seats or pews in a dissenting meeting-house, which was held in trust for the use of the congregation (which had always been in spiritual connexion with "the presbytery of the Scotch church in London"), but who did not take the sacrament there, had been excluded from voting at the election of a minister to officiate in the meeting-house, an application for an injunction to restrain the individual so elected from acting as minister, or receiving the emoluments attached to his office, was refused with costs (e).

In many cases, dissenting ministers are mere tenants at will to the trustees of chapels; the consequence is, that they may be turned out by ejectment after a demand of possession. Thus, on an ejectment to recover from the defendant, who had been elected minister by the members of a dissenting congregation, a chapel and dwelling-house, which he was put in possession of by the trustees in whom the legal estate was vested, in trust to permit the chapel to be used, for the purpose of religious worship. The members of the congregation having become dissatisfied with some of the doctrines of the defendant, in consequence wished to remove him, and came to a resolution to that effect. The trustees demanded possession, and immediately served a declaration in ejectment. The defendant had an annual salary of 207., and objected that he was entitled to some notice to quit. The court decided, that the defendant being tenant at will only, the demand of possession was sufficient to determine the will, and that there was no authority in the law for the position that he ought to have been allowed a reasonable time for removing his goods. But it seems that a tenant, who, after the determination of his tenancy by a demand of possession, enters on the premises for the sole purpose of removing his goods, and continues there no longer than is necessary for that purpose, and without excluding the landlord, would not be considered a trespasser (f).

So in another case, where it appeared, that, in 1783, a piece

(e) Leslie v. Birnie, 2 Russ. 114. 10 B. & Cress. 721. (f) Doe d. Nicholl v. M'Keag,

of land, with a meeting-house thereon, was conveyed to trustees and their successors, ministers of the respective meetinghouses therein mentioned, to the intent that the said building should be used as a meeting place or house for public and religious worship, by the society or congregation of Protestant dissenters called Presbyterians; and that they should permit the same from time to time to be used, occupied, and enjoyed as and for a meeting-house, place, or house for such public and religious worship, by such society or congregation of Protestant dissenters. The defendant had been, according to the usual practice, elected by the congregation minister of the chapel sixteen years before, and was then put into possession of the house and premises by officers acting under the authority of the trustees. At a meeting of the congregation, in 1828, it was determined by a large majority, that the minister should be changed, but no other minister had been elected. Possession of the chapel, dwelling-house and premises had been demanded of the defendant on behalf of the trustees, but he refused to quit. On an ejectment brought by the heir of the surviving trustee, in whom the legal estate was vested, it was contended that the plaintiff could not recover possession against the defendant so long as he continued minister of the chapel. That the defendant, having been duly elected to fill the office of minister of the chapel, had an office coupled with an interest, and continued to hold such office until another minister had been duly elected according to the usual course adopted on former occasions. It was held by the court, that the defendant had no other estate in the premises than that of tenant at will, which had been determined by the demand of possession, and therefore that the trustees had a right to the chapel, whatever remedy the defendant might possibly have in equity against them, if they had improperly turned him out (ƒ).

An information and bill were afterwards filed in this case, by some of the congregation of the chapel, on behalf of themselves and the rest of the congregation having full com

(f) Doe d. Jones v. Jones, 10 B. & Cress. 718.

munion in the chapel, for an injunction to restrain the heir at law of the trustee from obstructing the minister of the chapel in the free use and enjoyment of the premises, and of the pulpit, and in the performance of his religious duties there; for an account of the money received by the defendant on account of the rents, and to restrain the conveyance of the legal estate in the premises, and from proceeding in an action for mesne profits. It was referred to the master to inquire and state, having regard to the nature of the congregration to whom the chapel belonged, and the rules and practice of the congregation, whether the plaintiff had been properly dismissed from his office, with liberty for the master to state special circumstances, and to examine all parties on the record and members of the congregation as witnesses (g).

A person to whom the key of a chapel, open to various preachers, is delivered merely for the purpose of preaching, has not such possession as will enable him to maintain an action of trespass against the person in whom the legal estate in the chapel is vested; although it seems to be otherwise, where a party regularly and exclusively uses a chapel, and keeps the key in his possession, for the purpose of preaching (h).

Where a trust deed invests certain individuals with an authority, quasi visitors, to dismiss or suspend a regularly appointed minister, at their own will and pleasure, the courts cannot interfere, however improper the dismissal or suspension may be; if, however, it is provided, that the same shall

(g) Attorney General v. Jones, V. C., 19 March, 1835. It was stated in the answer to be the universal rule of Protestant dissenting congregations, in England and Wales, of the Presbyterian persuasion, for the congregation for the time being attending divine worship and being in full communion, in any chapel, to elect the minister of it from time to time, and to dis

miss any such minister from his office, when dissatisfied with him, according to the majority of votes of the members of such congregation, which rule had always been observed. And that the minister in this case had been dismissed at such a meeting.

(h) Revett v. Brown, 2 Moore & P. 12; S. C. 5 Bing. 7.

be done according to certain rules, constitutions, and regulations specified in the deed, it must be made to appear that they are applicable to the particular case; and before the courts will lend their assistance to enforce the sentence, they will be satisfied that those rules, constitutions, and regulations have been complied with. It is doubtful whether the courts of justice in this kingdom will, under any circumstances, enforce the rules of a community established in a sister kingdom, which in that kingdom are not entitled to similar assistance (i).

If new

Of the appointment and removal of trustees.] trustees have not been appointed according to the provision of the deed of trust, the vacancies must be supplied by the Court of Chancery. A meeting-house had been built in 1796, to be regulated according to a trust deed then executed ; and in 1803, the site of the old chapel having been required for the purposes of the London Dock act, a new chapel was built on another spot, when a new trust deed was executed, differing from the former, by transferring the power of filling up vacancies amongst the trustees and committees, from the congregation at large to the surviving trustees and committees. This alteration was alleged to be conformable to the original resolutions of the congregation in 1796, from which the deed then executed had, in that particular, deviated. There were to be five committees and thirteen trustees, in whom the legal estate was vested, and, from time to time, on

(i) Attorney General v. Fletcher, cited in Beldam's Summary of Laws affecting Protestant Dissenters, p. 79. It has been decided, that a district committee of Wesleyan Methodists have power, according to the rules they have established, to suspend a minister from his office, to which he had been appointed by a conference of that persuasion. The Court of Chancery had jurisdiction in such case, because it con

cerned the execution of the trusts of a deed under which the chapel was held; but the court did not decide simply upon the trusts of the deed, but partly upon the understanding and agreement of the parties, as manifested by the rules and usage of Wesleyan Methodists with respect to their ministers. Warren v. Newton, Chanc. 25 March, 1835. See Warren's Chronicle of Methodism.

the appointment of new trustees, proper assignments were to be made. On a bill, filed by some of the members of this meeting-house, against the trustees and committees for the general regulation of its affairs, Lord Eldon said, if this stands on the first deed only, and was the case of any other trust, it seemed to him, that if they had not filled up the whole number of the trustees and committees, the power of the remainder was gone. The deed was on the principle which, he believed, governed most dissenting congregations, that the trustees and minister are to be elected; and it provides, that due assignments are to made from time to time. These persons could not associate others with them to act as trustees; they must be trustees or nothing. In such a case, unless it differs from all other trusts, the court would fill up the number, referring it to the master to appoint proper persons; and when appointed, would direct them to carry on the trusts of the deed. Having neglected to fill up the vacancies, there was no one then who had power, neither the congregation, nor any one else could fill them up; it must be done by the court (k).

It already appears, that trustees of one mode of religious belief will not be permitted to administer the trusts of an institution established for promoting doctrines of a direct opposite tendency (1). Lord Eldon said, with reference to a trustee who had not acted for many years, in consequence of his differing in opinion from the majority of the trustees with respect to the object of the institution, that such trustee could not be discharged without a regular proceeding on the part of the remaining trustees, to replace him by a successor; and if the other trustees had been endeavouring to divert the institution from its original purpose, the court would never permit a trustee to be discharged from his office for endeavouring to preserve the object of the institution (m).

Where a deed contemplates the event, that the trustees

(k) Foley v. Wontner, 2 Jac. & Walk. 245. See ante, pp. 736, 737. (1) Ante, pp. 749, 752, 761.

(m) Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 412.