of good faith in their former negociations with France? During the million of lord Malmbury to Paris, the jacobin government, then exilting, was no obftacle to negociation in the eflimation of them who fent him. He was not commiffioned to infift on a renunciation, on their part, of exifting principles, or on acknowledgments tending to their crimination. Yet, without thefe eflentials, thefe preliminaries, his lordship expected good faith on their part to any treaty that might have been concluded: otherwife their attempt at negociation could not have been fincere. In the fecond nego ciation at Lifle, one let of negociators were recalled, and a more jacobinical fet fent in their places. Still no objection was started to farther negociation. His majefty declared, in the face of all Europe, that he was ready to conclude a treaty with them, if their overtures had been at all reconcileable to the honour and interefts of his fubjects and allies. To discountenance negociation, many arguments had been drawn from the character of the first conful, who was reprefented both as an infractor of treaties, and an unprincipled blaf phemer. Every topic that could revile, and every art that could blicken, had been reforted to for the purpotes of political flander: and he was very fory to fee that the intercepted correfpondence, ftrengthened with notes, had made its appearance, with a view to prejudice the country against the firft conful, and thereby to fet every hope of negociation at a distance. It had been faid by Mr. Dundas that fince Buonaparte had been known to mankind, in no one in

ftance had he ever observed a treaty or kept an armistice. It was well known, Mr. Whitbread obferved, that the preliminaries of Leoben were not broken, or the peace with Auftria infringed by Buonaparte; for, before thefe events took place, he had left Europe. The condu& of Buonaparte, at Venice, Mr. Whitbread did not attempt to de fend any more than that of Auftria, As to the charge of mifconduct to wards the Cifalpine republic, thọ ground of acculation was the entire act of the executive directory.With regard to what had been fiid of treachery on the part of Buonaparte in ordering general Kleber to negociate with the Porte, but to delay the completion of the treaty till fuch time as he fhould hear from France, the completion of the treaty was the evacuation of Egypt which Kleber might have been very well told to delay, without any reafonable charge of treachery on the fide of Buonaparte. It was faid that he who could have invaded Egypt ought never to be treated with. To feize and colonize that country, Mr. Whitbread obferved, had always been a favourite fcheme of the old government of France, The only difference between the two was, that the new government of France had executed what the old had only planned. Treachery, however, of that kind, was not confined to France. For Prulia could feize Silefia, and three of the firit powers of Europe, while Eng land was a tame fpectator, could divide and appropriate to themfelves the unfortuuate kingdom of Poland. Yet Auftria and Ruffia, the chief agents in this tranfaction, were ftill our good and true allies; and with

this

this contradiction ftaring them in the face, minifters refufed to treat with any one whom they deemed treacherous and unjuft. Buonaparte," faid Mr. Whitbread, is full as good as they are. If he has broken treaties, fo have they: if he has killed his ten thoufands, Suwarrow alfo has killed his ten thoufands." Mr. Whitbread having enumerated many inftances of the treachery, perfidy, and injuftice of the kings of France, atked whether it could really be fuppofed that it was really the with of the people of England to lavish their blood and treafure, for the purpofe of reftoring to the throne of France the family of Bourbon? Could it be fuppofed that it was the duty of an Englifhman to reftore a banithed king to his throne, or a pope to his

tiara ?

Mr. Whitbread, then infifted, that we were now contending for one or the other of thefe two things: to reinstate a Bourbon on the throne, or to exterminate the reft of thofe perfons in France who held jacobinical principles. If the former was the cafe, we were fighting, he thought, for an unattainable object, and the conteft must be endlefs: if for the latter, we were fighting for an opinion; and both were equally abfurd. Mr. Whitbread recommended it to the house, to confider the relative fituation of this country with her allies. The allies did not appear to enter at all into each others views. There feemed to be no regular points of union between them: no community of interefts. This pofition Mr. Whitbread illuftrated. He was fully perfuaded that the prefent French government were fincerely

1

defirous of peace, and that they would negociate if we would let them.

Mr. Canning was very much difpleafed at Mr. Whitbread's attempt to juftify the enormities of the French, by faying, that we our felves and our allies had been guilty of others little lefs flagrant. As a proof of this pofition, he had flated, that our conduct was unwarrantable both towards the republic of Genoa and the grand duke of Tufcany. Had the Genoefe performed the duties of neutral nations, their rights would never have been infringed; but they had fent to the French clothes, provifions, military ftores, and fupplies of every kind. As to the grand duke of Tulcany, lord Hervey had taken meafures for the prefervation of British property at Leghorn, and to prevent, as far as was in his power, the government of Tufcany from affifting the French; but he had done nothing which the general practice of nations did not entitle him to do. The court of Florence had complained; but fmall ftates werealways irritable, and fenfible that they were liable to infult, apt to think themselves infulted. Great ftrefs had been laid on the declaration of his majefty after breaking off the negociation of Lifle; but because he was willing to negociate, 'on certain terms then, did it follow that he ought to be so now? Must a declaration be eternally binding, notwithstanding the greatest change of circumftances? The new conftitution, as it was called, of France, was more defpotic, and more deteftable than any that had gone before it; and unless it could be upheld by fome fupernatural power, like that of the Weird Sifters, in

Macbeth

Macbeth, it must be foon overthrown. By entering into any negociation now, we should only throw a damp on the minds of our countrymen, introduce difcord into the councils of our allies, and confolidate a power, which would afterwards be employed for our deftruction.

Mr. Erfkine, having read over his majefty's meffage, faid, it was plain that they were called upon not to advife his majesty on the fitnefs of an armistice, or of an immediate negociation, but to ratify or condemn the policy and fitnefs of the fpecific anfwers which minifters, on their own authority, had previously fent to France. "His majefty entertained the fulleft confidence that thofe anfwers will appear to this houfe to have been conformable to that line of conduct which was required from his majefty on this occafion, by his regard to all the most important interefts of his dominions." No materials had been laid before the house to enable it to judge of the fitnefs of an immediate armiftice, or even of an unqualified acceptance of an immediate hegociation, because the one and the other might depend on our engagements with other countries, and the actual pofition of the war. But, to judge of the unfitnefs of the anfwer, the answer itfel furnished a fafficient foundation; becaufe, under no circumstances, and at no time, could fuch an answer be either wife or decent, from the minifters of any nation, to any poffible profeffion of conciliation and peace. It was rafh, infolent, and provoking, without neceffity. It was dangerous, as a precedent, to the univerfal interefts of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if

peace were a curfe, and the demand of negociation an infult; and held faft to war, as if war were an infeparable adjunct to the profperity of nations. The question was, not whether the original or prefent effects of the French revolution were beneficial or dangerous, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with their exiftence.The American revolution when it firft broke out, was inveighed against by its opponents in the fame extravagant and ufelefs declamations. But it had been asked very properly by an eloquent member of that houfe, Mr. Burke, "What, in God's name, are you to do with it?" Had minifters yet been able, by eight years invective, to mitigate the evils of the French revolution? On the contrary, after, in a manner creating the worst of them, they had prevented them from fubfiding, and provoked moft of the exceffes which now furnished the pretexts of perpetual and unavailing war. What Mr. Ertkine wifhed principally to imprefs on the houfe, as a caution not to let flip the prefent aufpicious period, was, that when minifters, at various periods of the war, had been preffed not to repel peace by general objections to the capacity of France to maintain the relations of peace and amity, they had, by perfifting in that irrational fyftem, produced the very evils which the war was entered on to avert. Our enemies uniformly increafed in ftrength, keeping pace, on their fide, with the hoftile mind on our's, and which every day became more fevere and unrelenting. In this manner we conducted ourlelves till Holland was overrun; the Netherlands annexed

10

to the republic; our principal allies detached from the confederacy; fome of them connected in alliance with the enemy; and, what was worfe than all, fchemes of extenfion and aggrandifement avowed and acted upon, which not only had not exifted before the war, but which the war had pofitively courted. If Buonaparte found that his interest was ferved by an arrangement with England, the fame intereft would lead him to continue it. If fincerity in a foreign government was a thing which could ever be correctly estimated or acted upon, as a bafis for liftening to, or rejecting peace, there was more reafon now than formerly for confidering that Buonaparte was fincere. Surrounded with perils; at the head of an untried government; menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was at the head; compelled to prefs heavily on the refources of an exhaufted people, whofe power of renovating riches and profperity were fufpended by war, it was his intereft undoubtedly to be at peace with England. But though it was thus his intereft to negociate a peace, it might be no lefs his intereft to accept it. Buonaparte, looking to himself, and to his own power, would make national facrifices to preferve tranquillity, and England would thus acquire an additional influence in the fcale of Europe; becaule, no man in his fenfes, in the circumftances of Buonaparte, at that moment, having once reconciled, by wife policy, fo mighty a power as Great Britain, would run the risk of overfetting his own authority, by throwing her back again into the war, without the most unlooked-for provocations.

3,

If Buonaparte's government, faid Mr. Erskine, became eftablished and confirmed in its authority, it was admitted, that, after fome undefined period of probation, we were, in the end, to consent to peace; but was it certain that France would then be as willing, as at prefent, to be at peace with us? Fatal experience has taught us the contrary; for, after every interval, when peace had been repelled by us, we had feen France in a more formidable aspect, and with a more alienated fpirit. If, on the other hand, the government of Buonaparte gave way to an internal democratic revolution, additional difficulties prefented themfelves: minifters, upon their own principles, muft put that new government upon a fimilar ftate of probation, and fo in infinitum any other establishment, which might fucceed in a revolutionary fyftem. But what internal revolution might be expected to deftroy Buonaparte's government from within, if ever it fhould be deftroyed? From whence could its deftruction poffibly come, but from the revulfion of democracy, overawed by armies, and chained down by the complicated forms of the prefent complex government? In the event of fuch a revolution, all our panics would return upon us: the terror of French principles would again become predominant, and war would be perfifted in, though ruinous and hopeless, to prevent the more dangerous contagion of opinions to be engendered by a peace. But was it Buonaparte we objected to: Was it the man and not the government we mistrusted? Were we to make war then till his place was taken by fome new con

ful,