construed by reference to the Customs Acts in force at the time when the private Act was passed, inasmuch as they create the machinery and regulate the trade and commerce of the country in respect of export and import, and are therefore those from which the Legislature would naturally adopt the phraseology when imposing dock rates in respect of trade in goods to and from a port. do not bind strangers, 1. "It is said in the books," said Wigram, V.C., in Dawson Private Acts v. Paver (1844), 5 Hare 415, at p. 434, "that public Acts bind all the Queen's subjects. But of private Acts of Parliament it is said that they do not bind strangers, unless by express words or necessary implication the intention of the Legislature to affect the rights of strangers is apparent in the Act.""If in a local and personal Act," said Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877), 2 App. Cas. 766, "we found words that seemed to express an intention to enact something quite unconnected with the purpose of the promoters, and which the committee would not, if it did its duty, have allowed to be introduced into such an Act, I think the judges would be justified in putting almost any construction on the words that would prevent its having that effect." In Lucy v. Levington (1671), 1 Vent. 176, it was said that "every man is so far a party to a private Act as not to gainsay it, but Private Act binds all par it or not. 'Tis the great not so as to give up his interest. A private Act binds all parties named in it, whether ties named in or not they concurred in passing it. This was much discussed in the case of Earl of Shrewsbury v. Scott (1859), 6 C. B. N. S. 1. The facts of that case, so far as relates to this point, were that in 1718 a private Act, 6 Geo. 1, c. 29, was obtained to settle the Shrewsbury estates, and by s. 8 of that Act it was enacted that the estates should always follow the title and should be inalienable, but the section contained a proviso that, if the first or any other son of the then earl or any the heirs male of any such son should abjure the Catholic religion and become a Protestant, his disability to alienate should cease. In 1856 the then earl, being tenant in tail, alienated the estates, and one of the grounds relied upon by the alienee was that the private Act of 1718 was not binding upon any tenant in tail, the tenant in tail in 1718 not having been a party to the Act. to this argument, Cockburn, C.J., in his judgment said: "We have been reminded that a private Act of Parliament has been said upon high authority to be little more, if anything, than a private conveyance between those who are parties to it, and to a certain extent I agree in that proposition. Recitals in a private Act could never bind persons who were not parties to the Act. Provisions, however general in their terms, could not be held to affect the rights of parties who were not before Parliament and whose rights were never intended to be affected. Thus, if a tenant for life should obtain power to convey an estate in fee, no Court would hold that it As could have been the intention of the Legislature to bind a remainderman who was not a party to the Act or named in it. But if an Act in positive and express terms professes to affect and does affect the rights of parties named in it, it is quite impossible, as it seems to me, to maintain that a court of law is not bound to give effect to the provisions of such an Act, although such parties may not have concurred in passing it." or not they tion into Par A private Act binds all parties named in it, whether and whether they have had notice of its introduction into Parliament had notice of or not. This was pointed out in Edinburgh Rail. Co. v. its introducWauchope (1842), 8 Cl. & F. 710, in consequence of a liament. note appended to his interlocutor by the Lord Ordinary to the effect "that he is by no means satisfied that due parliamentary notice was given to the pursuer, previous to the introduction of the private Act for regulating the Edinburgh Railway Company . . . . and that he should strongly be inclined to hold that rights previously established could not be taken away by a private Act, of which due notice was not given to the party meant to be injured." As to this Lord Cottenham said, p. 720: "It appears that in the Court below an impression existed that an Act of Parliament might or might not be binding on parties according as there might or not be proof that the individual to be affected by it had had notice of the Act while in progress through the two Houses [that the standing orders for the protection of private rights not having been complied with, the authority of the Act of Parliament itself would be affected (a)]. There is no foundation for such an idea, but such an impression appears to have existed in Scotland, and I express my clear opinion upon it, that no such erroneous idea may exist in future." And Lord Campbell added, p. 723: “The Lord Ordinary seems to have been of opinion that if this Act professed to take away Mr. Wauchope's rights, it would have had that effect only if due notice had been given him of the introduction of the Bill into the House (a) Loc. cit. p. 720, per Lord Brougham. Private Act persons dealing with a company created by it. of Commons, but that, notice not having been given to him, it could not have such effect, but became wholly inoperative. I cannot but express my surprise that such a notion should ever have prevailed. There is no foundation whatever for it. All that a Court of justice. can do is to look to the Parliamentary Roll. If from that it should appear that a Bill had passed both Houses and received the royal assent, no Court of justice can inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament, or into what was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament during its progress in its various stages through both Houses." 2. "If need was," said Erle, C.J., in Cahill v. London and also binds all N. W. Rail. Co. (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 154, at p. 172, "I should be prepared to hold that, where a company is created by Act of Parliament, having privileges and rights granted to them and liabilities and duties imposed upon them in respect of their incorporation, parties dealing with them must be taken to be cognizant of the provisions of the Act of Parliament granting those privileges and rights and imposing those duties and liabilities, although it be a private Act." This dictum of Erle, C.J., which was acquiesced in by Willes, J., and Byles, J., is now well established as a statement of the law. Repeal of special by general Act. 3. In the absence of any indication of intention on the part of the Legislature, local Acts are not repealed by public general Acts.(b) "There is another rule which has been laid down, which is a good rule if it is properly applied, namely, that where there has been a particular rule established by custom or by statute, where there is some particular law standing, and a subsequent enactment has general words which would repeal the particular law or particular custom if they were taken in all their generality, yet nevertheless the first particular law is not to be repealed unless there is a sufficient indication of intention to repeal (b) Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861) 30 L. J. Ch. 777. pp. 357, 360. Vide ante, |