as are holy, juft and unchangeable in themfelves, which yet it is impoffible to have had the leaft fufpicion of, without exprefs Revelation. He inftances in that law which commands us to worship the Son and the Holy Spirit, which certainly, however reasonable in itself, could not have been known without Revelation. Having obferved this, he infers, that Heathens, invincibly ignorant of the law of nature, could not be condemned, purely because that ignorance was the confequence of a thing voluntary in its principle, viz. original fin, because if all ignorance of this fort were criminal, the ignorance of the worship due to the Son of God, and of other precepts of that nature, must be fo likewife; for even of that and fuch like precepts we could never have been ignorant, had man continued in his primitive perfection. Since then it was poffible for the Heathens to difcover the law of nature, it follows, that it must have been poffible for them to know the being and perfections of God alfo; for, without fuch knowledge, it was impoffible for them, if not to perceive a moral difference in actions, at leaft to learn their duties to God, which, however, make a confiderable part of the law of nature. If it be faid, That it was indeed poffible for the Heathens to discover the law of nature, but that this poffibility did not take its rife from the natural ftrength of their reason, but from the opportunities they had to learn thefe truths by tradition, conversation with the Jews, and above all, by the care the civil magiftrate used in establishing the belief of future rewards and punishments, and, the divine government of the world, without which he faw fociety could not fubfift; if this, I fay, fhould be alledged, and that of confequence all all my reafoning here is of no force against the Doctor's hypothefis, I fhall grant this a fufficient reply to my argument, if the Doctor will own, that one way or other the Heathens had a power of discovering the law of nature; for this will be fufficient to fhew their inexcufableness in acting contrary to its dictates; which, methinks, it will be impoffible for one of the Doctor's principles to do, without efpousing that hypothefis. But then the Doctor will be obliged, upon this hypothefis, to fhew particularly in what way it was poffible for the Heathens, notwithstanding the weakness of their reafon, to attain fuch knowledge of the law of nature. ciously writ, wherein the feveral opportunities the Heathens had of informing themselves of natural religion and morality, fhould be traced out, and their different degrees of divine and moral knowledge, according to thefe different opportunities, fhewn; fuch a treatife, I fay, would caft a new light on the origin and progrefs of religion amongst the Heathens, and would demonftrate, that the care of the civil magiftrate, the notions of certain philofophers, the traditions preferved in the heathen world, the opportunities they enjoyed of converfing with those whom God had favoured with a revelation of his will, efpecially when added to the force of natural confcience, and that ftrength of reason, which many of the Heathens feemed endued with, were more than fufficient to fhew the inexcufableness of the vices of the heathen world. But this, I'm afraid, we have no reason to expect from the Doctor, fince he attempts to confute Dr. Hyde and others, (vide p. 37. 1.) who have afferted, the Heathens had right notions of mo A treatise on this fubject, judi rality, rality, tho', at the fame time, they owned thefe notions were not the product of rational enquiries. I fhall only add, that, had I thought it the Doctor's opinion, that the Heathens, though not by their rational powers, yet by converfing with other nations, were able to acquaint themfelves with natural religion, I should have heartily wished his fentiment made good. And tho' certain difficulties would have ftill remained, one of which is propofed in the next Section, yet, as my grand objection would have been removed, I fhould hardly have attempted the answering his performance... TH SECTION III. HE laft Section only proved, that, one way or other, the Heathens must have been able to difcover natural religion. In this it fhall be fhewn, that, by bare unaffifted reafon, they might have made the discovery. If then it was impoffible for bare unaffifted reafon to discover the being and perfections of God, or the immortality of human fouls, there must be fome caufe, fome foundation, fome occafion of that impoffibility; and there is no caufe, fo far as I can fee, that can be alledged to have had the remoteft influence that way, fave either that these truths are fo unobvious and abftrufe, that it is highly improbable our weak understandings fhould be able to difcover them; or elfe, that the wickedness of mankind is fo great, as neceflarily to exclude that light, which these truths would otherwife dart in upon them. The firft of thefe cannot be the caufe; becaufe, by bare unaffifted rea fon, fon, men have attained the knowledge of feveral geometrical and algebraical truths, which required a series of reasoning to come at them, much longer and more fubtil than that by which we demonftrate the divine exiftence. And if reafon can discover what is more difficult, why may it not discover what is more easy alfo ? Afk an unprejudiced enquirer, Whether he thinks he could have eafilier discovered the Pythagorick theorem, or this plain propofition, that as every fingle effect must have a caufe, fo a whole feries of things that once did not exift no less needs one? Would he, do you think, demur about an anfwer? Would he not fee, that the latter of these truths lies much more level to his capacity, than the former ? Neither can it be faid, that the wickedness of our minds fhuts out that light which these truths would otherwife dart in upon us, and thus that the corruption of our natures is to blame in our not discovering them. This, I find, is an anfwer in the mouths of feveral of those who favour the Doctor's principles. Whether he himfelf will adopt it or not, I cannot judge. When I first heard it propofed, I thought it very plaufible, but a little reflection convinced me of my mistake. Let it then be obferved, that the only reason why wicked men are averfe to believe the exiftence of a God, the immortality of the foul, and other important articles of natural religion, is, that they fee plainly, if thefe doctrines are true, they muft either forfake their beloved vices, or expose themselves to certain ruin; and as they have no mind to do either the one or other of thefe, they attempt to perfuade themfelves that religion religion is nothing but a cheat. So that it is only the practical confequences of the truths I have just now mentioned, that make wicked men refufe to believe them, when proposed to their confideration. Now, the cafe is quite otherwife with a perfon fuppofed entirely ignorant of the divine existence. By a chain of reasoning that he occafionally falls into, perhaps about motion, or fome other natural phænomenon, he discovers this important truth. The wickedness of his mind cannot hinder his making the difcovery, because, being entirely ignorant of the confequences of that doctrine, which are the only things he would ftartle at, thefe confequences can have no influence upon him to prevent his making the discovery. I grant indeed, that after the truth is difcovered, they may prevail with him to reject it, and perfuade him there is fome flaw in the arguments which led him to the knowledge of it; or, if he does not go fo far as entirely to reject it, may at least influence him to detain it in unrighteoufnefs. Which laft was certainly the cafe of many of the Heathens. But how a confequence can have any influence upon the mind before it is known, is, I own, paft my comprehenfion; and yet this must be the cafe, if we fuppofe that the practical consequences of the divine existence prevent men from finding out that truth; unless, perhaps, it be faid, that the confequences of a doctrine may be known, before the doctrine of which they are confequences. But this is as abfurd in logicks, as it would be in natural philofophy, to affert, that an effect may poffibly exift before the being that caufes it. Since then, neither the natural abftrufeness of the truths of religion, |