vises of lands or any interest in them, as well to individual trustees, as to bodies politic, for charitable purposes; but no case comes within that act unless the gift be for a charitable use (o).

The statute 9 Geo. II. c. 36, s. 1, after reciting that gifts. or alienations of lands in mortmain were prohibited by Magna Charta, and other wholesome laws, as prejudicial to the common utility, and that such public mischief had greatly increased by many large and improvident dispositions made by languishing or dying persons to charitable uses, to take place after their deaths, to the disherison of their lawful heirs (p), enacts, that after the 24th day of June, 1736, no lands or other hereditaments whatsoever, nor any sums of money, or any other personal estate whatsoever, to be laid out or disposed of in the purchase of any lands or hereditaments should be given, or any ways conveyed to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate or otherwise, for any estate or interest whatsoever, or any ways charged or incumbered by any person or persons whatsoever in trust, or for the benefit of any charitable uses whatsoever; unless such gift or conveyance of any such lands or hereditaments, sums

(0) 2 Marsh. 71. See ante, pp. 58-82, where the different charitable uses are enumerated.

(p) This act is said to have originated in consequence of several heirs at law having suffered considerably by injudicious, ostentatious dispositions, by the owners of lands to charitable and other uses; and the case of one Mr. Mitchell, who was going to leave a very large estate in land to one of the Universities, is mentioned. The bill passed the House of Commons by a large majority, but was much opposed in the House of Lords; and petitions against it from the two Universities and other charitable institutions were presented.

It was argued against the bill,

that though there were many hospitals in the kingdom, that they were far from being sufficient for the purposes designed; and that there was such a deficiency in every branch of public charity, as to render it both uncharitable and unwise to make a regulation which would very much prevent the increase of all public charitable funds. One argument in favour of the bill was the danger to be apprehended from too great a liberty of granting lands in mortmain, lest any particular society should become so powerful as to be able to prescribe laws to the government and overturn the constitution. See Parl. Hist. 1736, Vol. IX. 1110 n.

of money, or personal estate (other than stocks in the public funds), be made by deed executed in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, twelve calendar months before the death of such donor or grantor, (including the days of the execution and death,) and be inrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calendar months next after the execution thereof; and unless such stocks be transferred six calendar months before the death of such donor or grantor (including the days of the transfer and death), and unless the same be made to take effect in possession for the charitable use intended immediately from the making thereof, and be without any power of revocation, reservation, trust, condition, limitation, or agreement whatsoever, for the benefit of the donor or grantor, or of any person or persons claiming under him.

The second section of the act "provides that nothing thereinbefore mentioned relating to the sealing and delivering of any deed twelve calendar months before the death of the grantor, or to the transfer of any stock six calendar months before the death of the grantor or person making such transfer, shall extend, or be construed to extend, to any purchase of any estate or interest in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any transfer of any stock to be made, really and bonâ fide for a full and valuable consideration, actually paid at or before the making such conveyance or transfer, without fraud or collusion."

This section of the act has been explained by a recent act to have been intended only to prevent such purchases from being avoided by reason of the death of the grantor, within 12 calendar months after the sealing and delivery of the deed relating thereto, and not wholly to exempt such purchases from the operation of the act (q).

The 3rd section of the 9th Geo. II. c. 36, provides " that all gifts, grants, conveyances, appointments, transfers, and settlements whatsoever of any lands or other hereditaments,

(q) 9 Geo. IV. c. 85, which confirms all purchases for valuable consideration made prior to that act, for charitable purposes, to take effect

in possession which had not been avoided by suits at law or in equity, or then the subject of any such suit.

or of any estate or interest therein, or of any charge or incumbrance affecting any lands or hereditaments, or of any stock, money, or other personal estate, or securities for money to be laid out or disposed of in the purchase of any lands or hereditaments, or of any estate or interest therein, or of any charge or incumbrance affecting the same, to or in trust for any charitable uses whatsoever which shall at any time after the said 24th day of June, 1736, be made in any other manner or form than by that act directed and appointed, shall be absolutely and to all intents and purposes null and void.” This statute, which has been said by several judges to be founded on good sense and sound policy (r), was made to prevent the mischief arising from improvident alienations or dispositions to charitable uses by dying or languishing persons. The object of the act was wholly political, grew out of local circumstances, and was intended to have merely a local operation. For a long series of years devises to charitable uses in this country had not only been wholly unrestrained, but had received a more liberal construction than other gifts; and had become so excessive in their amount that the Legislature deemed it expedient, as there was so much land already in mortmain, to lessen the facility of placing more in that situation (s). The very liberal construction adopted by the courts in favour of charitable gifts, was perhaps another reason which occasioned the statute. The particular views of the Legislature were, first, (as expressed in the title of the act) to restrain the disposition of lands whereby the same became unalienable, it being considered of great importance in a trading country to allow the free alienation of lands; and, second, to prevent testators in their last moments from being imposed on by mistaken notions of religion, in giving away their estates from their heirs or families (t).

(r) 2 Eden, 210; 3 Barn. & Ald. Id. 321; Attorney General v. Lord 151; 2 Jac. & Walk. 275.

(s) 2 Mer. 161; 3 Atk. 147. (t) Attorney General v. Day, 1 Ves. sen. 223; Durour v. Motteux,

Weymouth, Ambl. 20, 2 Eden, 209; Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Ves. 541; Price v. Hathaway, 6 Madd. 312; Sorresby v. Hollins, 9 Mod. by Leach, 222;

Lord Hardwicke said "that the statute was not at all aimed against perpetual charities merely as such, or to prevent the establishment or creation of them, but was designed against the cases of perpetual charities in lands; and as the title imports, to restrain the disposition of lands whereby the same become unalienable. The whole recital and enacting part of the statute take notice only of the unalienable disposal of land whereby heirs are disinherited, and therefore the alienation or conveyance of lands to such purposes is prohibited; and though there is a clause to prohibit money being laid out in lands to such purposes as would make them unalienable, yet there is no restriction whatsoever upon any one from leaving a sum of money by will or any other personal estate to charitable uses, provided it be to be continued as personalty; and the executors or trustees are not obliged or under a necessity of laying it out in land, by virtue of any direction of the testator for that purpose” (u).

In construing acts of Parliament, the first thing to which attention must be paid is, to find out the general object of the Legislature; one object of this act was certainly to prevent land being put out of circulation; but that was not the only object, as it may be done by deed; and personal property may be given to be invested in land for a charity, under the regulations contained in the act. The principal

Attorney General v. Harley, 5 Madd. 321; where it was contended that the true intention of the act was according to its title. Lord Hardwicke said that the intent was taken up much too short, for the title is no part of the act, as had been often determined; nor ought it to be so considered in the construction of the act, for originally there were no titles to the acts, but only a petition and the king's answer, and the judges thereupon drew up the act into forms and then added the title, which does not pass the same form as the rest of the act, only the speaker,

after the act has passed, mentions the title and puts the question upon it; and therefore the meaning of the act is not to be inferred from the title, but the act itself must be considered; Attorney General v. Lord Weymouth, Ambl. 223. It has been repeatedly held, that the title of a statute is not part of the act. Barrington on Stat. 337, 338; 1 Bl. R. 95; 6 Mod. 62; but see 4 T. R. 491; 3 T. R. 137; Dwarris on Stat. 219, 653–655.

(u) Sorresby v. Hollins, 9 Mod. by Leach, 222; S. C. 2 Burn's Eccl. L. 555, 8th ed.; 1 Coll. Jur. 439.

object of the Legislature seems to have been to prevent improvident dispositions upon the approach of death; when a person having his end in contemplation, would probably take an erroneous view with regard to a pious and charitable disposition; and to protect such persons, and those who would represent them, from the inclination to make such a disposition at a time, when, with regard to their families and natural claims upon them, an act, the most improvident and improper, might appear to them to be the wisest (v).

Courts of equity construing this statute as highly remedial, have given it the most extensive construction, and to promote its object, have departed from the rules they apply in all other cases, and will not marshal assets in favour of a charity for no other reason, but that a law so highly remedial and providing against so great an evil, as such dispositions in prospect of death, should have the most extensive operation (w).

This statute does not apply to Ireland, where there is no similar act (x), nor to Scotland, nor to the island of Grenada in the West Indies; the object of the act being wholly political, and so framed as to be quite inapplicable to that or any other colony. For, as observed by Sir W. Grant, in its causes, its objects, its provisions, its qualifications, and its exceptions, the act is a law wholly English, calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated with local establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in the effect, of being transferred as it stands into the code of any other country (y).

(w) Attorney General v. Tyndall, 2 Eden, 207; S. C. Ambl. 614; Foster v. Blagden, Ambl. 704; Hillyard v. Taylor, Id. 713. See post. sect. vii.

(v) See Mackintosh v. Townsend, England to her colonies, see Cal16 Ves. 335. vin's case, 7 Rep. 34, 1 Bl. Com. 108, 2 P. Wms. 75; Campbell v. Hall, Cowp. 204; Galdy, 2 Salk. Brown, Id. 666; 4 Burr. 2500; Br. C. C. 325; Evelyn v. Forster, 8 Ves. 96; Ex parte Anderson, 5 Ves.

(x) Attorney General v. Power, 1 Ball & B. 154.

Blankard v. 411; Smith v. Rex v. Vaughan, Ex parte Prosser, 2

(y) Attorney General v. Stewart, 240; Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. 2 Mer. 143. 481; Pike v. Hoare, Ambl. 428;

On the application of the laws of S. C. 2 Eden, 185, and note.