to their use, and that no scholars from that school had, for many years, been maintained in the college; and praying an account of the rents of the lands conveyed to the college, and a declaration that the same were applicable in maintaining the scholarships. The information contained no statement that any scholars had been tendered, or refused, or nominated by those who had the right of nomination, nor any averment that the scholars were not maintained by the college in the manner required by the endowment. A plea, consisting of the endowment only, which was not set forth in the information, by the college, but without any averment that the college had always admitted and sustained the scholars, was allowed, because the information contained no statement which rendered such an averment necessary (2).

On a bill for carrying a charity into execution, the defendant may demur and show for cause of demurrer, that the charitable legacies are void in law (a).

Where the stat. 9 Geo. II. c. 36, is pleaded to an information by defendants, whether in possession or not, they need not show a title in themselves; but it is enough to show a want of title in the relators (b).

Where an information stated certain bequests to have been made to the defendants upon certain trusts, and that other bequests had been made to them upon the like trusts, a plea by the defendants of a will, containing a bequest to the defendants, upon a like trust; but in which another company was interested, and that such company was not a party to the suit, was overruled (c).

Where an information alleged certain sums to be vested in the defendants for certain charitable purposes, and that the defendants had misapplied those sums; and also alleged generally that other sums were vested in the defendants upon

(z) Attorney General v. St. John's College, 1 Coop. Rep. Ld. Brougham's Judgments, 401. See Bayley v. Adams, 6 Ves. 586; Roche v. Mayell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721.

(a) Attorney General v. Nash, 2

Br. C. C. 589.

(b) Attorney General v. Lord Weymouth, Ambl. 22.

(c) Attorney General v. Merchant Taylors' Company, 5 Sim. 323.

like trusts, but did not charge any misapplication or breach of trust with respect to them, it was held that the defendants were not compellable to answer the general allegation; for the court cannot administer relief unless misapplication is shown, and consequently all statements contained in the record upon which no relief could be given, were considered irrelevant (d).

In 1803, a bill, to which the attorney general was a party, had been filed by the respondent, praying a declaration that a bequest for charitable purposes was void; upon that bill a decree was made in favour of the respondent and others in 1809, under which they held the property without dispute until 1823, when a bill was filed by the appellants, stating the former bill and proceedings, but omitting to state that the attorney general was a party. To this bill the respondent put in a general demurrer, which was overruled, because it did not appear on the face of the bill that the attorney general was a party to the former suit; but leave was given to put in a plea of the decree on further directions in the former cause, in bar of the information, which was accordingly done. The plea consisted of a statement of the former suit and proceedings, and the decree made under it. The appellant then presented a petition of re-hearing of the former suit; but the plea was allowed, and the decree affirmed on re-hearing (e).

The court will not permit a plaintiff to demand, by one bill, several matters of different natures against several defendants; for this would tend to load each defendant with an unnecessary burthen of costs, by swelling the pleadings with the state of the several claims of the other defendants with which he has no connection. A defendant may therefore demur, because the plaintiff demands several matters of different natures, of several defendants, by the same bill (ƒ). But the rule is not confined within the narrow limits laid down by Lord Redesdale, for it is not competent for a sole

plaintiff in a bill against a sole defendant, to unite all sorts of matters wherein they may be mutually concerned; for a court of equity, so far follows the practice of the courts of law as to give its judgment in one case; and though at law in an action of debt, the plaintiff may declare both upon a specialty, and on a simple contract, yet he cannot join in one action, covenant, case, trover, detinue, &c. So a court of equity requires, that one subject should be presented for its decision, and will not allow itself to be called upon to pronounce different decrees, on several totally distinct matters.

An information, after stating a will by which property was given to the defendants for making loans to young men free of the company, to assist them in trade and otherwise, alleged that divers other bequests and donations had been made to the company, for the purpose of making loans to young men for their advancement in business or in life; but no part thereof had, for a great number of years, been applied for any charitable purposes as aforesaid, and prayed that the principal and all other, if any, like gifts and bequests to the company for loans might be established, and the due performance of the charitable trusts enforced for the future, that a scheme might be framed for that purpose, and for an account of the rents of the estates. A demurrer to the information by the company, because it was exhibited against them for several and distinct matters which ought not to be joined together in one information, was allowed; for the court requires that one subject should be presented to it for its decision, and will not allow itself to be called upon to pronounce different decrees on several totally distinct matters. There might be a thousand such charities for making loans to young men, of different descriptions, which could not be embraced in one decree, and in one scheme. If it had been so alleged in the information as to show that the character of all the other bequests was homogeneous, though there might be minute differences between them, they might all have been comprised in the same information. But where there is a total want of any such allegation, it must be supposed that the other bequests and donations are totally distinct from,

and in no way homogeneous with, the principal object of the suit (g). But leave was given to the relators to amend, by striking out such parts of the information as related to the general charge.

A demurrer for multifariousness to an information, containing general sweeping charges, was disallowed, and the court directed a reference to the attorney general, to prevent the defendants from being unnecessarily harassed by these charges (h).

An information seeking an account of estates given for the endowment of a school and foundations of scholarships in a college, for boys to be nominated by the master, &c. of the school, and asking reference for schemes for both charities, was held to be multifarious; because the grant to the college for the maintenance of the five individuals who were to be sent from the Pocklington school was quite separate from the formation of the school; that grant in effect creating a sort of charity for five individuals which came into existence by virtue of their being sent away from the school. And the administration of the latter charity was quite a different thing from the management of the school.

By the information two questions were raised-one how the school was to be managed-another, what was the benefit which these five individuals, not the school, who had ceased to have any connection with it, should have out of the estates given to the college? These questions were in their origin distinct, and in reality the charity for the school, and for these five individuals, had no connection with each other, and the question whether the information embraced two distinct subjects ought to be considered with reference to thiscan one defence be made to the whole information? And it did not appear that any defence which the college might put in as to the administration of the school, would apply to that part of the case requiring a larger benefit to be given to the five individuals belonging to the college; and therefore

(g) Attorney General v. smiths' Company, 5 Sim. 670.

Gold- (h) Attorney General v. Merchant
Taylors' Company, 5 Sim. 288.

that the college might take the objection of multifariousness (i).

An objection to a bill or information, on the ground that it is multifarious, must be made by demurrer, and cannot be insisted on by the answer (k), nor taken at the hearing of the cause (1).

A demurrer for multifariousness was allowed to an information, stating that a corporation was seised of real estates for purposes of public utility, and of other real estates, in trust for private charity; and that the defendants had sold part of the first mentioned estates, and were selling the remainder, and charging a general misapplication of the funds and abuses of the charity, and praying an injunction to restrain the first, and the court's regulation of the latter (m).

In a suit against a corporation to establish eight charitable trusts, of which seven were for the benefit of poor members of the corporation exclusively, and the eighth was subject to a fixed payment to another corporation, it was held that this latter corporation was a necessary party as the suit was then framed, and that as such an addition of parties might render the suit multifarious, leave was given to amend the information, by striking out the matter relating to the charity last mentioned (n).

Where the object of an information was to have an account taken of what the defendant had received as treasurer of the Philanthropic Society, and to restrain him from proceeding to collect money in that character, after two insufficient answers, an order was made on petition, that the cause should be set down, in order that the information should be

(i) Attorney General v. St. John's College, V. C. 19 Jan. 1835, 4 Law Journ. N. S. 72-77.

(k) Ward v. Cooke, 5 Madd. 122. (1) Wynne v. Callander, 1 Russ. 293.

(m) Attorney General v. Corporation of Carmarthen, Coop. C. C. 30. Generally speaking, the Court of Chancery will not interfere with

regard to the misapplication of money belonging to a corporation; S.C. ibid.; nor is it a ground for a criminal information to be granted by the Court of King's Bench. Rex v. Watson & others, 2 T. R. 200.

(n) Attorney General v. Merchant Taylors' Company, 1 Mylne & Keen, 189; S. C. 5 Sim. 288.