a bill only, because the charity had no fixed revenue, but depended on voluntary contributions (e).

Where it appeared that a part of the trustees of a chapel were acting, or had been acting, and might fairly be understood as meaning again to act in a manner inconsistent with their trust, regarding the ecclesiastical concerns of a chapel; an injunction was granted, upon affidavit before answer, on a bill filed by two of the trustees, one of whom was an elder of the congregation, to restrain the other trustees of a chapel erected by a Presbyterian congregation for religious worship according to the usages, discipline, and doctrine of the church of Scotland, from electing as minister, a person not duly licensed by that church; but an injunction to restrain them from allowing persons not so licensed to officiate, and from preventing persons so licensed and otherwise duly authorised from officiating during the intermediate period prior to such election, was refused (ƒ).

Three objections were afterwards taken to the frame of the suit in this case-first, that the property in question was of such species, that a suit in respect of it ought to have been by way of information and not by bill-secondly, that even supposing the parties to have been entitled to proceed by way of bill, the attorney general was a necessary party to the suit -and thirdly, that if the parties were entitled to sue in their own names, they ought to have sued on behalf of themselves and the other persons interested in the property. Sir C. C. Pepys, M. R., decided, that as the chapel had been built by the voluntary subscription of persons professing particular doctrines, and was supported by them, it was a species of property in respect of which the persons interested in it had a right to proceed in the Court of Chancery by way of bill; and that the attorney general was not a necessary party to the suit. But as the bill had been filed by trustees who had the management of the chapel, in whom the legal estate was

(e) Davis v. Jenkins, 3 Ves. & B. 154.

(f) Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 Mylne & Keen, 446.

not vested against other trustees, one of whom had the legal estate, without making the persons beneficially interested parties, the suit was held on that account to be defective for want of parties; and it was ordered, that the plaintiffs should be at liberty to amend their original bill within three weeks, for the purpose of adding parties, as they might be advised, or of showing cause why they were unable to bring all proper parties before the court (g).

Whilst a suit is pending for the regulation of a dissenting meeting house, it is the practice of the court, where the minister in possession is performing his duty and preaching the doctrines which were intended, to continue him whether he was duly appointed or not, the first point being to have the service performed; and the court will order the payment of his salary (h).

Where a dissenting chapel is supported by voluntary contributions, and the rents of the pews are appropriated to the support of the minister, the court will not interfere in the appointment of a receiver as to the voluntary contributions, the amount and application of which depends entirely upon. the donors; although, if the nature of the case required it, one might be appointed as to the pew rents (i).

If a deed of trust for establishing a meeting-house contains no directions as to the mode of electing ministers, nor as to the duration of their office when elected, nor any provision for the minister, who depends entirely on the voluntary contributions of the members of the congregation, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere to prevent the removal of the minister (k).

On an application for an injunction to restrain an individual who had been elected minister of a chapel, Lord Eldon said, this court has nothing to do with the voluntary subscriptions

(g) Milligan v. Mitchell, Reg. lib. B. 1834, fol. 887.

(h) Foley v. Wontner. 2 Jac. & Walk. 247. See Attorney General v. Hartley, 2 Jac. & Walk. 375.

(i) Attorney General v. Fowler, 15 Ves. 85. See Ex parte Pearson, 6 Price, 214.

(k) Porter v. Clarke, 2 Sim. 520.

which may be paid to-day and withheld to-morrow; its jurisdiction is founded only on its right to declare the trust of the chapel, and how the chapel is to be used. The trust of the chapel is, however, connected with the consideration of the exercise of a spiritual jurisdiction; and the property being for the use of a Scotch congregation, we are led to the inquiry how the ministers of such congregations are usually appointed. We have to do, therefore, only with the fact, whether the minister has been appointed minister by the exercise of that spiritual jurisdiction which regulates such congregations (1).

5. Of informations respecting funds applicable to public purposes.] A few of a large number of persons may institute a suit on behalf of themselves and the rest, for relief against acts injurious to their common right; although the majority approve of such acts, and disapprove of the institution of the suit, and the attorney general is not a necessary party; but where the whole body concur in an abuse, the suit must be instituted by the attorney general (m).

Where by an act of parliament certain inhabitants of a parish were empowered to meet, for the purpose of making rules and regulations for the management of allotments, over which the parishioners had rights of common, and to appoint a treasurer and other officers, and to raise money by rates on such occupiers, for the purpose of carrying the rules into effect, it was held that a bill might be filed by some of the householders, on behalf of themselves and the rest, for an account of the rates received, and of the balance, and to restrain the further misapplication of the rates (n).

An informality in a bill filed by certain individual parishioners, omitting to state that it was "on behalf of themselves and all the other parishioners," may be cured by

(1) Leslie v. Birnie, 2 Russ. 119. (m) Bromley v. Smith, 1 Sim. 8. See Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swanst. 277. In proceeding against some individuals as representing a numerous class, as the vestry of a parish, it

must be alleged that the suit is brought against them in that character.-Lanchester v. Thompson, 5 Madd. 15.

(n) Bromley v. Smith, 1 Sim. 8.

amendment, even at the hearing of the cause, if it made any material difference, such omission being considered as merely a clerical error (o).

Where the object of a suit is to avoid payment of a rate levied on the inhabitants of a town, all the inhabitants having a common interest to avoid the rate, any one or more of them may sue on behalf of himself and the other inhabitants. An information and bill were filed by the attorney general and certain persons, on behalf of themselves and all others, who were assessed to a rate under the authority of the defendants, insisting that the defendants were in effect trustees for certain charitable puposes, with power to make the rate in question only in case the charitable funds were insufficient; and that such funds were ample for the purposes required; and praying, therefore, amongst other things, an account of the charitable funds, and of the application thereof by the defendants, and that they, in the mean time, might be restrained from enforcing the payment of the rate so made by them. The defendants having put in a general demurrer for want of equity, it was held that the plaintiffs had a right to sue on behalf of themselves and of all other persons on whom the rate in question was assessed (p).

It seems that where any fund is created for the purpose of being applied to some public purpose, a court of equity has, by its original jurisdiction, a right to see to the application of the fund, although it may not be applicable to one of the purposes mentioned in the statute of charitable uses. In the case of the Attorney General v. the Corporation of Dublin, Lord Redesdale said, "There is on this subject a writ in the register (q), which recites that the king had been given to understand that his predecessors had granted certain rates on all merchandise brought into a town, to be applied to the walling of the town; and the inhabitants having complained that the rates had not been duly applied, the writ proceeds in

(0) Attorney General v. Newcombe, 14 Ves. 6.

(p) Attorney General v. Heelis, 2 Sim. & Stu. 67, ante, p. 76. See

Redesdale's Pl. p. 137, 3rd ed.; Gort v. Attorney General, 6 Dow, 137. Ante, p. 79.

(q) Reg. Brev. p. 138.

the nature of a commission for taking the account. Under such circumstances, an information at this moment would lie, at the suit of the attorney general, for taking such account. The practice of proceeding by information, rather than by the writ of account, has prevailed in consequence of the difficulty of proceeding under the writ." And then he added, “We are referred to the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4, with respect to charitable uses, as creating a new law upon the subject of charitable uses. That statute only creates a new jurisdiction. It created no new law: it created a new and ancillary jurisdiction, borrowed from the elements which I have mentioned; a jurisdiction created by a commission to be issued out of the Court of Chancery" (r).

The Corporation of Dublin having, before the year 1777, supplied water to the inhabitants of the city from works which they had constructed; but the rents which they received being inadequate to the maintenance of the waterworks, by the Irish act 15 & 16 Geo. III., the owners or occupiers of houses were compelled to provide branch pipes from the mains of the company to the houses, and the corporation were empowered to charge the owners or occupiers with certain fixed annual rates or rents, in order to construct new mains and extend their works, to borrow money for those purposes, and to mortgage the rates for the repayment of the money so borrowed.

(r) 1 Bligh, N. S. 347. See 2 ment (49 Geo. III.) by which they Sim. 449. were empowered to borrow, at stated annual periods, a further sum, amounting to 32,2007., and to charge the debt upon the rates granted by that and the former acts. The act further required, that the interest of the money borrowed under that act should be retained out of the rates thereby granted, as well as a further sum of 2,000l., to be appropriated as a sinking fund to pay off the whole debt for money borrowed under that and the former acts. The act further directed, that distinct accounts should be kept of the rates received under the act, and that the surplus, after providing for the interest of the whole debt, should be applied in laying down iron or metal main and service pipes, in the general improvement and extension of the waterworks, and to increase the sinking fund; and it was declared that the rates, being granted only for such purposes, should not be subject to deductions, except for collection, nor be deemed rates for the supply of water as for sale.

Under the authority of this act, the Corporation of Dublin from time to time borrowed on the credit of the water rents, various sums of money, which, in 1809, amounted to 67,000l. In that year the corporation obtained a new act of parlia