CHAPTER IV.

ATTENTION AND ABSTRACTION. "*

To understand clearly the nature of the mental phenomena, called Attention and Abstraction, two facts in our mental history need definitely to be understood, and borne in remembrance; facts which have a decided bearing on the nature and character of almost all the operations of mind.

The first is, that the objects of our conceptions are seldom, if ever, isolated, disconnected objects. On the contrary, there is an extended, and complex picture before the mind, including often a great variety of objects, with their several qualities, relations, and changes. In this mental picture, some objects seem clear and distinct, while others seem to float along in shadowy vagueness.

This fact must be evident to any mind that will closely examine its own mental operations, and it is also equally evident, when we consider the mode in which our ideas are gained by perception. We never gain our ideas in single, disconnected lineaments. We are continually viewing complex objects, with great varieties of qualities, and surrounded by a great variety of circumstances, which unitedly form a whole in one act of perception. Indeed there are few objects either of perception or of conception, which however close the process of abstraction, do not remain complex in their nature. The simplest forms of matter are combined ideas of extension, figure, colour, and relation. These different ideas we gain by the aid of different senses, and of course our conceptions of objects which have such qualities are combinations of different qualities, in an object which the mind considers as one.

and distinct from other objects. Each object then in any mental picture, is itself a complex object, and each mental picture is formed by a combination of such complex objects. If the experiment is tried, it will be found very difficult, if not impossible to mention a name, which recalls any object of sense, in which the conception recalled by the word is a single disconnected thing, without any idea of place, or any attendant circumstances. And as before remarked, almost all objects of sense are complex objects, combining several ideas, which were gained through the instrumentality of different senses. The idea of colour in any object is gained by one sense, of position, shape, and consistency by another, and other qualities and powers which the mind associates with it, by other senses.

The other fact, necessary to the correct understanding of this subject is, the influence which the desires and emotions have, upon the character, both of the perceptions and conceptions, with which they co-exist.

It will be found that our sensations vary in vividness and distinctness according to the strength and permanency of certain feelings of desire, which co-exist with them. For example, we are continually hearing a multitude of sounds, but in respect to many of them, as we feel no desire to know the cause or nature of them, these sensations are so feeble and indistinct, as scarcely ever to be recalled to the mind, or recognized by any act of memory. But should we hear some strange wailing sound, immediately the desire would arise, to ascertain its nature and cause. It would immediately become an object of distinct and vivid perception, and continue so, as long as the desire lasted. While one sensation becomes thus clear and prominent, it will be found that other sensations, which were co-existing with it, will become feebler and seem to die away. The same impressions may still be made upon the eye as before, the same sounds that had previously been regarded, may still strike upon the ear, but while the

desire continues to learn the cause of that strange wailing sound, the other sensations would all be faint and indistinct. When this desire is gratified, then other sensations would resume their former distinctness and prominency, and this would be disregarded.

Our conceptions, in like manner, are affected by the coexistence of emotion, or desire. If, for example, we are employing ourselves in study, or mental speculations, the vividness of our conceptions will vary, in exact proportion to the interest we feel, in securing the object about which our conceptions are employed. If we feel but little interest in the subject of our speculations, every conception connected with them will be undefined and indistinct. But if the desire of approbation, or the admonitions of conscience, or the hope of securing some future good, stimulate our desire, immediately our conceptions grow more vivid and clear, and the object at which we aim is more readily and speedily secured. The great art then of quickening mental vigor, and activity, the art of gaining clear and quick conceptions, is to awaken interest and excite desire. When this is secured, conceptions will immediately become bright and clear, and all mental operations will be carried forward with facility and speed.

The distinction between Attention and Abstraction is not great, but as it is recognized in the use of language, it needs to be definitely understood. Attention has been defined as "the direction of the mind to some particular object, from the interest which is felt in that object." It consists simply in a feeling of desire, co-existing with our sensations and conceptions, and thus rendering them vivid and distinct; while in consequence of this fact, all other sensations and conceptions seem to fade and grow indistinct. Attention seems to be the generic exercise, and Abstraction one species of the same thing. Attention is used to express the interest which attends our perceptions or conceptions as whole objects, thus rendering them clear and distinct from other surrounding objects.

Abstraction is that particular act of Attention, which makes one part, or one quality of a complex object, become vivid and distinct, while other parts and qualities, grow faint and indistinct. Thus in viewing a landscape, we should be said to exercise the power of Attention, if we noticed some object, such as a stream or a bridge, while other objects were more slightly regarded; and we should exercise the power of Abstraction if we noticed the colour of the bridge or the width of the stream, while their other qualities were not equally regarded.

It is the power of Abstraction which is the foundation of language, in its present use. Were it not for the power which the mind has of abstracting certain qualities and circumstances of things, and considering them as separate and distinct from all other parts and qualities, no words could be used, except such as specify particular individuals. Every object that meets our eye would demand a separate and peculiar name, thus making the acquisition of language the labour of a life. But now, the mind possesses the power of abstacting a greater, or fewer number of qualities, and to these qualities a name is given, and whenever these qualities are found combined in any object, this name can be applied. Thus the name, animal is given to any thing which has the qualities of existence and animal life, and the name quadruped is given to any object which has the qualities of animal life, and of four legs.

Every thing which is regarded by the mind as a separate existence, must have some peculiar quality, or action, or circumstance of time or place, to distinguish it from every other existence. Were there not something either in the qualities or circumstances, which made each object in some respects peculiar, there would be no way to distinguish one thing from another.

A proper name, is one which is used to recall the properties and circumstances which distinguish one individual existence from every other. Such is the word, Mount Blanc, which

recalls certain qualities and circumstances, that distinguish one particular thing from all others; and the name Julius Cæsar, which recalls the character, qualities, and circumstances which distinguish one being from every other. Some words then, are used to recall the peculiar qualities and circumstances of individual existences, and are called proper names; other words are used to recall, a combination of certain qualities and circumstances, which unitedly are an object of conception, but are not considered by the mind as belonging to any real particular existence. These last words are called general terms or common names.

A great variety of names may be applied to the same object of conception or perception, according to the number of qualities and circumstances which are abstracted by the mind. Thus an object may be called a thing, and in this case, the simple circumstance of existence, is what is recalled by the word. The same object may be called an animal, and then the qualities of existence and animal life are made the objects of conception. It can also be called a man, and then in addition to the qualities recalled by the word animal, are recalled those qualities which distinguish man from all other animals. It can also be called a father, and then to the qualities recalled by the term man, is added the circumstance of his relation to some other being. The same object can be called La Fayette, and then to all the preceding qualities, would be added in our conceptions, all those peculiar qualities and circumstances which distinguish the hero of France from all other existences.

The following will probably illustrate the mode by which the human mind first acquires the proper use of these general terms. The infant child learns to distinguish one existence from another, probably long before he acquires the use of any names, by which to designate them to others. We may suppose that a little dog is an inmate of his nursery, and that with the sight of this animal has often been associated the sound of