe in a miracle, if we had such a fact fairly exhibited before our eyes. This is true; they have not extended their principle so far; but we aver, and think we have proved, that it is as applicable to the evidence of the senses as of testimony. To bring the matter, however, to the very point, on which they are desirous that it should bear; let us suppose that Daniel had been absent on the king's business, but arriving just at the close of the wonderful scene, he hears the same testimony from the king and his counsellors. The men themselves being his particular friends, he interrogates them, and hears a full report of their wonderful deliverance from the power of the fire, of the fate of the men who cast them into the furnace. If mere testimony could have

added to his certainty, thousands and tens of thousands, on every side, were loudly proclaiming their admiration of the miraculous deliverance of these young men. Now, supposing Daniel not to have been a witness of the transaction; but to have received the testimony just mentioned, will any candid man assert, that his persuasion of the truth of the facts was not as firm and as rational, as if he had seen them with his own eyes? And it will be to no purpose to allege, that few facts are ever attested by such evidence as this: there are thousands within the knowledge of every man, of the truth of which he is as fully convinced, as of those which are daily passing before his eyes. And as our object is, not to weigh the different kinds of testimony, and to ascertain their force, but to bring to the test the principle which has been so confidently laid down by this ingenious author; for if his principle was correct, it would make no difference how strong the testimony might be; for the evidence of the uniformity of causation, being an intuitive truth, and as certain as any thing can be, would be sufficient, completely to counterbalance, if it did not overpower, the highest testimony which can be imagined.

If the opinions which we have selected for examination had no intimate connexion with our religious belief, or the practical system of morality, we should have left them to find what acceptance they might, with speculative men; but believing, that the general adoption of the philosophical principles of this author would be subversive of divine revelation, and injurious to sound morality, we have judged it expedient to devote a portion of our pages to an examination and refutation of a theory, which is brought forward with much appearance of candor, and defended with much plausibility.

ART. VI.—THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN LIVINGSTON.

THE Conversion of five hundred souls through the instrumentality of a single sermon may seem incredible. Yet this took place in Scotland, two hundred years ago; and what is stranger still, under the preaching of one who, if he were now living, would be thought, by many good men among us, so antiquated a Calvinist, as to be shut out from all hope of usefulness.

In courts of law we often see pleadings, of which the va

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