Imatges de pàgina
PDF
EPUB

which they differ, so that two objects are thus brought together before the mind. It is owing to this fact, therefore, that objects which resemble each other, or which are very much contrasted in their qualities are very commonly united in our conceptions. If, for example, we see the countenance of a stranger, some feature will be recognized as familiar. Desire

wil be awakened to know where, and in what other countenance we have seen such a feature, or such an expression. This particular feature will thus become abstracted, and vivid, and will soon recall that other combination of features for which we are seeking, and of which this has formed a part in our past experience. Thus two objects will be brought before the mind at once, the person who is the stranger, and a conception of another person whom this stranger resembles. All our ideas of contrast are relative. One thing cannot be conceived of as very high or very low, as very large or very small, without a previous comparison with some object, to determine this relation. Our ideas of poverty and riches, or of happiness and misery, are also relative. A person is always considered poor or rich, happy or miserable, by comparing his lot with that of others, by whom he is surrounded. As therefore all ideas of resemblance, or of contrast, are gained by comparing two objects together, our conceptions often unite objects that resemble each other, or that are contrasted with each other.

CHAPTER VI.

IMAGINATION.

All operations of mind which are not produced by material things acting upon the senses, consist of a continual succession of conceptions. Some of these conceptions are exact pictures of past perceptions, and are attended by the consciousness

that they have existed before, and such are called ideas of Memory. Others are conceptions which, by the process of Association are continually recurring, and arranging themselves in new combinations, according to certain laws or principles of association. Imagination has been defined, as "that power which the mind possesses of arranging conceptions in new combinations," and it can readily be seen, that this includes all the ordinary succession of thought, except that of perception and memory. The term Imagination, has been used in rather a vague manner, by writers on the subject; sometimes, appearing to signify all that succession of conceptions, which recur according to the laws of association, and sometimes to be used in a more restricted sense. The more definite meaning is the one to which the term is most commonly applied. It seems to be the one which precision and accuracy in the use of terms would demand, and will now be pointed out.

The mind is susceptible of certain emotions, which are called emotions of taste. These more specifically, are called emotions of beauty, sublimity, and novelty. Such emotions are awakened by certain objects in nature, by certain works of art, and by the use of language, which recalls conceptions of these objects. Those objects which awaken such emotions, are called objects of taste, and those arts which enable us to produce combinations that will awaken such emotions, are called the fine arts.

Among the fine arts, or the works of taste, are ordinarily classed, painting, music, sculpture, architecture, ornamental gardening, and poetry. The art of the painter consists in combining according to certain rules of proportion and fitness of outline and colour, certain objects, which either from their peculiar character, or from the fitness of their combination in effecting a given design, awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity. The highest perfection of this art consists, not so much in close imitation, as in the nature of the combinations,

and their unity and fitness in producing the effect designed by the artist. The art of the sculptor is similar in its nature, and differs chiefly in the materials employed, and in being limited to a much more restricted number of objects for combination. The art of the architect consists in planning and constructing edifices, intended either for use or ornament, and in so arranging the different parts as to awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity from the display of utility, fitness, grandeur of extent, or order of proportion. The art of the musician consists in combining sounds, so as to produce such melodies or harmonies, as will awaken varied emotions in the mind. The power of this art over the human mind is much superior to that of those enumerated, because it can call forth, both a greater variety, and more powerful emotions than the others. The art of the poet consists in such a use of language as will recall objects of beauty or sublimity, in combinations that are pleasing to the mind; or as will by the description and expression of varied emotion in other minds awaken similar feelings in the breast of the reader. The art of ornamental gardening consists in such an arrangement of varied objects which compose a landscape as will awaken emotions of beauty, from a display of unity of design, order, fitness, and utility.

Imagination then may be defined as the power the mind exercises, when under the influence of desire, it forms those combinations of conceptions, which will awaken the emotions of taste.

The painter or the poet, when he attempts the exercise of his art, has some general leading desire of an object to be secured. Under the influence of this desire, all those conceptions, recurring by the principle of association, which appear fitted to accomplish this object, immediately become vivid and distinct, and are clearly retained in the mind. As other conceptions succeed, other objects are found which will forward the general design, and these also are retained, and thus the process continues, till the object aimed at is accomplished, and by the pen or pencil retained in durable characters.

The power of mind to which the term Imagination is thus restricted, differs in no respect from other acts of mind when it is under the influence of desire, except simply in the nature of the objects of desire. If it is the desire of the mind to establish a proposition, by a process of mathematical reasoning, the mind is engaged in the same process of conception as when it is engrossed with the desire to form some combination of taste. In both cases some desire stimulates the mind, and whatever conceptions appear fitted to accomplish this desire, immediately become vivid and distinct.

CHAPTER VII.

JUDGMENT.

The term Judgment is used with some varied shades of meaning, and often with much vagueness. Its primary meaning is, "that power of the mind by which it notices relations.” It is often used to signify all the intellectual powers, among which it is the most important one, as without it no act of memory could take place. Thus we hear it said, that in certain cases the feelings and the judgment are in opposition, or that the heart and the judgment are not in agreement. It is used to signify any act of the mind, when a comparison is made between two things, or between the truths asserted in any proposition, and a truth already believed. The act called Memory is a conception attended with one specific act of Judgment, by which a present state of mind is compared with a past, and the relation of resemblance perceived.

The nature of our ideas of relation are very different, according to the object or purpose for which the comparison is made. If objects are compared in reference to time, we learnt

some one of the relations of past, present, or future. No idea of time can be gained, except by comparing one period of time with another, and thus noticing their relations. All dates are gained by comparing one point of time with some specified event, such as the birth of the Saviour, or some particular period in the revolution of the earth around the sun. If objects are compared in reference to the succession of our conceptions, or perceptions, we gain the ideas of such relations as are expressed by the terms firstly, secondly, and thirdly. If objects are compared in reference to the degree of any quality, we gain an idea of such relations as are expressed by the terms, brighter, sweeter, harder, louder, &c. If objects are compared in reference to proportion, we gain ideas of such relations as are expressed by the terms, an eighth, a half, &c. If objects are compared in reference to the relation of parts to a whole, we gain such ideas as are expressed by the terms, part, whole, remainder, &c.

The process of classifying objects and the use of language, depend upon the power of Judgment. For if we see an object possessing certain qualities, in order to apply the name, we must feel their resemblance to the qualities to which such a name has been applied in past experience, and this feeling of resemblance is an act of judgment. The application of a name then always implies the exercise of the power of judgment, by which a comparison is made between the present qualities observed in an object, and the same qualities which affected the mind, when the name has formerly been employed. It also implies the act of association, by which the perception of certain qualities recalls the idea of the sound or object with which they have been repeatedly conjoined.

The mental process called Reasoning, is nothing but a connected succession of acts of judgment. It is a comparison of what is asserted in a given proposition with some truth which is believed, or has been established by evidence, and

« AnteriorContinua »