Imatges de pàgina
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Of the rule of right and wrong.

HAVING feen what it is that nature teaches us

concerning GOD, our next inquiry refpects the proper rule of human conduct, and our expectations, grounded upon that conduct. No man comes into the world to be idle. Every man is furnished with a variety of paffions, which will continually engage him in fome pursuit or other; and the great question we have to decide is what paffions we ought to indulge, and what pursuits we ought to engage in. Now there are feveral very proper rules by which to form our judgment in this cafe; because there are feveral juft objects that we ought to have in view in our conduct. It is very happy, however, that this variety in our views can never mislead us, fince all the great ends we ought to keep in view are gained by the fame means. They are, therefore, like fo many different clues to lead to the fame end; and in the

following

following enquiry I fhall make use of any one of them, or all of them, as it may happen that, in any particular cafe, they can be applied to the most advantage.

Strictly speaking, there are no more than two just and independent rules of human conduct, according to the light of nature, one of which is obedience to the will of God, and the other a regard to our own real happiness; for another rule, which is a regard to the good of others, exactly coincides with a regard to the will of God; fince all that we know of the will of God, according to the light of nature, is his defire that all his creatures should be happy, and therefore that they fhould all contribute to the happinefs of each other. In revelation we learn the will of God in a more direct method, and then obedience to God, and a regard to the good of others will be diftinct and independent principles of action, though they both enjoin the fame thing. The fourth, and laft rule. of human conduct, is a regard to the dictates of confcience. But this is only the fubftitute of the other principles, and, in fact, arifes from them; prompting to right conduct on emergencies, where there is no time for reafoning or reflection; and where, confequently, no proper rule of conduct could be applied.

Having thus pointed out the proper diftinction and connection of thefe rules, I fhall confider

each

each of them feparately. The first object of enquiry, in order to inveftigate the proper rule of right and wrong, is what kind of conduct the divine being most approves.

Now the divine being, whofe own object, as has been fhewn, is the happiness of his creatures, will certainly most approve of those fentiments, and of that conduct of ours, by which that happiness is best provided for; and this conduct must deferve to be called right and proper in the ftricteft fenfe of the words. If we examine the workmanship of any artist, our only rule of judging of what is right or wrong, with refpect to it, is its fitness to answer his defign in making it. Whatever, in its structure, is adapted to gain that end, we immediately pronounce to be as it should be, and whatever obftructs his defign, we pronounce to be wrong, and to want correction. The fame method of judging may be transferred to the works of God; fo that whatever it be, in the fentiments or conduct of men, that concurs with, and promotes the design of our maker, we must pronounce to be, therefore, right; and whatever tends to thwart and obftruct his end, we ought to call wrong: because, when the former prevails, the great object of the whole fyftem is gained: whereas, when the latter takes place, that end and defign is defeated.

2. On the other hand, if we were to form a rule for our conduct independent of any regard to the divine being, we fhould certainly conclude that it is the part of wisdom, to provide for our greatest happiness; and, confequently, that we fhould cherish thofe fentiments, and adopt that conduct, by which it will be beft fecured. But this rule muft coincide with the former; because our happiness is an object with the divine being no less than it is with ourselves; for it has been fhewn, that benevolence is the spring of all his actions, and that he made us to be happy.

3. Since, however, the divine goodness is general, and impartial; and he muft, consequently, prefer the happiness of the whole to that of any individuals, it cannot be his pleasure, that we should confult our own intereft, at the expence of that of others. Confidering ourselves, therefore, not as separate individuals, but as members of society, another object that we ought to have in view is the welfare of our fellow creatures, and of mankind at large. But ftill there is no real difagreement among these different rules of conduct, because we are so made, as focial beings, that every man provides the most effectually for his own hap piness, when he cultivates those sentiments, and pursues that conduct, which, at the fame time, moft eminently conduce to the welfare of those with whom he is connected. Such is the wisdom of

this admirable conftitution, that every individual of the system gains his own ends, and those of his maker, by the fame means.

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The last rule is confcience, which is the result of a great variety of impreffions, the conclufions of our own minds, and the opinions of others, refpecting what is right and fit in our conduct, forming a set of maxims which are ready to be applied upon every emergency, where there would be no time for reafon or reflection. Confcience, being a principle thus formed, is properly confidered as a substitute for the three other rules, viz. a regard to the will of God, to our own greatest happiness, and the good of others, and it is, fact, improved and corrected from time to time by having recourse to these rules. This principle of confcience, therefore, being, as it were, the refult of all the other principles of our conduct united, muft deferve to be confidered as the guide of life, together with them; and its dictates, though they vary, in fome meafure, with education, and will be found to be, in fome refpects, different among different nations of the world, yet, in general, evidently concur in giving their fanction to the fame rules of conduct, that are fuggefted by the three before-mentioned confiderations. For, if we confider what kind of fentiments and conduct mankind in general will, without much reflection, and without hefitation, VOL. I. pronounce

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