ness of the relation, he seeks every occasion to jeer, insult, and abuse him, supposing that, as a matter of course, it must all be taken in good part. And while under the hood of brotherly affection he hides the two faces of jealousy and pride, he thinks that under a disguise so amiable he is free to follow his inclinations. Does such a one as this deserve to be called Christian in the modern sense of that word? I trow not. And I am surprized that such a one should wish to have this title adopted, when the name Brother affords to such freedoms a covert so much more ample. Indeed it has been regarded as giving an unbounded license from the time of the first brothers, one of whom took the liberty to put the other to death because he himself was less honored. Similar to this was the freedom which Jacob took with Amasa when he called him brother, and history is full of such in

stances.

I would by no means be understood to propose such examples as these for imitation. As the greater includes the less, I only wish to show by these how great liberties people take under the designation of brethren. And this is only one instance of many. Brethren can call a man from his family and his business, and send him to labor in the gospel; and after he has expended all his means, leave him in penury and distress. Brethren can borrow from one another, and pay not again. Brethren can enter into engagements with each other, and be careless of fulfilling them. But I have neither time nor inclination to detail all that "Brethren" can do, and yet still continue to be brethren as before, although it would be quite impossible for them under the same circumstances to be Christians in the sense which the moderns attach to that word. I conceive, therefore, that the name proposed is the most applicable.

I should be sorry, however, to think that it did not apply also in other cases as expressive of that true and sincere affection which I trust exists among the majority, of which there cannot be a better proof than the forbearance and long-suffering with which such liberties as are above mentioned have been endured. On all these accounts I do not think that any name can be chosen which will so completely cover the whole ground-which will give such allowance to existing familiarity, and afford such free and abundant scope for the exercise of the warmest and purest feelings of fraternal affection.

A RETORT.-A young clergyman having, in the hearing of Dr. Parr, stated that he would believe nothing he could not understand, "Then, young man," said the Doctor, "your creed will be the shortest of any man's I ever knew."

For practical good views and good sense on the "power of godliness," I exchange with no paper of more merit than the "Oberlin Evangelist." I extract from No. XVII., July 31, the following discourse on Romans xiii. 8. I think it is substantially orthodox, and I should like to see it fully tested by being reduced to practice, that we might prove by experiment whether the doctrine be sound—that is, healthful. A. C.

BEING IN DEBT.

TEXT.-Rom. xiii. 8. "Owe no man any thing."

IN discussing this subject we design to show-
I. THE MEANING OF THE TEXT.

II. THAT TO BE IN DEBT IS SIN.

III. THE DUTY OF THOSE WHO ARE IN DEBT. 1st. I am to show the meaning of the text.

The meaning of this text, like most others, is to be learned from a careful examination of the verses in its connexion. The Apostle begins the chapter by enforcing the duty of obedience to civil magistrates. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive unto themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou, then, not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must be subject not only for wrath, but for conscience sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also, for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing."

They are the servants of God, employed for your benefit. You are therefore to pay them tribute-i. e. give them the support which their circumstances require.

In the light of this and various other passages of scripture, I have often wondered how it was possible that any person could call in question the duty of obeying civil magistrates; or how they could call in question the right and duty of magistrates to inflict civil penalties, and even capital punishment, where the nature of the case demands it.— Certainly this passage recognizes their right and their duty "to execute wrath" upon transgressors, as the servants and executioners of God's vengeance.

"Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. Owe no man any thing, but to love one another; for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, viz.-Thou shalt love thy neighbor as

thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law."

From this connexion it is evident that the Apostle designed to teach, that whenever we come to owe a man, we should immediately pay him; and not suffer any debt or obligation to rest upon us undischarged.

"Owe no man any thing, but to love one another." Here the Apostle recognizes the truth that love is of perpetual obligation, and that this obligation can never be so cancelled or discharged as to be no longer binding. He recognizes no other obligation except love, with its natural fruits, as being, in its own nature, of perpetual obligation.

In respect to this obligation, all that we can do is to fulfil it every moment; without the possibility of so fulfilling it as to set aside the continued obligation to love.

But we are to owe no man any thing else but love.

We are to "ren. der to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; honor to whom honor."

I understand the text, then, simply to mean, Let no obligation but that of love, with its natural fruits, which is, from its very nature, a perpetual obligation, rest upon you undischarged.

I am aware that some modern critics maintain that this passage should have been rendered indicatively. But such men as Doddridge, and Henry, Barnes, and Professor Stuart, are of opinion that its imperative rendering is correct. And all are agreed that the doctrine of this text, as it stands, is plainly a doctrine of the Bible.

Here the question arises, What is it to owe a man in the sense of this text? I answer

1st. If you employ a laborer, and do not stipulate the time and terms of payment, it is taken for granted that he is to be paid when his work is done, and to have the money. If you hire him for a day, and nothing is said to the contrary, he cannot demand his pay till his day's work is done. Till then you owe him nothing. The same is true if you hire him for a week, or a month, or a year. When the time which he is to labor is stipulated, and nothing is said about the time and terms of payment, you owe him nothing-i. e. nothing is due him till his time' has expired. Then you owe him, and then you are bound to pay him, and pay him the money. But if the time was not specified which he was to labor, he may break off at any time, and demand pay for what he has done. Or if the time of payment was expressed or understood, whenever it arrives you then owe him, and are bound to pay him agreeably to the understanding.

2d. The same is true if you hire a horse, or any other piece of property. If you hire it for a specified time, and nothing is said of the conditions of payment, the understanding is that you are to pay when the time for which the property was hired has expired. It then becomes a debt. Then you are to pay, and pay the money. If there were any other understanding, fixing the time and terms of payment, you do not owe the man until the specified conditions are complied with.

to

3d. The same is true if you purchase any piece of property. If nothing is stipulated to the contrary, the understanding is that you are pay the cash at the time you receive the property. At that time, and neither before nor after, you are expected to pay the purchase money.

We do not properly owe an individual until we are under an obligation to pay him. Whenever he has a right to demand the pay, we have no right to withhold it.

There may be such a thing as contracting a prospective debt, giving your obligation to become due at a certain time. But then you do not properly owe, because you are under no obligation to pay till it becomes due. But whenever it becomes due you are bound immediately to pay.

II. I am to show that it is a sin to be in debt.

1st. Because it is a direct violation of the command of God. This text is just as binding as any command of the decalogue; and a violation of it is a setting aside the command of Jehovah, as much as to commit adultery or murder. It is not to be regarded merely as a piece of advice given by the Apostle; but as a direct, and positive, and authoritative command of God.

2d. It is unjust to be in debt. If your creditor has a right to demand payment, you certainly have no right to withhold it. If it is due, it is a contradiction to say that it is not unjust in you not to pay. It is a contradiction both in terms and in fact, to say that you owe a man, and at the same time are guilty of no injustice in refusing or neglecting to pay him. It is as much injustice as stealing, and involves the same principle. The sin of stealing consists in the appropriating to ourselves that which properly belongs to another. Therefore, whenever you withhold from any man his due, you are guilty of as absolute injustice as if you stole his property.

3d. It is sin, because it is falsehood. I have already shown that you do not properly owe a man till it becomes due. It becomes due when and because there is a promise on your part expressed or implied, that you will pay it at that time. Now you cannot violate this promise without being guilty of falsehood.

4th. If what has just been said is true, it follows that men should meet their contracts as they would avoid the grossest sin. They are bound to avoid being in debt-to meet and fulfil their engagements, as much as they are bound to to avoid blasphemy, idolatry, murder, or any other sin. And a man who does not pay his debts is no more to be accounted an honest man, than he who is guilty of any other heinous crime.

5th. If a professor of religion is in debt, he is a moral delinquent, and should be accounted and treated as a subject of church discipline. OBJECTION.-It may be said, I cannot avoid being in debt. I answer to this

That if you cannot pay, you could have avoided contracting the debt, and was bound to do so.

Do you reply, I really needed the thing which I purchased.

I ask, Were your necessities so great that you would have been justified, in your estimation, in lying or stealing to supply them? If not, why have you resorted to fraud? The same authority that prohi. bits lying or stealing, prohibits your owing a man. Why, then, do you violate this commandment of God, any more than the other? Is it not because a corrupt public sentiment has rendered the violation of this commandment less disgraceful than to violate these other commands of God? Why did you not resort to begging instead of running

in debt? Better far to beg than to run in debt. Begging is not prohibited by any command of God, but being in debt is prohibited. True, it is disgraceful to beg; but a God-dishonoring public sentiment has rendered it far less so to be in debt. And does not this account

for your shameless violation of this command of God?

Do you say again, I have been disappointed; I expected to have had the money; I made the contract in good faith, and expected to meet it at the time: but others owe me and do not pay me, therefore I am unable to pay my debts. To this I reply

You should have contracted with that expressed condition. You should have made known your circumstances, and the ground of your expectation in regard to being able to pay at the time appointed. In that case, if your creditor was willing to run the risk of your being disappointed, the fault is not yours, as you have practised no injustice or deception. But if your contract was without condition, you have taken upon yourself the risk of disappointment, and are not guiltless. But here it may be said again, Nearly the whole church are in debt; and if subject to discipline, who shall cast the first stone? I reply

(1.) If it be true that the church is so extensively in debt, no wonder that the curse of God is upon her.

(2.) Again, it may be true that a church may be so generally involv ed in any given sin as to make that sin a difficult subject of discipline, because each man knows that he himself is guilty, and must in his turn submit to the same discipline. But when that is true of any church, it is a shameless abomination for the members of that church to attempt to hide themselves under the admitted fact that nearly all the church are involved in the guilt of it.

Now rest assured, that when any sin becomes so prevalent that it cannot be made, and is not made in that church, a subject of discipline, God himself will sooner or later take up the rod, and find means to discipline, and that effectually, such a church.

III. I am to show the duty of those who are in debt.

1. They are bound to make any sacrifice of property or time, and indeed any sacrifice that it is possible for them to make, to pay their debts.

Here it may be asked again, Does the law of love permit my creditor to demand a sacrifice of me? If he loves me as he does himself, why should he require, or even allow me to make a sacrifice of property to pay what I owe him? I reply

(1.) If any one is to make a sacrifice or suffer loss, it is the debtor, and not the creditor. It will almost certainly be some damage to him to be disappointed in not receiving his due. It may so disarrange his affairs, and break in upon his calculations, as to occasion him great damage. Of this he is to be the judge.

(2.) Your sacrifice may be necessary not only to prevent his loss, but to enable him to meet his contracts, and thus prevent his sin. His confidence in your veracity may have led him to contract prospective debts, and by not paying him, you not only sin yourself, but cause him to sin.

(3.) The refusal of one to make a sacrifice to pay his debts, may involve many others in both loss aud gain. A owes B, B owes C, and