therefore, all that we can conceive, or pronounce concerning it, must be merely hypothetical; and provided that every perfon is fully fatisfied that his own ideas of the Divine effence are confiftent with the known attributes of divinity, they must necessarily be equally fafe, and equally innocent. We are all agreed with refpect to every thing that concerns us, viz. the divine works, and the divine attributes; and we differ only with respect to an opinion which, circumstanced as this is, cannot poffibly affect us.

It is faid, that matter can only be acted upon, and is neceffarily incapable of acting, or beginning action. This conclufion we have been led to form, by obferving that every motion in matter, with which we are acquainted, was preceded by fome other motion; which we therefore confider, and properly enough, asthe cause of the fubfequent motion. But, for the very fame reason, we might conclude, that what we call fpirit, or mind, is equally incapable of beginning action or motion; because every idea, every thought, and every determination of the mind of man, is preeeded, and, ftrictly speaking, caufed by fome other idea of the mind, or fenfation of the body; and, therefore, judging by what we know of ourselves, mind ought to be concludto be as incapable of beginning motion as the body itself. As far as we know from experience, both are equally paffive, the one being abfolutely governed by intellectual laws,

and influences, and the other by corporeal

ones.

Of the beginning of motion, or action, we must fit down with acknowledging, that we have, in reality, no conception at all; and the difficulty is by no means removed, or in the smallest degree leffened, by shifting it from matter to mind. Mr. Locke very juftly obferves, Effay, vol. ii. p. 147, that "it is as "hard to conceive felf motion in a created im"material, as in a created material being, con"fider it how we will." And certainly the difficulty of our conception is not leffened by transferring it from a created to an uncreated being.

We know there must be a firft caufe of all things, because things do actually exift, and could never have exifted without a caufe, and all fecondary caufes neceffarily lead us to a primary one. But of the nature of the exiftence of this primary caufe, concerning which we know nothing but by its effects, we cannot have any conception. We are abfolutely confounded, bewildered, and loft, when we attempt to fpeculate concerning it, and it is no wonder that this fhould be the cafe. We have no data to go upon, and no force of mind to support us in it. All we can fay is, that this fpeculation, attended as it is, with infuperable difficulties, is attended with just the fame, and no greater difficulty, on the idea of the mind being material or immaterial. And the fyftem of materialism has unqueftion

ably

ably this advantage, that it is entirely free from another difficulty, viz. how an immaterial fubftance can act upon matter; a difficulty which, in my idea, amounts to an abfolute impoffibility, as those substances have hitherto been defined.

As to the difficulty arifing from the divine material effence penetrating other matter, it has no place at all in the hypothefis advanced from Mr. Boscovich and Mr. Michell; and certainly this idea is much more confonant to the idea which the facred writers give us of the omnipresence of the divine Being, and of his filling all in all, than that of a being who bears no relation to space, and therefore cannot properly be faid to exift any where; which is the doctrine of the rigid immaterialists.

In the fcriptures, the divine Being is faid to be a Spirit; but all that is there meant by fpirit is an invifible power. The divine works are visible and astonishing, but himself no man bas feen, or can fee.

That fuch an idea as many have, or affect to have, of the strict immateriality of the divine nature, as not existing in space, is not an idea of much importance, at least, may with certainty be concluded from its not being fuggested to us in the fcriptures, and especially in the Old Teftament. All that we are there taught concerning the nature of God, is that he made all things, that he fees and knows all things, that he is present in all places, and that he fuperintends and governs

all

all things; alfo, that he had no beginning, that he can have no end, and that he is incapable of any change. Farther than this we are not taught.

On the contrary, it appears to me, as will be seen in its proper place, that the idea which the fcriptures give us of the divine nature is that of a Being, properly speaking, every where prefent, conftantly fupporting, and at pleasure controling the laws of nature, but not the object of any of our fenfes; and that, out of condefcenfion, as it were, to the weaknefs of human apprehenfion, he chofe, in the early ages of the world, to fignify his peculiar prefence by fome vifible fymbol, as that of a fupernatural bright cloud, or fome other appearance, which could not but impress their minds with the idea of a real local prefence. He is alfo generally reprefented as refiding in the heavens, and from thence infpecting and governing the world, and efpecially the affairs of men. This, indeed, is not a philofophically just, but it is an eafy, and a very innocent manner of conceiving concerning God.

SECTION X.

Of the Principles of HUMAN NATURE according to the Scriptures.

HAD

AD man confifted of two parts, so effentially different from each other as matter and Spirit are now represented to be, and had the immaterial been the principal part, and the material system only subservient to it, it might have been expected that there would have been fome exprefs mention of it, or declaration concerning it (this being a thing of fo much confequence to us) in the fcriptures, which contain the hiftory of the creation, mortality, and refurrection of man. And yet there is not only a most remarkable filence on the fubject of the immateriality of the human foul in thefe facred books, even where we fhould most naturally have expected fome account of it, but many things are there advanced, which unavoidably lead us to form a different conclufion; and nothing can be be found in thofe books to countenance the vulgar opinion, except a few paffages ill tranflated, or ill understood, ftanding in manifeft contradiction to the uniform tenor of the reft.

The hiftory of the creation of man is fuccinctly delivered in Gen. ii. 7. And the Lord God formed man of the duft of the ground, and

breathed