remedy, in case of any particular grievance, than that which the laws of the land afford them-they have no appeal in the visitor's jurisdiction; the visitor cannot give costs; and young men of fortune may ruin, or at least harass, the university by continual vexation.

On the part of the appellant, it was insisted that the visitor's jurisdiction is not confined to the foundation, but comprised the whole government of the college; that the independent members, though strangers to the eleemosynary constitution, are not strangers to the college, being recognised, defined, and described in the constitution of the university : for, by the university statutes, a degree cannot be taken by a person not a member of a college; that the same statutes enact the duties, privileges, ranks, and habits of independent members, according to their several orders; that these descriptions and definitions are acknowledged by those laws, which affirm the constitution of the university; that these laws will imply, on the part of the members admitted, intra mania ædis, submission to the orders and statutes of the society, and on the part of the college protection and redress. The relation, therefore, of these independent members to the college being legally recognised, definite, and certain, they had an appeal to the visitor.-The lord chancellor, with the advice of two common-law judges, dismissed the petition (t).

No redress can be obtained in a court of law by an independent member of a college, in a matter concerning its discipline. On a prosecution for an assault in turning out one who had been expelled from Queen's College, in the University of Cambridge, the Court of King's Bench determined, that such part of the statutes and other instruments of the college as might be proper to invalidate their sentence of expulsion, by showing that it should have been signed by the master and a majority of the fellows, it being signed by the master and one fellow only, had been properly rejected as evidence at the trial; for even if the party expelled was a member of the college and subject to its jurisdiction and orders, his mode of redress was by appeal to the

(t) Davison's Case, cited Cowp. 319.

visitor, and not to the Court of King's Bench-the expulsion being a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the college, and the visitor might have proceeded upon the contempt and misbehaviour subsequent to the original offence (u).

It has been doubted whether the visitatorial jurisdiction can properly be exercised with respect to a person not an actual member of an eleemosynary foundation, but claiming a right to become one. Dr. White, the founder of St. John's College, in Oxford, by the charter of foundation appointed that there should be a president and fifty scholars there, of whom forty-three should be named by particular schools in London, and the remaining seven by three cities, of whom Bristol was to name two. On a vacancy by resignation, the city of Bristol named one King as the successor; the college refused to admit him, and chose another. Application being made for a mandamus to admit King, it was objected that the Bishop of Winchester was visitor, and was to determine all disputes concerning the foundation; to which it was answered, that the person on whose behalf the application was made was only a nominee, and not yet of the foundation, and therefore this dispute was not within the visitor's jurisdiction. The court ordered the statutes of the college to be laid before them, and adjourned the question (v).

But in another report of the same case, it was held by the court to be the duty of the visitor to determine matters relating to persons who are of the foundation, and that he has no power before a person becomes a member; and therefore a mandamus was issued to the president and scholars of the college to admit King, the scholar nominated by the city of Bristol (x).

(u) Rex v. Grundon, Cowp. 315. delegated the power of exercising a S. C. cited 2 Ves. jun. 618.

(v) Rex v. St. John's College, Oxford, 4 Mod. 260.

(x) S. C. Comb. 238.

All persons have not a right to be admitted members of a college, they must be approved of by the college,

or by those to whom the college has

discretion as to the persons they admit. The master and fellows of a college cannot be compelled to admit a particular individual a member. Rex v. Benchers of Lincoln's Inn, 4 B. & C. 860, 861; S. C. 7 Dowl. & R. 351.

In a dispute between a college and a third party, respecting the performance of an agreement, an application to the visitor is nugatory, for he cannot compel a specific performance (y). So where an estate is vested in the whole body of a college, as trustees for particular purposes, the visitor cannot interfere with the subject matter of the trust (z).

Whether fellows of colleges have power to let their chambers, held in right of their fellowships, is a matter to be determined by the visitor, and not a proper subject of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Lord Hardwicke said, "that if he were to inquire whether a fellow of a college had a right to let his chambers, that he should make wild work, and give an opportunity to half the university to bring bills against particular persons, to discover whether they had forfeited their fellowships by letting their chambers” (a).

The exercise of a visitor's power in determining the election of a master of a college is a judicial act, and a judge cannot determine without hearing the parties concerned; and such power should be exercised in a formal manner by at least convening the parties interested, in order that they may have an opportunity of making a defence (b).

The visitors and trustee of a free grammar-school, who had dismissed the schoolmaster for breach of regulations contained in the endowment, cannot maintain an ejectment to recover the possession of the schoolhouse, unless they have determined the master's interest therein, by summoning him to appear before them previously to his dismissal, in order that he may be heard in answer to any charges that may be brought against him, and on which such dismissal may be founded. Thus in an action of ejectment by the trustee and visitors of Skipton Free Grammar-school, in the county of York, for the recovery of the school-house and lands belong

(y) Rex v. Windham, Cowp. 378. (z) Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. sen. 462, ante, pp. 357-359. (a) Attorney General v. Stephens, 1 Atk. 360; S. C. 2 Eq. Cas.

Abr. 196, pl. 17.

(b) Rex v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 336; Rex v. University of Cambridge, 2 Ld. Raym. 1334; S. C. 8 Mod. 148; Fortesc. 202.

ing to such school, it appeared that the legal estate was vested in the Earl of Thanet, heir-at-law of the surviving feoffee or trustee, and that in the deed of endowment the vicar and churchwardens were the visitors of such school. By the deed of endowment in 2 Edward VI. the master was to have an estate for life, with a power for the visitors to remove him for certain causes of misconduct therein mentioned; and it appeared that the defendant was appointed and licensed head master of the school in 1794; that a meeting of the vicar and majority of the churchwardens was called on the 28th of January, 1822, at which it was resolved that the defendant should be removed from the school, and a notice was given him in September, 1822, by the visitors, stating that they had thought proper to remove him from his office of schoolmaster, from which situation he was accordingly removed on the 31st of that month, for an alleged breach of the regulations laid down by the founder for the government of the school; but it was not shown that the defendant had been summoned before the visitors to show cause against the charges alleged against him before his removal, nor that he had been served with notice to quit. The court was clearly of opinion that the defendant could not have been legally removed from his office of schoolmaster without having been previously summoned before the visitors to answer the accusations made by them against him, or the causes on which such removal was founded. The defendant, as a schoolmaster, had a freehold in his office, as well as the legal interest under the deed of endowment by which he was elected, although such interest was determinable in case of a breach of the regulations therein contained; he had continued in the uninterrupted enjoyment of the school for more than twenty years before the action was brought, and the only ground on which it was founded was the misconduct of the defendant or breach of the regulations. His interest in the school could only be determinable on such an event. If the defendant had offended or been guilty of a breach of any of the regulations of the school, he ought to have been summoned before the visitors to defend himself,

or show cause against the charges alleged against him; after which he might have been legally removed (c).

A visitor cannot be a judge in his own cause, unless that power be expressly given to him. A founder, indeed, may make him so, but such an authority is not to be implied; he cannot visit himself the same person cannot be the visitor and the visited; and therefore where the visitor claims an interest and asserts a right in the appointment of the master, and that appointment is the act complained of, the power of deciding devolves on the Court of King's Bench, and a mandamus will be granted if the application be supported by other substantial grounds. Thus where the Bishop of Ely, being visitor of a college, asserted a right to the appointment of the master of the college, and that was the act complained of, it was held that the decision of such question which arose on the construction of the statutes of the college, devolved on the Court of King's Bench (d).

So where, by a deed founding a school, a power was given to the lord of the manor of the parish of assisting in the nomination and removal of the head master, and of controlling him in various respects, the appointment of the lord of the manor himself to that situation is inconsistent with the provisions of the deed; and the lord chancellor, on petition, declared that such an appointment was inconsistent with the due administration of the trusts of the charity, and that the master should be removed and another appointed in the manner prescribed by the deed of foundation (e).

A general visitatorial power may cease and revive, and during such cessation the jurisdiction will, for want of particular appointment or reservation of power, devolve on the king's courts of general jurisdiction. Thus where a mandamus was issued to the Bishop of Chester to admit a chaplain of the

(c) Doe d. Thanet v. Gartham, 8 Moore, 368; S. C. 1 Bing. 357. See Rex v. Gaskin, 8 T. R. 209.

(d) Rex v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 338; Rex v. Bishop of Ches

ter, 2 Str. 797, cited 1 Ves. sen. 471.

(e) In re Risley School, 1 June, 1830; Reg. Lib. B. 2298-2300,