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tive trichotomy. (a) The Biblical statement as to creation (Gen. ii. 7) implies that man was not endowed with an animating soul before or apart from the inbreathing of the Spirit. (6) That the terms nephesh, and yuxń, soul, are used as in some degree equivalents of ruach, TTVEÛja, spirit, is implied in frequent passages in which they designate the self-conscious thinking ego, e. 8., Jer. iv. 19: “Thou hast heard, O my soul (nephesh which corresponds to youxń), the sound of the trumpet,” etc. In 1 Sam. XX. 4, Lam. iii. 24, Ps. cxxxix. 14, the soul is spoken of as desiring, speaking, and knowing. In Deut. iv. 9, memory is attributed to it. These are functions, not of a mere animal soul, but of the intelligent, rational, permanently self-identifying personal spirit of man. This attributing of them to the "soul” implies the use of this term as but another name for the same thing. (c) James ii. 26 writes : “The body without the spirit is dead.” How could this be said if the bodily life were due to a principle of vitality other than the spiritual essence? (d) “Glorify God in your body and in your spirit” sums up our whole man in two parts, and plainly uses spirit (TTVEūma) as an equivalent term for (yuxń). (e) In Matt. vi. 25, Jesus epitomizes care for ourselves as care for the body (oua) and the soul (yuxń). In Matt. X. 28, He admonishes: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul.” Can “soul” here mean the merely animal "life" which, in the trichotomistic view, is extinguished at death? In Mark viii. 36, He asks, “What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul ?" Can this be justly interpreted into a simple teaching of the selfevident truth that no worldly acquisitions can be profitable at the cost of the physical life? Deceased persons are sometimes called “souls” and sometimes
spirits,” used as equivalent terms, Ps. xvi. 10 and Acts ii. 27, “ Thou wilt not leave my soul (nephesh, yuxív) in hell ; " Rev. vi. 9, “I saw under the altar the souls (xruxas) of them that were slain;" Heb. xii. 23, "to the spirits (Ttvejuaoi) of just men made perfect.”
But if we reject trichotomy, how are we to understand the passages that seem so directly to imply it? The following points will sufficiently explain.
(1) The term soul, while expressing all man's spiritual essence acting in his higher faculties, and used interchangeably for this with the term spirit, is, rather than the latter, particularly employed to designate the sum total of the bodily activities and tendencies as the natural "life.” Thus, the whole life of the body, though due to the quickening of the spirit, is specially designated by “soul.” As it is thus employed in this particular application to the physical life—which the word spirit is not -it becomes the natural term to express the carnal or fleshly appetites, desires, passions, and depravities.
(2) The rupture in human nature by the fall and sin, dissolving the right control of the spirit, in its higher rational and moral powers, over the body, is peculiarly shown in the unregulated action and ascendency of the physical appetites and corrupt inclinations. Like the word nephesh in the Old Testament, in the New Testament soul (foxń) is specially used when the action of the sensuous nature is involved, the action which turns the o@ua (body) into oáp (flesh). This accounts for the fact that the adjective yuxíkos (psychical or sensual) in New Testament usage denotes a man who is governed by the “sensual” principle or animal life (Jude 19; 1 Cor. XV. 44; ii. 14 ; Jas. iii. 15). In like manner the adjective Tivematikos (spiritual) denotes a man who is governed by the higher reason, the 'soul' acting as voûs or veŪua, enlightened and strengthened by the Spirit of God.
(3) When St. Paul prays for the sanctification of “body, soul, and spirit” he is not making a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of man, but praying that grace may pervade and keep not only the higher powers of intellect and will, but all the lower life-impulses, inclinations, and passions by which the man is in danger of being carnalized. When he writes of the word of God as sharper than a two-edged sword, dividing “soul and spirit,” he simply assigns to the divine word a dividing efficacy which extends to the entire moral life of men, the language not being literal and scientific, but a highly figurative statement of the proper pervasiveness of the word's needed action.
FREE WILL Mention has already been made of man's creation "in the image and likeness” of God as his endowment with the sublime attributes of self-conscious rational intelligence, sensibility, and self-determination-gifts opening to him at once the inexpressibly lofty realities of fellowship with God's thoughts and will, and the blessedness of ethical excellence or holy character in such fellowship. The abuse of the free agency given by God, though it brought sin into man's nature, did not destroy the faculties that make up his essential being. And as the redemptive recovery through grace must, therefore, be through moral forces, dealing with moral agents for a moral change, a full analysis of man's psychological constitution might seem to be a prerequisite to the theological view of salvation. For, to effect such recovery, God necessarily comes into the souls or lives of men through their natural faculties of intelligence, conscience, and will. But since the capacity to know and feel are clear and undoubted, it seems sufficient here to deal only with the psychology of the will or the principle of freedom, and consequent personal responsibility.
This subject is one of great importance, deeply integrated in Christian theology and analyzed through long and acute discussion. But as it is not necessary to rehearse the weary metaphysical strife over some of its mysteries, but simply to exhibit the essential features of the actual truth, the discussion need not detain us long.
1. The Will, as the designation of a psychical faculty, is the soul's power of causality for choices. In it the ego, or personal self, acts as a self-determining, free agent. This means that the soul itself, in its powers of personality chooses—makes or causes its own choices in the presence of different possibilities in self-regulation. This direct causal relation of the soul to its own activities is essential in all its characteristic personal faculties. In the intellect the soul, as the personal ego, is causal for thought or knowing. The soul knows. In the sensibility, the soul is causal for feeling. It feels. So in the will, the soul is causal for choices or volitions. The soul wills. Each soul can say: 'I choose, make my choices,' in the presence of alternatives. This self-determination, of which every man is directly conscious, is not an illusion. The claim that it is an illusion must include denial of the reality of consciousness itself. For consciousness, the immediate and fundamental form of knowing, covers not only the actual choice, but the
power to make it as the soul's own elective act. To allege that this self-determination, of which every one is directly conscious, is an illusion would dissolve all human knowing and feeling, as well as willing, into unreality, phantasmagoria, and fraud. The further suggestion that not the person, but the “motives" playing upon him determine the choice, utterly misinterprets the actual relation between personality and motives. In sober sense every person knows that motives neither choose nor compel choice, but are only considerations or reasons in view of which he chooses or makes his choice.
2. This personal power of self-determination in the presence of, multiform motives is not reducible to what is often named “voluntariness," a mere spontaneity or passiveness, a movement due to some invisible, unfelt necessity, to external causation in fixed and inviolable enchainment of sequences, or as shut in by an eternal predestination of whatever is to come to pass, but is a capacity in freedom for alternative choice. It is not the freedom of the star to move in its orbit, nor of the stream to flow in its channel, but the high prerogative of self-direction in the free possibilities of life and conduct. If free-will is not at its innermost core such a faculty of actual election between open alternatives, to choose to do or not to do, to choose this or that or another thing, the whole conception of freeagency is but a dream, and the holding of any one responsible for anything is the basal injustice of human life. Bishop Butler's reminder that whatever speculative theories necessitarianism might put forth, the actual life and affairs of the world have to be conducted on the principle of freedom and responsibility, remains of