direction of princes and kings, and we can see no way out of this slavery as long as the Churchman accepts his salary from princes and kings. I believe with the apostle, that it is right we shook} obey God rather than man, preach the gospel of Christ in all the plenitude of the power of freedom and trust to the inspiration of the divine spirit to move the faithful or those blessed by the gospel to make corresponding provision for our wants and needs.

Let the Church cast herself wholly on the appreciative love of God who careth for her and even if she should not hob nob as much with princes and kings, what of it? God will inspire His children to care for His own. I hold this doctrine of utter separation of Church and State, in all lands, in perfect harmony with the theory I have long ago advocated, that the Church should provide parochial schools for her own children and as many others as may care for the kind of education her schools have to offer, and that if the State provides common school education for children, much more, if the State makes education compulsory—which I do not believe in—the said State is bound in common law and justice and honor to devote as much of the common school fund to the Catholic parochial or other schools pro rata, head for head, as it costs said State to educate an equal number of scholars in the public schools, including, of course, as much as it costs the State for scholars and the teachers who teach her scholars: simply the equivalent per head for scholar and teacher. That I think we are bound to claim, as Catholics; have long thought so and taught so before Bishop McFall was bishop at all and more clearly than he knows how to teach. I believe also that we should be satisfied with this and with nothing short of this, and that we should not discuss or ask anything more; always leaving the scholar or the parent free to choose the school and simply making a business deal with the State, precisely as we would were we buying a piece of government land. The State has no business to teach religion in the public schools or elsewhere, and if it chooses to teach agnosticism, that is not our business as long as the State leaves religious teachers free to teach religion, and does not interfere with them—and we never want to mix up any claim of the Catholics with the claims of Lutherans, Episcopalians or others. They are all agnostics in one sense, though many of them are excellent people. They are not Catholics and we have no interest in getting their religious notions taught in or out of the public schools.

The government of the United States is wedded to the public schools. The New York Sun recently quoted a Brooklyn Catholic priest as saying that if any Congregational conglomeration should ever attempt to break up the public school system he would get down his old musket and fight for its continuance. All priests will not agree to my proposition either, and I only remention it here as showing that in my treatment of the subject of Church and State, I have not failed to consider the proposition of education as related thereto.

Cut the chain that binds Church and State. Let the Church mind the spiritual affairs of the race and mind them well. Let the State look after the criminals of the world and hang all she can convict according to her laws, but keep her hands off the altars of the Lord God Almighty. Let each be just in all its dealings with the other and with all men, and the millennium will dawn and Christ will come again and be recognized as King of Kings and Lord of Lords: the only ruler of princes and democracies— the Eternal Son of the one Eternal God. There will always be trouble in this world, but let the Church adhere closely to her own sphere and so stop the confusions and wrecks of hundreds of years. William Henry Thorne.

THE GOAL OF SCIENCE.

The intellectual revolution of the 17th century, which gave to modern science its Magna Charta, had as its battle-cry the substitution of the inductive for the deductive method.

Thus Galileo, Gassendi and Bacon, and their associates and followers, walking in the footsteps of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Gilbert, and other great scientists of the preceding generation, and animated by the spirit of Cardinal Cusa, Telesius and the Cosentinian Academy, succeeded in breaking the power of those fixed presuppositions in natural science which had for nearly two millenniums dominated the schools, vitiating alike the physical philosophy of the professed disciples of Aristotle (like the Catholic and Lutheran scholastics), the speculations of the Ramists and other neosophists, and the science of the medico-occult school, then represented by Trithemius, Agrippa and Paracelsus.

There never have been lacking those who, in the name of ancient or mediaeval philosophy, or of modern speculative thought (especially of the idealistic Cartesian and Post-Kantian types), have impugned the so-called Baconian method, denying its value, or questioning its validity, as an organon, or an adequate organon, of truth.

But as time has gone on, the two contending schools have approximated to each other, and have prepared the way from both sides, for a better understanding of the relative values, and proper utilities, of the inductive and deductive methods.

The fangs and nails of the deductionists are drawn by the simple consideration that their greatest master, Aristotle, was in a certain sense the historic father of the inductive method, reiving upon it almost exclusively. The scientific errors resulting from the deductive method can thus be traced back to the imperfect induction upon which the basic principles of its deductions rested.

On the other hand, the hue and cry of the naturalists against the deductive method has lost much of its force since modern natural science, as a result of the discovery of one great unifying law after another, has itself become, in its higher phases, so largely deductive.

The characteristic vice of deduction is the imperfect verification of its premises and conclusions; the characteristic vice of induction is the hasty drawing of conclusions from insufficient data.

Deduction, the drawing of particular facts from general principles and laws, is a speculative air-castle, unless it rests upon sound induction.

Induction, the deriving of general principles and laws from particular instances, is a mere embryo of science, unless those principles and laws are made use of by deduction.

It cannot be successfully maintained that deduction differs fundamentally from induction because it has as its basic self-evident truths directly intuited; for those truths which are really and indisputably self-evident, like the principle of contradiction (a thing cannot be and not be in the same sense at the same time), are the (conscious or unconscious) basis of all reasoning—of the inductive or a posteriori variety, quite as much as of the deductive or a priori.

The function of induction is the attaining of real knowledge; that of deduction is the application of it. All the constructive work of the human intellect must ascend from details to unifying truths, and from the less general truths to the more general, by way of induction; but when unifying truths are attained to they 'must be utilized, applied and tested by deductive processes.

The empirical element of science is ancillary to the metempiric. The collection and classification of facts is valuable chiefly as a means to the discovery of principles and laws, and only so far as the latter are attained to is real science made possible. It is, likewise, only through these that we are enabled to apply the products of scientific labor to the exigencies of art,—that is, to make them instruments for the accomplishment of practical ends.

The milestones of scientific progress are the great unifying discoveries like the Copernican system, the Keplerian laws and the nebular hypothesis, in astronomy; the laws of gravitation, the atomic theory of the constitution of matter, the undulatory theory of light, heat and sound, and the law of the correlation of forces, in physics; Mendeleff's periodic law, in chemistry; and the evolutionary hypothesis and Quetelet's law of variation, in biology.

But every forward step in the explanation of phenomena is an approximation towards that universal synthesis which alone can perfectly satisfy the mind, and which every scientific philosopher is consciously or unconsciously striving for.

The very possibility of science depends upon the universality and uniformity of law; but if the whole universe is governed by fixed laws, a perfect understanding of its original elements" and fundamental constitution would permit of an a priori deduction of all the consequences of those fundamental laws—that is to say, of all phenomena, in all their details and relationships. This will still hold good even if real causality and objectivity are not acknowledged; all that is necessary for the validity of the statement is the supposition that phenomena are co-ordinated, in a definable manner, in such sequences as if they were causally related to each other.

Many instances of such a priori deductions, with substantial results by which they have been strikingly verified, are furnished by the recent history of science. From the laws of anatomy the paleozoologist has been able to reconstruct a whole animal from a single bone, and his reconstruction has been vindicated by the finding of the missing parts. From the laws of astronomy the existence of unobserved planets and stars has been ascertained, and a search for them instigated which has resulted in their discovery. From the law of evolution the discovery of specific intermediate forms has been predicted before it was made. From the periodic law in chemistry unknown elements have been named, and their properties described with a considerable degree of accuracy, long before they were actually met with.

Whatever theory of the origin of the visible universe is held to, provided only that the universality and inviolability of its laws be recognized, the theoretical possibility of the ultimate discovery of a valid basis for the universal a priori deduction of phenomena must be recognized.

The possibility of such deduction, verified by the event, is the test, practically used, if not explicitly recognized in so many terms, of the truth of every large and bold induction. The parallelism between the periodic series of the elements and the members of the hydrocarbon series, pointed out by Sir Norman Lockyer. might lead to the permanent adoption and retention of his hypothesis that the so-called elements are only progressive and systematic combinations of two or three proto-elements; provided that it could be demonstrated that from the ascertained or hypothetical properties of those proto-elements all the properties of the elements at present recognized are deducible. In this and every other case, the truth inductively attained must be verified in its deductive application by observation and experiment. If the deduction, rightly made, does not lead to the facts empirically ascertained, the inductions or hypotheses which furnished the ground for the deduction must be repeated and corrected.

If all sensible phenomena are, according to the theory so ably elucidated coram publico by Dolbear, the results of the mechanical motions of atoms mediated by stresses in the circumjacent ether, then a perfect knowledge of the properties of the atoms and the ether, and of the laws of motion, would enable all the infinite details of the system of nature to be accurately deduced from them.

If, in accordance with the brilliant Helmholtz-Thompsonian hypothesis, the whole material universe is derived from the interstellar ether, the ultimate atoms being simply permanent vortexrings in that medium, then all atomic and molecular phenomena must be perfectly explicable by the properties which atoms so