erature, p. 480, it may be added, that in 1828 a manuscript of A. D. 1453 was published under the title; Pamientniki Janczara, etc. i. e. Journal of a Polish Nobleman,' who was induced by circumstances to enter the Turkish army during the siege and conquest of Constantinople. This work, besides containing some important historical information, is of still greater interest in respect to the Polish language, of which there exist so few ancient monuments; and which has altered so much, that it was found requisite to add a version in modern Polish, in order to render the work intelligible. At the close of the History of Polish literature, it ought to have been mentioned, that in consequence of the late insurrection; the universities of Wilna and Warsaw have been suppressed, and in their stead a new one established at Kief; that, in order to deprive the Polish youth of all means for an independent national education, the great public library of Warsaw, as formerly that of Zaluski, has been removed to St. Petersburg; and, finally, that all the institutions for public education at the expense of the crown, have been removed to Russia. THE BIBLICAL REPOSITORY. No. XVI. OCTOBER, 1834. ART. I. ON THE CATECHETICAL SCHOOL, OR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AT ALEXANDRIA IN EGYPT. By R. Emerson, Prof. of Ecclesiastical History, in the Theo. Sem. Andover. [PART SECOND CONTINUED.] On the Doctrines taught in the Alexandrian School. VI. ANTHROPOLOGY. This term has been more frequently applied in respec to man's physical than his moral nature. The latter use, however, appears well established in Europe. The term seems as much needed in the science of morals as of physiology, if we would avoid the tedious, and often inaccurate or ambiguous, circumlocutions that have been employed in its place. I am therefore led to introduce it here, notwithstanding a deep dislike to uncommon terms. If such a technical word shall be found at all to aid us in the moral SCIENCE OF MAN, its office will be good. On this subject the sentiments of some of these Alexandrian fathers have already been, in part, anticipated, while treating on other topics, in a previous part of this essay. Athenagoras. According to this teacher, men become "virtuous or vicious, by their own free choice." Their nature, in itself, is good; and sin arises from free will, corrupted by evil spirits. "Although the same power of reason is common to all, yet they are severally borne away, in diverse directions, as each Vol. IV. No. 16. 79 one is partly inclined by his own disposition, and partly influenced by those evil genii, the prince of matter and his coadjutors.And this happens to the soul, when it receives into itself the animal spirit, and is mingled with it in a kind of union, not looking upward to celestial things and their Maker, but wholly downward to the terrestrial, and to the earth, as though it were entirely flesh and blood, and no longer a pure spirit." Such declarations are, of course, made on the old assumption of the three fold nature of man, as consisting of spirit, soul, and body. This father, however, by no means supposed sin to proceed from the body only; nor, on the other hand, that the mind alone exercises virtue; but that both proceed from both, or from the whole man. 2 Clement. This father is more explicit on the threefold nature of man, as held to by the Platonists; and according to which, be interpreted the language of Scripture in many places. In addition to the body, there is according to this writer the rational soul, or mind, λoyıxǹ yuzý, vous; and the fleshly, bodily, and irrational soul or spirit, σωματική ψυχή, πνεῦμα ἄλογον, σαρxxóv. The bodily soul, or life, is made by God; the mind, κικόν. the image of the λoyos, is breathed into man by God. "Yet, the soul is acknowledged to be the better part of man, and the body the poorer. But neither is the soul morally good by nature, nor the body morally bad by nature. Neither, indeed, is that forthwith evil, which is not good; for there are certain. things which hold a middle place, both such as are naturally good and such as are naturally bad, καὶ προηγμένα καὶ ἀποπρο ηγμένα.” 993 On freedom of will, he thus writes, immediately after speaking of a godly life: "Now, any thing is in our power, when we are equally the masters of that and of its opposite; as, to philosophize, or not; and to believe, or to disbelieve. And what is in our power, is found possible by our being equally masters of each of the opposite things." And in another place, he contends, that "neither praises, nor censures, nor honours, nor punishments are just, if the soul has not the power of embracing or shunning; but the evil is involuntary. Hence," as he goes on to argue," whoever hinders any one from doing a thing, is responsible for such hindrance; but he who does not thus in Athen. Apol. c. 22, 23. 3 Strom. IV. 26. 2 See Guer. II. p. 104. terpose, may justly sit in judgment on the choice of the soul; so that God is not the responsible cause of our sin. But since free choice and voluntary seeking, are the commencement of sin, and a false notion sometimes prevails, which we through ignorance neglect to abandon, punishments are therefore justly inflicted. For to be sick of a fever is involuntary, but when one brings a fever on himself, by his intemperance, we blame him. Thus the evil may be involuntary, as no one chooses evil, simply as evil; but drawn away by the pleasure that surrounds it, supposing it good, he decides to embrace it. These things being so, it is in our power to be free from ignorance and from an evil though pleasing choice, and in spite of them, to refuse our assent to these seductive illusions." 991 Passages like the above, are frequent in the ancient fathers; and they amply prove, that these fathers held to a genuine free will, in distinction from fate and from all constraint that would interfere with such freedom. But, when detached portions of these passages are brought, as they 'sometimes are, to prove that the fathers, who lived before Augustine, held to such a freedom of the will as to exclude the purposes, if not also the agency of God, in respect to man's conduct, there is a sad mistake. Take, for instance, the passage last quoted; and we find, that instead of human freedom's being asserted in opposition to God's foreknowledge and purposes respecting sin, it is here asserted and explained for the very purpose of vindicating the divine character against the charge, then frequently brought, and ever since brought, against God, for not preventing sin, when he had it in his power to prevent it. Clement had just spoken of one kind of sin, "the use which heathen philosophy had made of divine truth, and which God foresaw and did not prevent, and that because he had a good purpose for which he designed to overrule the sin, though the perpetrator had a different and bad purpose.' At this stage of his argument, he says, "I know there are multitudes continually rising up against us and saying, that he who does not prevent, is himself a responsible cause." After dwelling on this position, and showing its absurdity in some respects, he thus continues : "But if we must scrutinize the matter closely, in opposition to these men, let them know, that, in what we speak of as taking place in theft, non-prevention, to un xoAUTIxóv, is not at all a cause; but prevention, (or that which is 1 Strom. I. 17. preventive,) to xwhvrixóv, is liable to the responsibility of causation. For he who shields one, is the cause of his not being wounded, preventing him from being wounded. And the demon was a cause to Socrates, not in not preventing him, but in persuading, although he did not actually persuade him." Then follows the quotation given above, and which this view of its connexion may help us the better to understand, in other points beside the one for which I have more especially introduced it. While Clement holds to the perfect knowledge and power of God in governing free agents, in the fullest sense which any would claim, he, at the same time, takes very good care, that his statements may not seem inconsistent with the freedom of moral agents. In connexion with these doctrines, Clement held to the exercise of faith in the work of acceptable obedience. He supposed faith, which he would denominate "a kind of natural art," to cooperate with pious instruction, and goes on to illustrate his views in the following manner. "Thus a prolific soil aids the germination of seeds; for the best instruction is useless, without the reception of the learner; and so is prophesying, without the obedience of the hearers. For dry straw, prepared to receive the power of fire, is easily kindled; and the celebrated stone [load-stone] attracts iron by its kindred nature; as also the tear of amber attracts straw, and amber draws up heaps of chaff. But the things thus attracted, obey those bodies, being drawn by an inexplicable breath (or spirit), vεuua, not as the sole causes, but as the joint-causes. Now, the form of evil being two-fold, the one, that of deception and concealment, and the other, that of open and overpowering assault, the divine Word cries aloud, calling all collectively. And while he knew, most perfectly, those who would not obey, yet, because it is in our power to obey or not, that none might have ignorance to plead, he made a just call, and demands what is in the power of each one; for some have the power both to will and to do, having grown to this by careful practice, and are purified; but others though they are not yet able, have the power to will. The work of willing, belongs to the soul; but that of doing, is not without the body." And a little before the passage just quoted, he says: "No longer, then, is faith a duty discharged by free choice, provided it is the prerogative of nature, [i. e. by physical necessity.] Nor does he receive a just 1 Strom. II. 6. |