which he himself has established. Now the proper evidence that there has been any fuch interruption in the ufual courfe of nature, or that any real miracles have been performed, must be the testimony of those who had an opportunity of examining the facts, in the fame manner as, by our own obfervation, and that of others together, we acquire a knowledge of the laws of nature themselves.

In fome refpects, however, the evidence of revelation borrows aid from other confiderations, independent of human teftimony, so as to be perfectly fimilar to the evidence for natural religion. The proper evidence for natural religion arifes from prefent appearances, the doctrines of it being nothing more than the conclufions we draw from them. Could we poffibly account for every thing that we fee in the world around us without the fuppofition of an uncaused being, there would have been no foundation for natural religion; but not being able to account for what we fee without fuppofing the existence and agency of a fupreme being; we are under a neceffity of admitting that there is fuch a being, and confequently of affenting to every other article of natural religion.

In like manner a variety of prejent appearances may be confidered as fo many ftanding evidences of feveral leading articles in revealed religion; becaufe, unless we admit that the divine being has interpofed in the government of the world, in

VOL. I.

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fuch

fuch a manner as the hiftories of the Jewish and christian revelations affert, it is impoffible to give a fatisfactory account of the known ftate of the world in paft and prefent times; as, for instance, that such a system as Judaism should have been established, and fuch a religion as chriftianity fhould have had that spread in the world, which all history shews that it had, in fuch circumstances as the fame history informs us both the profeffors of that religion, and the world in general, then

were.

In fact, the evidence from teftimony itself is ultimately the fame with this, being reduceable to the method of judging from known and even prefent appearances. For the reason why we are inAuenced by it, and act upon it, in any particular cafe, is that, from our knowledge of human nature, we have found that, fo circumftanced, it never has deceived us; fo that human nature must be changed before fuch teftimony could be fallacious. For the fame reafon, all hiftorical evidence is ultimately an appeal to prefent appearances. For if things in time past had not been as they reprefent, the information we now receive concerning them, could not have been conveyed to us.

The argument from prophecy is of a mixed nature, refting, in general, upon the teftimony of the friends of revelation, that fuch prophecies were actually delivered a fufficient time before the event,

and

and upon the teftimony of general hiftory, and the prefent state of things, for the accomplishment of them. Many of the scripture prophecies, however, even in the Old Teftament, and almost all those of the New, are universally acknowledged to have been published prior to the events to which they correfpond..

Thefe three kinds of evidence for the Jewish and christian revelations, viz. from teftimony, from preSent appearances, and from prophecy, I fhall confider in the order in which they are here mentioned.

SECTION III.

Of the importance of teftimony, and the credibility of

miracles.

INCE one principal evidence of revelation de

SINCE

pends upon human teftimony, I fhall first confider the importance of it, and then lay down fome general rules for estimating the value of it.

The greatest part of our knowledge has no other foundation than teftimony; and even when the proper foundation is of a different kind, our faith is much ftrengthened by means of it. For inftance, when we ourfelves form any rational conclufion from appearances, as that there is a God, we are much confirmed in our belief, by finding that

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that many other per fons have drawn the fame conclufion, either from the fame appearances, or from any other.

Befides, the knowledge on which we act every day depends chiefly upon memory, or our recollecting and believing that we once faw the evidence of the truths which may not now be obvious to us. For no perfon can pretend to be able at all times clearly to demonftrate every propofition to which he gives his firmeft affent. Now belief, which depends upon recollection, is fomewhat fimilar to that which depends upon teftimony. In one case we believe that we ourselves have feen a thing to be what we now apprehend it to be, and in the other cafe we believe that other persons have seen it to be so.

We ought not, therefore, to think lightly of the nature of faith in revelation, because it is an historical faith, and depends upon human testimony; for the fame is the foundation of the greateft, and moft valuable part of human knowledge.

If we appeal to experience, to determine the actual weight and effect of different kinds of evidence, we shall be convinced that the evidence of teftimony is adapted to give as much fatisfaction to the mind of man as any other kind of evidence. No perfon, I believe, who has read hiftory, has any more doubt of there being fuch a city as Rome, of there having been fuch a perfon as Julius Cæfar, or of his having been killed there, than he

has

has of the truth of the propofition that 2 and 2 make 4. At leaft, if there be any difference in the fullness of perfuafion in these two cafes, it is altogether imperceptible; and any perfcn would, in fact, venture as much upon the truth of the one, as upon that of the other.

Though it be true, indeed, in theory, that there is some small degree of uncertainty in every single teftimony, which can never be wholly removed by any fubfequent teftimony (fince this, alfo, must be liable to the fame kind of uncertainty) yet there is alf a degree of uncertainty, and a fource of mistake, in drawing conclufions from felf-evident truths, and especially when the chain of deduction is of confiderable length.

Confidering the great weight which teftimony naturally has with mankind, we cannot but conclude that any thing may be proved by it, except fuch things as are contradicted by fuperior evidence, and fuch is, certainly, that of our own fenfes, comprehending not only our immediate perceptions, but even neceffary conclufions from thofe perceptions. How incredible, therefore, foever, any fact may be a priori, fince, if it be not abfolutely impoffible, it may be true, fo alfo a certain degree of historical evidence must be fufficient to prove the truth of it.

We judge of other perfons, and of the connection between their fentiments, language and conK 3

duct,