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It will be faid that philofophy must certainly have been fome check upon these enormities; but, ftrange as it may feem, this does not appear to have been the cafe. Human facrifices, indeed, became lefs frequent, and were, in a manner, abolished both in Greece and Rome; but this does not feem to have been owing to the philosophy, but to the greater humanity of later times. The philofophers were fo far from attempting the reformation of any religious rite, however abominable, that they are known to have encouraged the most abfurd of all their fuperftitions, and to have connived at least, at the most scandalous of them. Socrates, and their best moralists, strongly recommend even the divinations, and oracles of their times; and when Ariftotle expreffes his disapprobation of obscene pictures, he excepts thofe of the Gods, which religion had sanctified.

If we confider the real fentiments of the philofophers, abftracted from any relation to the people, or connection with civil government, they will be found by no means to furnish a sufficient foundation for a spirit of just and useful devotion, confifting of the fentiments of reverence and love to God, confidence in his providence, and a regard to virtue from his authority. Thofe who are thought to have had the moft fublime notions concerning the deity, after the times of chriftianity, feem to have been against all external worship of the fu

preme God. Cicero, in all his treatise concerning human duty, never draws any argument to enforce the practice of it from the authority, or command of God. Maximus Tyrius has a whole differtation to prove that we ought not to pray at all, and Seneca represents it as altogether needless to apply to God by prayer. Make thyself happy, fays he. But the language of the Stoics was not uniform, or confiftent, on this, or on several other fubjects. Notwithstanding they speak much of God, or the Gods, they never mention repentance, and confeffion of fin, as any part of our duty.

If the heathen philofophers had been impreffed with a proper reverence for God, they could never have indulged themselves in the indecent practice of common fwearing, which they feem to have done without the leaft reftraint. The dialogues of Plato, in which Socrates is always a speaker, are full of oaths; and fo are the works of Marcus Antoninus.

It will be faid that fuch a religion, and fuch philofophy, were the produce of an early age; and that it may be prefumed that, in time, men would have formed jufter notions of the attributes and moral government of God, have attained to a practical and steady dependence upon him, and have expreffed their devotional fentiments by proper acts of homage. But we fhall be obliged to give up this flattering idea, when we confider what

has

has been advanced upon these subjects by philofophers of a more enlightened age, who have abandoned revelation, and have pretended, at least, to be guided by nature only.

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Mr. Hobbes fays, that whatever is incorporeal is nothing at all, and he makes religion a business of the fate only. Mr. Hume fubverts the very foundation of all our reafoning from effects to caufes, fo that from what we fee round us, we cannot with certainty infer an intelligent author. Mr. Blount, the author of a celebrated treatise called. The oracles of reason, reprefents the opinion of the origin of good and evil from two different eternal principles, the one good and the other evil, as not unreasonable; and he makes objections to the duty of prayer. Mr. Chubb exprefsly denies the doctrine of a particular providence, and not only speaks of the impropriety of praying to God, but even suggests a fufpicion that it may be displeasing to the divine being.

Bolingbroke, who has been much extolled as a writer and philofopher, blames even the Pagan theifts for flattering human nature, when they taught that a good man imitates God. He will admit of no proof that God is a lover of mankind, and made, man to be happy. He altogether rejects the fcripture doctrine of a particular providence, and the notion that God is attentive to the prayers and wants of men. He acknowledges H 6

that

that God is a being of almighty power, and infinite wifdom; but he fays, that we must not pretend to afcribe to him any moral attributes, as holiness, justice, or good nefs. He fays that he neither has thefe qualities, nor any thing equivalent to them.

SECTION III.

Of the moral fentiments of the Heathens.

WAVING taken a view of the ftate of theology

HAVING

in the Gentile world, I fhall proceed to confider fome of their general maxims relating to morals, and especially fuch as were patronized by the philofophers; and we cannot but be fenfible that they were by no means favourable to virtue, taken in its just extent. At the close of this I fhall also fhew how modern unbelievers have relapfed into the fame loose kind of morality.

Many of the philofophers maintained that there is nothing juft or unjust by nature, but only by pofitive law and cuftom. This was the opinion of Theodorus, Archelaus, and Ariftippus, of the Alexandrian school, which prevailed the most a little before the time of Chrift. All the earlier philofophers allowed too much to the obligation of pofitive law. Even Socrates himself represents it

as

as effential to the character of a good man to obey, without referve, the laws of his country. On the other hand, Epicurus taught that a man is to do every thing for his own fake, his own happiness being the great rule of life.

The most distinguished fyftems of morals among the Greeks was that of the Stoics, and it is generally esteemed to have been peculiarly favourable to virtue. It carries, indeed, an air of greatness and fublimity in it; but when examined will be found to be no friend to the humane and pleafing virtues. It was the great maxim of the Stoics that the foul of man, being of the fame nature with God, is felf fufficient for virtue and happinefs, infomuch that it is not in the power of the Gods themselves to make a good man unhappy. Nay, fo arrogantly did fome of them talk, that they reprefented men as fuperior to the Gods, faying that these are wife by the neceffity of their nature, but men by choice. Such notions as these could not but lay a foundation for a very dangerous and insufferable pride.

To fupport this ftrange hypothefis, with respect to a world in which the wifeft and best of men are fubject to pain and death, they were obliged to maintain, and they did it refolutely, that pain is no evil, and that length of time makes no addition to happiness. To promote an infenfibility to pain, they maintained that men must

fup