Imatges de pàgina
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the word dog. This is so often repeated, that by the principle of association, the sight of the object, and the sound of the word, invariably recur together. He observes that this sound is used by those around him, in order to direct his attention to the animal, and he himself soon uses the word to direct the attention of others, in the same way. But soon it happens that another animal is introduced into his apartment, which in many respects resembles the object he has learned to call a dog. To this new object he would apply the same term, but he finds that others use the sound cat in connection with the sight of this new animal. He soon learns the difference between the two objects, the particulars in which they agree, and those in which they differ. He afterwards notices other animals of these species, and observes that some have the qualities to which the term dog is applied, and others those to which the term cat is applied. He continues to notice animals of other kinds, and after long experience, in this way, he learns to apply names to designate a particular combination of qualities, and whenever these qualities are found combined, he has a term ready to apply to them. He learns that some words are used to point out the peculiar qualities, which distinguish one thing from all others, and at the same time other words are used, which simply recall qualities, but do not designate any particular existence to which they belong. Thus the term boy, he uses for the purpose of designating qualities, without conceiving of any particular existence in which they are found, while the term Mary or Charles is used to designate the qualities and circumstances of the particular existence he finds as the companion of his sports.

All objects of our perceptions are arranged into classes, according to the particular combination of qualities, which are recalled by the names employed to designate them. For example, all objects that have the qualities of existence, and of animal life, are arranged in one class, and are called animals. All those which have the qualities recalled by the term ani

mal, and the additional qualities of wings and feathers, are arranged in another class called birds. All those objects which have the qualities included in the term bird, together with several additional qualities, are arranged in another class and called eagles.

To these various classes the terms genera and species are applied. These terms always imply a relation, or the comparison of one class with another, in reference to the number of qualities to be recalled by the terms employed. Thus the class bird, is called a species of the class animal, because it includes all the qualities that are combined in the conception recalled by that term, and others in addition. But the class bird is called a genus in relation to the class eagle, because it contains only a part of the qualities which are recalled by the term eagle.

A genus may be defined as a class of things, the name of which, recalls fewer particulars, than the name of another class or species, with which it is compared. The name of the species with which it is compared recalls all the qualities designated by the name of the genus, and some additional circumstances. Bird is a genus when compared with the class eagle.

A species, is a class of things, the name of which, recalls more particulars, than the name of another class or genus with which it is compared. The name of the genus with which it is compared recalls a part only of the qualities of the species. Bird is a species, when compared with the class animal.

In examining language it will be found that almost all the signs which are in common use in communicating ideas, are names of various genus and species. That is, they are names used to recall various qualities and circumstances according to which all our ideas of things are arranged in genera and species. It is only the class of words called proper names, that are employed to recall to the minds of others, concep

tions of the particular existences by which we are surrounded. Some of these surrounding existences are furnished with these particular names, and others can be designated and distinguished from each other, only by a description. Thus we see some hills around our horizon, some of which have a peculiar name, and others can be designated; only by describing the circumstances which distinguish them from all other hills.

A definition of a word, is an enumeration of the several qualities and circumstances, which are recalled to the mind, when the term is used. Thus if the word animal is to be defined, we do it by mentioning the circumstances of its existence and of animal life, as the ideas recalled by the word. Generally a word is defined, by mentioning the name of some genus of which the thing intended is a species, and then adding those particular qualities which the species has, in addition to those included under the genus. Thus if we are to define the word man, we mention the genus animal, and then the qualities which man has in addition to those possessed by other animals. Thus "man is an animal, having the human form, and a spirit endowed with intellect, susceptibility, and will." There are some words which recall only one quality or circumstance, and which therefore cannot be defined, like the words which recall various qualities and circumstances. Such are the words joy, sorrow, colour, &c. Such words as these are defined by mentioning the times, or circumstances, when the mind is conscious of the existence of the idea to be recalled by the word. Thus joy is "a state of mind which exists when any ardent desire is gratified." Colour is “a quality of objects which is perceived when light enters the eye." Those conceptions, which can be defined by enumerating the several qualities and circumstances which compose them, are called complex ideas, and the words used to designate them, are called complex terms. Such words as landscape, wrestler, giant, and philosopher, are complex terms.

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The word landscape recalls a complex idea of various material things. The word wrestler recalls an idea of a material object and one of its actions. The word giant, recalls an idea of a thing and its relation as to size. The word philosopher recalls the idea of a thing and one of its qualities. Those conceptions which are not composed of several qualities and circumstances, but are themselves a single quality or circumstance, are called simple ideas, and the words used to recall them, are called simple terms. Such words as sweetness, loudness, depth, pain, and joy, are simple terms. Some terms which apply to emotions of the mind are entirely simple, such as sorrow, joy, and happiness. Others are words which recall an idea of a simple emotion and of its cause, such, for example, as gratitude, which expresses the idea of an emotion of mind and also that it was caused by some benefit conferred.

CHAPTER V.

ASSOCIATION.

The causes of the particular succession of our ideas, and the control which the mind has in regulating this succession, is a subject no less interesting than important. For if by any act of choice the mind has the power of regulating its own thoughts and feelings, then man is a free agent and an accountable being; but if the conceptions and the emotions that attend them, depend entirely upon the constitution of things, and thus, either directly or indirectly, on the will of the Creator, then man cannot be accountable for that over which he can have no control.

In the preceding chapter, has been illustrated the effect which the co-existence of desire has in regard both to our

sensations and our conceptions, tending to make those which are fitted to accomplish the object desired, very vivid and prominent, while others to a greater or less extent disappear. The mind is continually under the influence of some desire. It constantly has some plan to accomplish, some cause to search out, or some gratification to secure. The present wish or desire of the mind, imparts an interest to whatever canception appears calculated to forward this object. Thus if the mathematician has a problem to solve, and this is the leading desire of the mind, among the various conceptions that arise, those are the most interesting which are viewed as fitted to his object, and such immediately become vivid and distinct. If the painter or the poet is laboring to effect some new creation of his art, and has this as the leading object of desire, whatever conceptions seem best fitted to his purpose, are immediately invested with interest and become distinct and clear. If the merchant, or the capitalist, or the statesman, has some project which he is toiling to accomplish, whatever conceptions appear adapted to his purpose, soon are glowing and defined, in consequence of the interest with which desire thus invests them.

From this it appears that the nature of the desire, or governing purpose of mind, will in a great measure determine the nature and the succession of its conceptions. If a man has chosen to find his chief happiness in securing power and honour, then those conceptions will be the most interesting to his mind that best fall in with this object. If he has chosen to find happiness in securing the various gratifications of sense, then those conceptions that best coincide with this desire will become prominent. If a man has chosen to find his chief enjoyment in doing the will of God, then his conceptions will to a great extent, be conformed to this object of desire. The current of a man's thoughts, therefore, becomes one, and the surest mode, of determining the governing purpose, or leading desire of the mind.

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