Imatges de pàgina
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is ftri&ly agreeable to his nature, and fince our intercourse with him is necessary to our virtue and happiness, he will certainly condefcend to us; fo that we may depend upon finding him to be what the best of his creatures hope, and expect concerning him.

It will not therefore be the fame thing, whether we apply to him for the good things we ftand in need of, or not. Do not the wifest and best of parents act in the fame manner towards their children? It has been the fource of great error, and rash judgement concerning the ways of God, to confine ourselves to the confideration of what God is in himself, and not to confider what it even becomes his wifdom and goodness, both to represent himself, and actually to be, with respect to his imperfect

creatures.

Befides, if good difpofitions be regarded as the only object and end of prayer, it should be confidered, that an addrefs to God for what we want is a teft of good difpofitions, as well as a means of improving them, fuppofing it be known to be the will of God, that we fhould pray to him. But it must be acknowledged that, without revelation, or fome exprefs intimation of the will of God, in this refpect, the reasonablenefs and obligation of prayer is not fo clearly, though fufficiently evident.

In fact, there are fimilar reafons for asking favours of God, as for thanking him for the favours we

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have received; fince it may be faid, that if we be truly grateful, it is quite unneceffary to tell the divine being that we are fo; and thus all intercourse with God by words must be cut off. But, certainly there can be no real impropriety in expreffing by words whatever is the language of the heart; and it can only be an unreasonable and dangerous refinement to distinguish, in this case, between love, gratitude, defire, or any other difpofition of mind.

CHAP.

HA

PART III.

Of the future expectations of mankind.

AVING endeavoured to inveftigate the rules of human duty, from the principles of natural reason, I fhall proceed to ascertain, from the fame principles, what we have to expect in confequence of our obfervance, or neglect of them.

The natural rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice, in this life, have been already mentioned occafionally. I, therefore, propose, in this fection, to confider the evidence with which nature furnishes us, concerning a future life, impartially ftating both its ftrength and its weakness.

1. The argument that, in general, has the most weight with the wife and good, in favour of a future life, is the promifcuous and unequal deftribution of good and evil in this world, in a general, indeed, but by no means an exact proportion to the degrees of moral worth; which feems to be inconfiftent with the perfect goodness and rectitude of God as our mortal governor. If, together with his attributes of infinite wifdom and power, he be alfo a lover of virtue, may it not be expected, it is said, that he will reward it more completely than is

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generally done in this world, especially in the cafe of a man facrificing his life to his integrity, when he evidently cuts himself off from all prospect of any reward, except in a future state. It is acknowledged that in this life we find all the perfection we could wifh, confidering it as a state of trial and discipline in which to form virtuous characters; but in order to complete this scheme, it seems to require another state, to which it may be fubfervient, and in which the characters that are formed here, may have a fuitable employment and reward.

2. There is in the human faculties a capacity for endless improvement, in a conftant advance from fenfual to intellectual pleasures, and these growing more complex and refined ad infinitum, provided it was not checked by that change in our conftitution which is at present produced by our approach to old age. Our comprehenfion of mind, likewise, increases with the experience of every day; whereby we are capable of enjoying more of the past and of the future together with the prefent, without limits, and whereby our happiness is capable of growing continually more stable and more exalted. In comparison of what we are evidently capable of, our present being is but the infancy of man. Here we acquire no more than the rudiments of knowledge and happiness. And can it be confiftent with the wifdom of God, to leave his workmanship fo un

finished,

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finished, as it must be, if a final ftop be put to all our improvements at death?

It is true, that we have no faculties but what have fome proper exercise in this life, and there is a kind of redundancy in all the powers of nature. It is the best provision against a deficiency. Brute creatures too have faculties fimilar to ours, fince they differ from us in degree more than in kind. But then the difference is fo great, especially with refpect to fome men and fome brutes, and man is fo evidently the moft diftinguished of all the creatures of God upon the face of the earth, that there feems to be foundation enough for our expecting a preference in this refpect. Or, if the brute creation fhould be interested in a future life, we fhall certainly have more reason to rejoice in it, than to be offended at it; and many of them feem to have more pain than pleafure in this.

We fee, indeed, that many things never actually arrive at what we call their perfect ftate. For example, few feeds ever become plants, and few plants live to bear fruit; but still some of each species come to maturity, and are whatever their nature is capable of being. Allowing, therefore, that, agreeably to this analogy, very few of mankind should arrive at the proper perfection of their natures, we might imagine that, at least, fome would; and therefore that the wife and the virtuous, if none else, might F 6

hope

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