ties that are insignificant and little, are connected with those which are grand and sublime. The following may be given as an example of the union of incongruous ideas, in bombastic writing:

"And now had Phoebus in the lap
"Of Thetis taken out his nap;
"And like a lobster boiled, the morn

"From black to red began to turn."

The sublime ideas connected with the sun, and the classical associations united with the name of Thetis, would not naturally have recalled the idea of so insignificant an animal, nor the changes produced in cooking it, and these connections violate the ordinary laws of association.

Emotions of the ludicrous are also produced, by the sudden conception of some cause of association in ideas, which has never before been discovered, this discovery awakens the • pleasurable emotion of mirth. Thus if ideas have been united in the mind on some other principle of association than that of resemblance, the sudden discovery of some unexpected resemblance, will produce emotions of the ludicrous. This is the foundation of the merriment produced by puns, where the ideas which the words represent, would never have been united by the principles of association, but the union of these ideas is effected on the principle of resemblance between the sounds of the words which recall these ideas. When the mind suddenly perceives this unexpected foundation for the union of ideas that in all other respects are incongruous, an emotion of the ludicrous is produced. This is also the foundation of the pleasure which is felt in the use of alliteration in poetry where a resemblance is discovered in the initial sound of words that recall ideas, which in all other respects are incongruous.

Among the susceptibilities, the emotions of taste have always been distinguished, and treated of as a peculiarly distinct class. Why it is, that certain objects of sight, and certain sounds or combinations of sound awaken emotions, more than other sights and sounds; and why the perceptions of the eye and ear, should so much more powerfully affect the mind, than those of the other senses, certainly are objects for interesting enquiry. In attempting the discussion of this subject, the following particulars need to be considered.

I. All pleasurable emotions are caused either by sensation, or by conception; for we have no other ideas but of these two kinds. Of course, emotions of taste must be caused, either by sensation alone, or by conception alone, or by the united influence of these two modes of thought. That they are not occasioned by sensation alone, must be evident from the fact, that infants and children, who have the same sensations as matured persons, do not experience the emotions of taste, in view of the most perfect specimens of the fine arts. A combination of gaudy colours, or a string of glittering beads, will delight a child more than the most finished productions of a Raphael, or a Phidias. That it is not conception alone, which awakens such emotions, is manifest from the fact that it is the perception of objects which are either sublime or beautiful, Of course that awakens the most vivid emotions of this kind.

it is inevitable, that emotions of taste are caused by the combined operation of sensation and conception, by means of their connection with some past co-existing emotions.

II. Perceptions and conceptions, can recall the emotions which have been connected with them, and emotions can also recall a conception of the objects with which they have been united. For example, if some dark wood, had been the scene of terror and affright, either the perception, or the conception of this wood, would recall the emotions of fear, which had coexisted with it. If on some other occasion, a strong emotion of fear should be awakened, this would probably recall a conception of the wood with which it had formerly been united. It is no uncommon fact in our experience, to have circumstances about us that recall unusually sad and mournful feelings, for which we are wholly unable to account. No doubt at such times, some particular objects or some particular combination of circumstances, which were formerly united with painful emotions, again recur, and recall the emotions with which they were once connected, while the mind is wholly unable to remember the fact of their past existence. In like manner pleasurable emotions may be awakened, by certain objects of perception, when the mind is equally unable to trace the

cause.

III. Objects of perception, recall the emotions connected with them, much more vividly than objects of conception can do. Thus if we revisit the scenes of our childhood, the places of the sorrows and the joys of early days; how much more vividly are the emotions recalled, which were formerly connected with these scenes, than any conception of these objects could awaken.

IV. Certain sensations will be found to recall emotions similar to those awakened by the intellectual operations of mind. Thus the entrance of light produces an emotion similar to the discovery of some truth, and the emotion felt while groping in doubt and uncertainty, resembles that experienced when shrouded in darkness. Great care and anxiety produce a state of mind similar to what is felt when the body is pressed down by a heavy weight. The upward spring of an elas

tic body, awakens feelings resembling those that attend the hearing of good news, and thus with many other sensations. From this fact originates much of the figurative language in common use; as when knowledge is called light, and ignorance darkness, and care called a load, and joy is said to make the heart leap.

V. It has previously been shown that the discovery of certain operations and emotions of mind affords much more pleasure, than attends mere sensation. Those who have experienced the exciting animation felt at developements of splendid genius, and have experienced the pure delight resultting from the interchange of affection, well can realize that no sensitive gratification could ever be exchanged for it, or thought of, in comparison with it. Whatever objects, therefore, most vividly recall those emotions which are awakened when such qualities are apprehended, will be most interesting to the mind. Now it will appear that there are no modes by which one mind can learn the character and feelings of another, but by means of the eye and ear. A person both deaf and blind, could never, except to an exceedingly limited extent, learn either the intellectual operations, or the emotions of another mind. Of course, it is by means of certain forms, colours, motions, and sounds, that we acquire those ideas which are the most interesting and animating to the soul. It is by the blush of modesty, the paleness of fear, the flush of indignation, that colour aids in giving an idea of the emotions of the mind. The pallid hue of disease, the sallow complexion of age, the pure and bright colours of childhood, and the delicate blendings of the youthful complexion, have much influence in conveying ideas of the immediate qualities of mind in certain particulars. The colour and flashing expressions of the eye also, have very much to do, with our apprehensions of the workings of mind. As it regards motion, as aiding in imparting such ideas, it is by the curl of the lip that contempt is expressed, by the arching brow that curiosity and sur

prise are exhibited, by the scowling front that anger and discontent are displayed, and by the various muscular movements of the countenance, that the passions and emotions of the mind are portrayed. It is by the motions of the body and limbs, also, that strong emotions are exhibited, as in the clasped hand of supplication, the extended arms of affection, and the violent contortions of anger. Form and outline also have their influence. The sunken eye of grief, the hollow cheek of care and want, the bending form of sorrow, the erect position of dignity, the curvature of haughtiness and pride, are various modes of expressing the qualities and emotions of mind. But it is by the varied sounds and intonations of voice, chiefly, that intellect glances abroad, and the soul is poured forth at the lips. The quick and animated sounds of cheerfulness, joy, and hope; the softer tones of meekness, gentleness, and love; the plaintive notes of sympathy, sorrow, and pain; the firm tone of magnanimity, fortitude, patience, and selfdenial; all exhibit the pleasing and interesting emotions of the soul. Nor less expressive, though more painful, are the harsh sounds of anger, malice, envy, and discontent.

VI. Not only are certain forms, colours, motions, and sounds, the medium by which we gain a knowledge of the intellectual operations and emotions of other minds, but they are the means by which we discover and designate those material objects, which are causes of comfort, utility, and enjoyment. Thus it is by the particular form, and colour, that we distinguish the fruits and the food which minister to our support. By the same means we discriminate between noxious or useful plants and animals, and distinguish all those conveniences, and contrivances, which contribute to the comfort of man. Of course, certain forms and colours, are connected in the mind with certain emotions of pleasure that have attended them as causes of comfort and enjoyment.

In what precedes, it appears, that it is those emotions which are awakened by the apprehension of certain intellectual op