when, at the fame time, reafons of ftate may require that these motives should not be publickly known. And if this be fo, are not we, fhortfighted creatures, under a much stronger obligation to obey the commands of God, which may have the jufteft reafons in themfelves, though we cannot difcern them?

If all that the Doctor means is, That except a precept have, at leaft, a general tendency to promote obedience from a regard to the divine authority, we are not to regard it, then all his flow of language is trifling and useless; for, by this principle, which is certainly a true one, we may be obliged to perform rites not only trifling in themfelves, and that have no natural tendency to promote focial happiness, but that are burdenfome to individuals, and prejudicial to focieties. Were not many of the Mosaical rites, and was not the command for extirpating the Canaanites, of this nature? And would not a command, to pull down our houses, and quit our poffeffions, tho' it would have no tendency to promote focial happinefs, yet oblige us to obedience on this hypothefis?

There is another paffage in the Doctor's book, p. 50. which it is equally hard for me to explain.

The religion of nature, fays he, is our most "valuable property, and the only fure means of "our lafting happiness." How far this reflects on that way of falvation, which the gofpel has revealed, or how it is confiftent with the words of the apostle Paul, that, by the deeds of the "law no flesh living fhall be juftified," I leave the reader at liberty to judge.

But whatever be our author's fentiments as to one of the articles of Deifm, contained in the

paffage

paffage cited from Tindal, or whatever his reafons for not confidering it, yet, without doubt, the part of the argument he here treats is of vast importance; for the fhewing that fome nations and perfons have, notwithstanding their natural reafon, been ignorant of the great truths of natural religion, is a proof, though not the principal one, of the great benefit the world has received from Christianity; and, at the same time, an excellent answer to all objections against our religion, drawn from the imperfection of its promulgation; fince, if God may fuffer natural religion to be in fact not univerfally known, without any impeachment on his juftice or goodness, What fhould oblige him to communicate the knowledge of revealed religion to all mankind?

I am glad therefore to fee that any of our Scots clergy employ their pens in fo ufeful a manner, in oppofition to the enemies of religion. But a good caufe may be fupported by a bad argument; and a good argument may be trained too much. That this laft is the cafe here, will, I doubt not, be made appear in the fequel.

SECTION II.

THE argument the Doctor proposes to make good is, That mankind, left to themselves, without fupernatural instruction, are not of themfelves able, in the exercife of their reafon, i. e.. their power of comparing things together and perceiving their relations, to difcover the being and perfections of God, and the immortality of human fouls, in the knowledge and belief of which all religion is founded. This impoffibility

of

of difcovering thefe articles, he afterwards informs us, he does not mean to be abfolute, i. e. fuch as, that the fuppofing mankind to discover them, fhould involve a contradiction, but only of fo ftrong a nature, that there is no reason to think mankind would ever, in fact, have difcovered these truths without revelation or tradition.

In oppofition to this, I fhall here attempt to prove, That God has afforded the Heathen world fuch advantages for the discovering and receiving these truths, that their ignorance or difbelief of them could be owing to nothing but their own negligence or perverfeness.

Let me obferve, then, that though, in fome cafes, a law may oblige a perfon, who has no actual knowledge of it, yet it is the opinion of all good moralifts, and feems evident from the first principles of the law of nature, that no law whatsoever can be binding on a person who is under an abfolute inability of knowing it. Thus Grotius in his excellent treatise, De jure belli ac pacis, 1. 2. c. 20. § 43. "Nam ignorantia legis,

ficut inevitabilis fi fit, tollit peccatum: Ita "etiam, cum aliqua negligentia conjuncta, de"lictum minuit." And, I. 2. c. 23. § 13. he carries the matter ftill further, and afferts, that no perfon can act unjustly, without knowing he does fo. "Injufte enim nemo agit, nifi qui & "fcit fe injufte agere." Puffendorff, in his fmall piece, De off. Hom. & Civ. 1. 1. c. 2. § 6. fays, "Ceterum, ut lex vim fuam, in animis eorum

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quibus fertur, exferere poffit, requiritur cog"nitio tum legislatoris, tum ipfius legis." Profeffor Carmichael, in his notes upon that paffage, rightly denies this; but, at the fame time, intimates there, and plainly afferts in his first Sup

plement,

plement, '13. "That, in order to a law's impofing an obligation on us, there is requifite, "not indeed the actual knowledge of it, but its

being fufficiently promulgated." His words in the last cited paffage are, Sed ut actio quævis. “humana, vel ejus omiffio, conftituatur, actio "moralis, atque adeo homini imputabilis ut bona "vel mala, per fupradicta accedere debet lex, "actionem iftam præcipiens vel vetans; Dei ni❝ mirum voluntas idoneis declarata indiciis; iis, "fc. circa quæ, ut & circa exiftentiam conditi

onum, quas forte lex ea fupponit, fi quis ra<tione fua recte & debita cum attentione uteretur, ex iis Dei voluntatem, fibique juxta eam hac in parte incumbens officium, poffit cog"nofcere." I need not enlarge on this fubject, as, I believe, none will alledge, that God gave a law to men, and punifhed them for the breach of it, while yet, at the fame time, he left them under a moral incapacity of knowing it. If the the law of nature is obligatory upon Heathens,, and they inexcufable for the breach of it, which no Chriftian, fo far as I know, ever yet denied, Does it not follow, that it was not a thing fo impoffible, as the Doctor reprefents, for them to have discovered the precepts of it? I could wish the Doctor would explain his fentiments as to thefe points; if a law can bind without fufficient promulgation; and if that promulgation can be reckoned fufficient, which leaves perfons under a moral incapacity of knowing a law?

It may perhaps be alledged, as an anfwer to the argument here advanced, that though the ignorance the Heathens lie under of the law of nature is invincible, yet it cannot excufe them from the punishment due to disobedience, as being the confequence

confequence of original fin, which, in its caufe and principle, is voluntary. I fhall content myfelf with Placette's reply to this, (in his Treatife on Confcience, 1. 2. c. 7.) till once I fee its fallacy difplayed, viz. "That it may well bear difpute, "whether an action is therefore criminal, be"cause it is voluntary in its principle. Let us "fuppofe, fays he, a man to have been punished "with the lofs of his hands for a crime volun-1 tarily committed, Would it not be thought "very unjuft to command him to work in this his miferable condition and yet his prefent incapacity was, as to its principles, voluntary ;, but being involuntary in itself, it will no doubt

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be admitted for his excufe." Another fuppofition may, perhaps, make the application of Placette's obfervation to the cafe in hand more eafy. In fome unknown region, the way of propagating new laws was, to give a written copy: of them to every perfon in the kingdom, with a view to oblige every one to learn to read; and, the better to obtain this defign, fufficient care! was taken, that no perfon fhould be inftructed, what laws were made in any other manner. this kingdom Bævius commits a trefpafs, for which. his eyes are put out; I afk, whether he could be juftly punished for tranfgreffing a pofitive law made in the kingdom, after that punishment was inflicted, when it was impoffible for him to learn the knowledge of that law in the common way, and no extraordinary method was provided to inform him of it?

In!

If this answer will not fatisfy, Placette gives another in the fame place, which, perhaps, may have more weight with fome. He obferves, that there are fome laws which preferibe fuch duties.

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