tional advantage, in furtherance of his general intention, as the introduction of a condition requiring the residence of the lecturer, who was the object of the charity (q).

Where money had been bequeathed for the purpose of being lent out without interest, in sums not exceeding 2001., and the master, in settling a new scheme for the charity, had directed the maximum of the sums lent out to be 5007., it was held, that as the latest of the wills was 200 years old, the increase in the amount of the loans, regard being had to the alteration in the value of money, was not inconsistent with the intention of the testator (r).

The only way of administering a charity is by a general direction to the trustees; and in case of their misbehaviour, there must be a new information, but the court will not retain an information, in order to execute the trust from time to time (s).

It is not the practice of the court to retain the direction of the application of the future increase in charity funds; but after the settlement of a scheme, the trustees are to administer the charity, and the court only informs them what is to be done, and the course which it is their duty to pursue (1).

Where a surplus revenue of a charity is to be distributed beyond repairs and other charges, the master ought to report the shares in aliquot parts, and not in moneys numbered, for the surplus from various causes, as failure of tenants, must be an uncertain sum (u).

It has been already stated that the rule, requiring the attendance of the attorney general before the master on the settlement of a scheme, is sometimes dispensed with (v).

(q) Ex parte Lane in re Kings bridge School, 4 Madd. 479.

(r) Attorney General v. Mercers' Company, 2 Mylne & Keen, 654.

(s) Attorney General v. Haberdashers' Company, 1 Ves. jun. 295. Upon an information against the trustees of a charity, Lord Hardwicke, though he did not see any ground to make a decree, would not dismiss the information, but kept

it on foot, in order to have control over the trustees. Attorney General v. Governors of Harrow School, 2 Ves. sen. 551. See Attorney General v. Townley, ante, p. 442.

(t) Attorney General v. Solly, 5 Law Journ. N. S. Chanc. 5.

(u) Attorney General v. Haberdashers' Company, 1 Ves. jun. 295; S. C. 4 Br. C. C. 103.

(v) Ante, p. 401.

The court will not direct a scheme to be laid before the master, where there is a great latitude of description in the will, and it is not a residue, or a sum in gross, that is once for all to be distributed, but part of an annual and temporary income, to be disposed of from year to year, according to a discretion to be exercised every year, and possibly every day, it seems very difficult for the court to take upon itself the direction and management of the fund so to be applied, as it would require a scheme to be laid before the master every year.

In a case, therefore, where there was neither any allegation, nor even suspicion, that the fund had been, or would be, withheld, the court would not impose upon the party to whom the power of distribution was given, at the expense of the charity, the necessity of annually accounting for the employment of the fund before the master. As that purpose might be answered by reserving to any of the parties liberty to apply as there might be occasion; so that, if at any time there should be ground for supposing that the fund had not been fairly expended, the court might be called upon to interfere.

Thus where a testator bequeathed all his personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, after payment of his debts, to two trustees, their executors, and administrators, "upon trust to pay the neat income, interest, dividends, and proceeds thereof, from time to time as the same shall arise and grow due and become payable, unto his wife and her assigns, for and during the term of her natural life, or otherwise to permit and suffer her to receive the same; but, nevertheless, I do hereby most solemnly enjoin, and earnestly desire, and I am thoroughly persuaded, from the invariable fidelity and attachment my dear wife has always shown towards me, that she will, after my decease, with the utmost readiness and cheerfulness, co-operate with my said trustees in carrying my wishes into execution; and therefore, having made a very considerable provision for my said dear wife, by this my will, I do direct and desire that she will, with the advice and assistance of my said trustees, or the survivor of them, yearly and every year, during her life, lay out and expend one moiety or

half part of the neat income of my personal estate, in promoting charitable purposes, as well those of a public as of a private nature, and more especially in relieving such distressed persons, either the widows or children of poor clergymen or otherwise, as my said wife shall judge most worthy and deserving objects, giving a preference always to poor relations," and after the decease of his wife upon trust to pay and assign all his personal estate and effects among the children of two persons therein named.

Sir W. Grant, M. R. was of opinion, that the testator's intention was to vest in his wife a discretionary power of distributing to such charitable purposes as she should think fit; and therefore, though the trustees were to advise and assist, yet in case of a difference of opinion, it was hers that must prevail. Into her hands the whole money was to be paid; by her the distribution was to be made; and by her judgment the fitness of the object was to be determined. There was hardly an opening for them to interfere, except by their advice and assistance. Advice did not include decision, nor did assistance imply the power of control.

It was decreed, that the funds forming the clear residue of the testator's personal estate should be transferred to the accountant-general, and that he should, from time to time, pay one moiety of the interest and dividends to the testator's widow, for her own use, and pay her the other moiety, in order that she might, from time to time, apply the same to such charitable objects and purposes as by the will expressed, and permit her to receive a surplus arising from the charitable fund in the defendant's hands to be applied to the same purposes (v).

We have already seen that the Court of Chancery will not give directions for the establishment of a charity in Scotland (w). So where a charity is to be established in any other country out of England, the Court of Chancery, not having any jurisdiction to administer the fund, will order the money

(v) Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 206. See Hordev. Earl of Suffolk, 2 Mylne & Keen, 59; ante, p. 529; Powers

court v. Powerscourt, 1 Molloy, 616; ante, p. 530.

(w) Ante, pp. 260, 262.

to be paid to the trustees whom the testator has appointed, without the settlement of any scheme. Thus a fund, bequeathed to a charity at Lyons, was ordered to be paid to two of the plaintiffs, as attorneys of their co-plaintiff, the mayor of Lyons, under a power of attorney, which authorised two or one of them to receive the money; and the same course was pursued where the charity was to be distributed in Switzerland (x). So a fund, given by will, which had been invested in the accountant-general's name, to a corporation in England for a charitable purpose in America, was ordered to be paid to the corporation without the settlement of any scheme, it appearing that the testator had reposed confidence in them (y).

6. Of the apportionment of charitable funds.] If a gift is for the poor of any city, and other parishes are afterwards admitted within its precincts, such parishes will be entitled to a proportion of the charity. Thus where a testator gave property for building almshouses in the city of Rochester, and by a subsequent deed provision was made for the poor of the said city and the liberties and precincts thereof, and afterwards the bounds of the city were enlarged by charter, it was held that the poor who inhabited the parts added to the city should participate in the revenue of the charity, which had greatly increased (≈).

In 1808, an information was filed on behalf of a fourth parish for a similar purpose, and that parish was decreed to be entitled to a share of the rents, in the proportion of its extent and population to the extent and population of the three other parishes, but the proportions, as between those parishes were not to be altered. An information, afterwards filed on behalf of one of those three parishes, claiming an increased share of the rents, on account of its population having increased more than the population of the other

(x) Martin v. Paxton, 24th Feb. 1824, cited 1 Russ. 116; Minet v. Vulliamy, cited Id. 113 n.

gation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Attorney General, 3 Russ. 142.

(z) Attorney General v. Mayor, (y) The Society for the Propa- &c. of Rochester, Finch, R. 193.

parishes, was dismissed, the decree in 1680, which had been since acted upon, being final (a).

On an information, at the relation of the inhabitants of the Rolls liberty, in Middlesex, for an account of charities given by several deeds and wills to the poor of the parish of St. Dunstan in the West, London, of which the liberty of the Rolls was part, it appeared that since the statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, before which there were no such officers as overseers of the poor, that such part of the parish of St. Dunstan as lay in London, had appointed distinct overseers, made distinct rates, and maintained their poor separately, which made them a distinct parish. The court therefore decreed, that such part of the parish as lay in London should have the benefit of all charities given by deed or will to the parish of St. Dunstan, after the statute 43 Eliz.; but that the Rolls liberty should have a proportion of all gifts to charities. made before that act, when the parish was united (b).

Lands were devised to the parson and churchwardens of the parish of St. Austen, in London, and their successors, to the intent that the rents, after certain charges were defrayed, might go to the use of that parish church, at the discretion of the parson and churchwardens, and their successors. After the fire of London, that parish was united with the adjoining parish of St. Faith's, and the church of St. Austen thenceforth became the parish church of the two united parishes. The act 22 Car. II. c. 11, s. 68, by which the two parishes were united, declared, that notwithstanding such union, each of the parishes, as to all rates, taxes, parochial rights, charges, and duties, and all other privileges, should remain distinct as theretofore. It was held, that the parishioners of St. Faith's had no right, either under the will nor the act of parliament, to have any part of the rents applied in ease of that proportion of the expenses of maintaining the

(a) Attorney General v. Mayor of Rector of St. Dunstan's, 1 P. Wms. Rochester, 6 Sim. 273, 322.

(b) Attorney General v. Grant,

669.

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