facrifice to this purfuit all thofe appetites and paffions, to the gratification of which it was originally fubfervient, and for the fake of which only it was originally coveted. In this ftate the love of money, or the paffion we call covetousness, is evidently abfurd and wrong.

This grofs felf intereft, which confists in an exceffive love of money, as an end, and without any regard to its use, will fometimes bring a man to abridge himself of all the natural enjoyments of life, and engage him in the most laborious purfuits, attended with moft painful anxiety of mind; it very often steels his heart against all the feelings of humanity and compaffion, and never fails to fill him with envy, jealousy, and refentment against all those whom he imagines to be his competitors and rivals. Much lefs does this fordid paffion admit of any of the pleasures that refult from a consciousness of the approbation of God, of our fellow creatures, or of our own minds. In fact, it deprives a man of all the genuine pleasures of his nature, and involves him in much perplexity and distress; the immediate caufe of which, though it be often abfurd and imaginary, is ferious to himself, and makes him appear in a ridiculous light to others.

All these obfervations, concerning the love of money, are equally true of the love of power, or of any thing else, that is originally defirable as a VOL. I.

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means

means to fome farther end, but which afterwards becomes itself an ultimate end of our actions.

It

is even, in a great measure, true of the love of knowledge or learning. This is chiefly useful as a means, and is valuable in proportion to the end it is fitted to answer; but, together with the love of riches and power, it is abfurd, and to be condemned, when pursued as an end, or for its own fake only.

The amaffing of money must be allowed to be reasonable, or at least excufable, provided there be a probability that a man may live to enjoy it, or that it may be of use to his pofterity, or others in whose welfare he interests himself; but when we fee a man perfifting in the accumulation of wealth, even to extreme old age, when it would be deemed madness in him to pretend that he could have any real want of it; when he discovers the fame avaricious temper, though he has no children, and there is no body for whom he is known to have the leaft regard, it is evident that he purfues money as an end, or for its own fake, and not at all · as a means to any thing farther. In this cafe, therefore, it is, without doubt, highly criminal, and deserving of the above-mentioned cenfures.

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§ 4. Of the passions which arife from our focial

nature.

The paffions and affections which I have hitherto confidered are those which belong to us as individuals, and do not ncceffarily fuppofe any relation to other beings; I fhall now proceed to treat of those which are of this latter clafs, and first of the pleasure that we take in the good opinion of others concerning us, which gives rife to that paffion which we call the love of fame.

This is a paffion that discovers itself pretty early in life, and arifes principally from our experience and obfervation of the many advantages that refult from the good opinion of others. In the early part of life this principle is of fignal ufe to us, as a powerful incentive to those actions which procure us the esteem of our fellow creatures; which are, in general, the fame that are dictated by the principles of benevolence and the moral fenfe, and also by a regard to the will of God.

But though, by this account, the love of fame is an useful ally to virtue, the gratification of it ought by no means to be made our primary purfuit; because, if it were known that fame was the fole end of a man's actions, he would be fo far from gaining this end, that he would be despised by mankind in general; and especially if he were advanced

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advanced in life, when it is commonly expected that men should be governed by higher and better principles. For no actions are looked upon by the bulk of mankind as properly praife worthy, but thofe which proceed from a principle of difinterested benevolence, obedience to God, or a regard to confcience.

2. Befides, humility is a principal fubject of praife; and, indeed, without this, no other virtue is held in much efteem. Now this humility fupposes such a diffidence of one's felf, fuch a readiness to acknowledge the fuperiority of others, and alfo fo fmall a degree of complacence in the contemplation of our own excellencies, as must be inconfiftent with our making this pleasure our chief purfuit, and the fource of our greatest happiness.

3. In another refpect, alfo, the love of fame, as a primary object of pursuit, tends to defeat ititself. We are not pleased with praife, except it come from perfons of whofe judgment, as well as fincerity, we have a good opinion; but the love of fame, as our fupreme good, tends to beget fuch a degree of felf fufficiency, and conceit, as makes us defpife the reft of mankind; that is, it makes their praise of little value to us; fo that the sprightly pleafures of vanity naturally give place in time to all the fullennefs and morofenefs of pride.

4. If a man have no other object than reputation, or popularity, he will be led to dwell frequently upon the fubject of his own merit, of which he will, confequently, entertain an overweening and unreafonable opinion; and this can hardly fail to produce, befides a moft ridiculous. degree of conceit, fo much envy and jealousy, as will make him infufferable in fociety, and fubject him to the most cutting mortifications.

5. If a man's principal object be thofe qualifi cations and actions which ufually diftinguifh men, and make them much talked of, both in their own and future ages, fuch as eminence with refpect to genius, excellence in the polite arts, discoveries in fcience, or great atchievements in the arts of peace or war, his chance of fucceeding is very fmall; for it is not poffible that more than a few perfons, in comparifon, can draw the attention of the reft of mankind upon them. And befides that the qualifications which are the foundation of this eminence are very rare among mankind, fuccefs depends upon the concurrence of many circumftances, independent on a man's felf. It is plain, therefore, that very few perfons can reasonably hope to distinguish themselves in this manner, and it would certainly be very wrong to propose that as a principal object of pursuit to all mankind, which the bulk of them cannot poffibly obtain, or enjoy.