there is no operation of the Spirit at all, but only of the word which he has dictated. We hold that there is an operation of the Spirit; an inward operation; an operation on the mind. But we hold, at the same time, that this operation is with or by the truth, agreeably to the explicit testimonies of inspired apostles :-James i. 18, "Of his own will begat he us, by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures:"-1 Pet. i. 23, “Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever:-And this is the word, which by the gospel is preached unto you."-And the same word continues, under the influence of the same Spirit, the instrumental means of progressive sanctification:-66 When ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of man, but, as it is in truth, the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe :"- "He that is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him"-(that is, the incorruptible seed of the word)" and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." 1 Thess. ii. 13. 1 John iii. 9.-In as far, however, as the operation of the Spirit is inward, there is a sense in which it is also immediate :- -that is, it is not an operation upon the truth; for of this it is impossible to form any conception whatever :it is an operation upon the mind, when the truth is,

or has been, presented to it,—an operation, of which the mode is beyond our distinct apprehension, John iii. 8. but the reality of which is evinced in its results. When we deny it to be, in the Quaker sense, immediate, we mean that it does not consist in any direct communication of truth to the mind, independently of the existing revelation in the Holy Scriptures; but only in such a removal of the mind's natural blindness (a blindness arising from moral causes) as imparts a spiritual discernment of the excellence, and suitableness, and glory of the truth there revealed. It is immediate, as being upon the mind; it is mediate, as being by the truth.

A fourth and most glaring exemplification of the confusion arising from the adoption of a fallacious principle, is, Mr Barclay's confounding the truth of what God reveals with the reality of the revelation. No two things, surely, can be more distinct than these: yet mark how he writes, when he is proceeding to answer objections to the second part of his second proposition.—In that proposition he had affirmed, in regard to the "divine revelation, "or inward illumination," for which he contends, its independence of any more noble or certain rule and touchstone," whether it be "the outward testimony of the Scrip"tures, or the natural reason of man;" asserting it to be as "evident and clear of itself," and as assuredly "forcing by its own evidence and clearness, the

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"well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly

moving the same thereunto, even as the common "principles of natural truths do move and incline the "mind to a natural assent: as, that the whole is "greater than its part; that two contradictories can"not be both true nor both false."*-Now, I have already asked-even on the supposed admission of the confidence being legitimate that is placed in this immediate revelation by those who are themselves the subjects of it, what is it to others? Are others to trust to it, without any credentials produced on the part of those who pretend to it? Mr Barclay seems to have felt the fairness and the force of this objection, and even, (notwithstanding the strong terms used by him in his proposition) of the objection taken from the possible uncertainty to the very person himself, of the reality of the communication:-" The most usual objection," says he, "is, that these reve“lations are uncertain.-But this bespeaketh much "ignorance in the opposers: for we distinguish be"tween the thesis and the hypothesis,—that is, be"tween the proposition and supposition. For it is "one thing to affirm, that the true and undoubted "revelation of God's will is certain and infallible; "and another thing to affirm that this or that parti"cular person or people is led infallibly by this reve

"lation in what they speak or write, because they "affirm themselves to be led by the inward and im"mediate revelation of the Spirit. The first only is "asserted by us; the latter may be called in ques"tion. The question is not, who are or are not so "led?-but whether all ought not or may not be so "led?"*

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"The first only is asserted by us." What is it? "That the true and undoubted revelation of God's 'Spirit is certain and infallible !" And is this really what Mr B. and his friends assert?-this all that they assert? this truism,-which, it may be presumed, there never existed a creature possessing reason, on earth or in the universe, that could question ?--Surely you must at once be sensible of this extraordinary fallacy. The point in question between us has no relation to the infallible certainty of what God reveals, but solely to the reality of the revelation. If this be ascertained, there can be no doubt about the other. It is here admitted by Barclay, that a man may "affirm himself to be led by the inward and immediate revelation of the Spirit," and yet that his authority may be "called in question," -doubted, that is, and disbelieved:—which amounts to the same thing as admitting that the man himself may be deceived! The query, therefore, comes

back upon us, What is the test?

Are the immediate suggestions professedly received by one man, to be judged of by the immediate suggestions professedly received by another? Which have the claim to preference? One man is as much entitled to dispute the alleged revelations of another, as the other can be to dispute his. Is there no determinate common standard for both? When Barclay says, "The

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question is not, who are or are not so led; but whe"ther all ought not or may not be so led;" he surely deludes himself. For, in the first place, the proposition that "all ought to be, or may be, so led," is by no means an identical proposition with that which he had just stated to be the affirmation of Friends,— namely, that "the true and undoubted revelation of God's Spirit is certain and infallible:"--and secondly, Of what avail can the admission be, that "all ought "to be, or may be, so led," if there be no means of determining with certainty when they are so led? If this be left indeterminate, the proposition is the most useless and futile imaginable.-Yet, according to Barclay, the professed subject of immediate revelation may deceive himself. What, then, are others to do with his alleged communications? Are they not entitled to demand credentials? Assuredly. For, observe, even on the assumption that the Scriptures were admitted to be the test, it is not enough that such communications abide the test. This, I say, is not