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majefty's European dominions, during the winter, in the islands of Guernsey and Jersey. And he moved," that this meflage be taken into confideration on the fame day with the firft:" which was alfo agreed to.

Thefe two meffages were brought down to the house of commons by Mr. Pitt, and a day fixed of courfe for their confideration. Ou Tuefday, January 28th, 1800, the order of the day, for taking into confideration his majesty's meflage, relative to the overtures from France, being read, lord Grenville made a variety of obfervations on the importance of the queftion under their lordships' confideration." It was not poffible," he obferved, "to have made the ftady of the prefent condition of the world, as he had done, a principal object of care, without perceiving that a hoftile mind ftill pervaded the whole conduct of the enemy. It was obvious that the fame promenefs to aggreffion, the fame difregard to juftice, ftill actualed the conduct of the men who rule in France. Under fuch circumftances there could be no fecurity to Europe in peace. Peace, with a nation whofe war was made against all order and religion, all morality, would be rather a cellation of refillance to wrong, than a fuf'penfion of arms in the nature of or dinary warfare. It was in war that ourfelves, and the great civil community of Europe, were to find fecurity. To negociate with established governments was formerly not merely eafy, but, under most circumstances, fafe: but, to negociate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining one of the benefits of even a temporary peace.

The motion he was about to fubmit," he faid, "would give to his majefty a pledge of the unchanged and unalterable affection of that houfe, while the continued fupport of parliament would give energy and effect to fuch measures as might be adopted to conduct the great conteft, in which his majesty was engaged, to a fafe and honourable conclufion. The motion would be founded on two principles: The firft was, that France ftill retained thofe fentiments and views which characterized the dawn, and continued to march with the progrefs, of her revolution: the second, that no fafe, honourable, and permanent peace could be made with France in her prefent fituation. The French minifter, Talleyrand, had afferted in his note, 'That, from the commencement of the revolution, the republic folemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her difinclination to conquefts, and her refpect for the independence of all governments.' Yet he had been at war with all the nations of Europe, except two, (Sweden and Denmark,) and next to being at war with America. And if war had not been formally declared by France against thofe two northern powers, their fubjects, and the commerce that had been carried on by them, had faffered, in aggravated inftances, from the cruizers of the republic, whole depredations found fanction from her laws, a feries of injuries, of infults, and injuftice: tolerable in war, becaufe common to it; but moft intolerable in peace, becaufe directly repugnant to the principles of any juft peace, or recognized equainty. With regard to the fecond principle, that no fafe, permanent, and honourable peace could be made with

France,

France, in her prefent fituation; every power with whom the republic had treated, whether for armiftice or peace, could furnish melancholy inftances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, injuftice, and cruelty, of her rulers."This pofition lord Grenville illuf trated by a review of their conduct to the Swifs, the grand duke of Tufcany, the king of Sardinia, the pope, the king of Naples, Spain, Holland, Venice, Genoa, and other fmaller Italian ftates: and, laftly, on this fubject of the ambition and injustice of the rulers of France, he mentioned the French invafion of Egypt.

His lordfhip then proceeded to an investigation of the degree of credit to which the prefent character of Buonaparte could be confidered as juftly entitled: "We fhall not be deftitute," faid his lordfhip, "of fufficient grounds for judging what degree of reliance is to be placed on his prefent promifes and and profeffions, from confidering his paft actions, if we trace general Buonaparte from the period when, in the third year of the republic, he impofed upon the French people, by the mouth of the cannon, that very conftitution which he has now deffroyed by the point of the bayonet." He enumerated many inftances in which Buonaparte had violated the treaties which he himfelf had made. Even the affiliated republics," he faid," were equally the victims of his destructive perfidy. The conftitution of the Cifalpine republic, which was the work of Buonaparte, was overthrown by the hands of his general, Berthier. But this is not all, my lords; let us now pafs from the continent of Europe, and try if the fubfequent

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conduct of the firft conful can fur nifh any grounds more fatisfactory, to give us a favourable opinion of his fincerity. When he arrived at Malta, he held the fame fpecious promifes of good faith, by which he had fo frequently fucceeded in betraying ftates and governments; but he treated this ifland as a con quered country, and defpoiled it of every thing that was valuable. I now come to his proceedings in Egypt. It would be very unneceffary in me to detain your lordships by details with which you are already too well acquainted; but I cannot avoid calling your attention to that part of his conduct which is diplomatic. I fhall, of course, pafs over his deceitful profeffions, his rapacities, and the cruel maflacres which were perpetrated by his troops, and by his immediate orders. He folemnly declared to the Porte, that he had no intention to take poffeffion of Egypt; he declared to his own generals, that his object was to take poffeflion of that country; and he affured the people of Egypt, that he had taken poffeffion of it with the confent of the Porte. What can we think of his blafphemies, his hypocrifies, his repeated acts of perfidy, his multiplied violations of all religions and moral ties? Did he not declare, in the moft unqualified terms, that the French were true Muffulmen? Is it in that country that he has laid the foundation for us to reft with fecurity upon the good faith and fincerity which he now profeffes? Having, therefore, fuch bafes for us to form a correct opinion of his policy, can it be thought inconfiftent to believe that he has no intention of fulfilling his engagements? Can we fo foon forget his delicate apprehen

fons, with respect to the lives of his remaining foldiers, after his flight, and his directions to general Kleber to propofe preliminaries of peace to the Porte; to enter into a treaty of peace, and to defer the execution of the articles? You may, (fays he, in his official letter,) fign a treaty to evacuate Egypt; but do not execute the articles, as you may obferve, with great plaufibility, that it muft be fent home, in order to be fubmitted to the inspection and ratification of the directory.'-Thus, my lords, we are in complete poffeffion of his fyftem of politics, a fyftem as fraudulent, perfidious, and deftructive, as ever was practifed, to the difgrace and mifery of human nature. Thus are we provided with unqueftionable pledges of his future integrity. In the correfpondence which appears upon your table, his motives are open and undisguised; and there is not the leaft neceffity for having recourfe to conjecture to afcertain that he has a double object in his communication. The one is to amule Great Britain, and the other to induce her to give offence to her allies. I hope I fhall not be accufed of entertaining any unfounded jealousy of fuch a man, who, having done nothing to redeem his good faith, fo often violated, but the overturning the government of his country by the terror of military defpotifm, now comes forward with prepofals of pacification. When we are fully fatisfied with the hare which he has had in previous aggreffions and depredations, can we be too flow in giving him credit for profeffions of fincerity?"

Lord Grenville, had heard it reported, as a matter of opinion, that it was the peculiar intereft of the first conful to make peace. He was

convinced that it might be the intereft of general Buonaparte to confolidate his power; but it could not be forgotten, that whenever any acts of atrocity were to be committed by the French, they had been ufually effected by a fufpenfion of arms. The propofed negociation would relieve France from the prefent preffure of numerous and alarming difficulties, and could not relieve England from any. The ports of France, now blockaded byour fleets and cruifers, would be thrown open, for the purpofe of introducing naval ftores: fleets too would be fent to bring back the troops which were now deprived of all intercourse with the republic.-From a negociation Buonaparte would derive confiderable advantages to the commerce and manufactures of the republic, whilft this country, with refpect to any benefit, would be left merely in its prefent fituation. He would alfo enjoy the fatisfaction and the triumph of lowering the tone and the character of a people who had hitherto proved the great and the effectual barrier against the encroachments of republican policy, and infufe into our allies, and the other powers, a diftrust of our refolution and integrity.-His lordthip obfer ved, that, in turbulent republics, it had ever been an axiom, to preferve tranquillity by conftant action; this axiom had uniformly been the ftandard by which the fyftem of the politics of France had been regulated. Buonaparte had made ftrong profeffions of a defire of peace, and he had faid that the prefent overture was the fecond proof of his with to effectuate a general pacification. But lord Grenville was at a loss to find any proof of his having entertained fuch a defire. Did he allude

to the treaty of CampoFormio? When official intelligence of that tranfaction was fent by him to the directory, Mongé, fpeaking in his name, and delivering his act, his acknowledged inftrument and confidential agent, declared, that the French republic and England could not exift together. So that, if he even were allowed to have an evident intereft in promoting peace, would not their lordships be perfectly juftified in paufing and reflecting on what degree of faith fhould be given to the intereft and power of fuch an individual? They had been lately told, by the prefent government of France, that there exifted no fecurity, no guarantee for the prefervation of peace in the republic from 1793, to November, 1799. So much did the actors in the laft revolution believe the statement of Boulay de la Meurthe,* that they founded their claims to the approbation and affent of the people of France, on the declaration that their government was founded on a juft view of thofe vices and defects, which were to stop the revolutions of the republican order. What other courfe then would wifdom bid Great Britain adopt, but await the event of things, to await the refult of future experience, and not to enter on negociation at a time when no advantage could be fairly expected from it? If they abandoned the manly and energe'ic conduct which had hitherto diftinguifhed their proceedings, they would defcend from a fiation which they had filled with fo much honour to themfelves, and advantage to their country. On these grounds he moved, "That a humble addrefs be pre

fented to his majesty, thanking him for his gracious melage, and ex preffing the concurrence of that houte, in the fentiments which it contained.

The duke of Bedford rofe to give the addrefs his decided negative. The noble fecretary had attempted to defend the conduct of his majefty's minifters in refufing to accede to overtures for peace, from the impoffibility of any government that France had, fince the revolution, affording a fufficient guarantee for the fuccefs of any negociations that might be entered into. But all the objections now advanced to preclude negociation might have been urged when the negociations were opened at Lifle. This argument the duke placed in various points of view, and urged it with much ability.-It was clear that the wild fcheme of reftoring the French monarchy was the fine qua non, if not of peace, at leaft of negociation. What hopes there were of such an event ever taking place by the exertions of this country, he would leave their lordflips to determine : but of this fact he was certain, that in proportion as this country oppreffed France, in the fame proportion did its government become violent. When a country was kept in a state of warfare, it was always able to adopt and carry on more violent mealures than in times of peace.—If the restoration of the monarchy were not the object of minifters, what was it? Were they contending for a more favourable opportunity of entering on negociation? How, if that was the cafe, was a more favourable opportunity to be attained? Was it by railing at

See his fpeech in the committee of elders, in chap. III. page 32.

Buonaparte?

Buonaparte? He could not, in terms fufficiently ftrong, cenfure that littlenefs of mind which prompted his majesty's minifters to attack the character of Buonaparte, with a view to ruin him in the efteem of the French nation; as if, by doing fo, they would be able to negociate with more effect, or gain a fairer profpect of peace. His grace admmitted that there might be occafions when it might be necefiary to decline the negociation: but no fuch occafion exifled at the prefent moment. He referred to former declarations of the noble fecretary, wherein he had ftated that his majesty would never fuffer the enemies of the country to poflefs that advantage which they neceffarily muft derive from his refufal to difcufs their overtures for peace. In fact, every thing he had advanced, as reafons for entering into the former nego: ciation, was at variance with what he had faid to-night. It had, in the note to Barthelemy, been afferted, that England would always be willing to treat, when its enemies fhewed a difpofition to that effect. If this difpofition was not a mockery, why did it not treat now? France had fhewn a pacific difpofition, and the only way to afcertain whether fhe was fincere, and whether Buonaparte was willing to do thefe acts, by which he could guarantee the fecurity of this country, was to enter into a negociation. To determine to perfift in the war after the conceffions on the part of the French government, was neither open, manly, nor characteristic of the British pation. He next referred to the report of Boulay de la Meurthe, relative to the government and fituation of France and its rulers for the last seven years, and admitted, VOL. XLII.

that what was faid by Boulay de la Meurthe was the fame as proceeding from Buonaparte: but his report was no more to be used by the people of this country as an argument against the lately abolished conftitution of France, than a report of any violent jacobin upon the ancient government of Louis XVI. He referred alfo to the reports of Mongé, upon prefenting the treaty of Campo Formio to the directory; and maintained, that his declaration in that report was far from complete evidence; that it was the general opinion of the French nation that England and France could not exist together. With regard to the character of Buonaparte, he did not fee any ufe that could be drawn from going into it. He, like all statesmen, no doubt, wifhed to make a peace, advantageous to himfelf, and the nation over which he prefided. Like all other statesmen, his motives in wifhing to make a peace were not influenced by humanity; it was to be fuppofed that he would not make any peace, but fuch an one as would fatisfy the French nation. He believed him fincere, becaule France wifhed for peace, and peace alone could confolidate his power. The events of war

were uncertain; and, whenever a leader failed, and was deferted by fortune, the people deferted him likewife. If Buonaparte should experience reverfes, he would, no doubt, be deftroyed, and fome other idol fubftituted. It was for their lordships to confider, whether they would continue the war for the purpose of establishing fome other perfon in the room of Buonaparte. As to the abufe which minifters had thrown upon the character of that man, he felt no concern upon [G]

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