There is more room for the display of mercy in the divine government than in that of men ; because men, not being able to diftinguish true repentance from the appearance of it, and pretences to it, must make but few deviations from general rules, left they fhould increafe crimes and hypocrify; whereas the fecrets of all hearts being open to God, he cannot be imposed upon by any pretences; so that if an offender be truly penitent, and it is known to him that he will not abuse his goodness, he can receive him into favour, without apprehending any inconvenience whatever. Such cafes as thefe, how dangerous foever the precedent might be in human governments, are not liable to be abufed in the perfect adminiftration of the divine being, Juftice and mercy, therefore, are equally attributes of the divine being, and equally deducible from his goodness or benevolence; both, in their places, being neceffary to promote the happiness of his creation.

3. As perfect benevolence is the rule of the divine conduct, and leads him to be both just and merciful, fo we cannot but conceive that he muft govern his conduct by every other rule that we find to be equally neceffary to the well-being of fociety, particularly that of truth, or veracity. All human confidence would ceafe if we could not depend upon one another's word; and, in thofe circumftances, every advantage of fociety

would

would be loft. There can be no doubt, therefore, but that the divine being, if he fhould think proper to have any intercourfe with his creatures, must be equally removed from a poffibility of attempting to impofe upon them.

4. As to thofe vices which arife from the irregular indulgence of our appetites and paffions, we can have no idea of the poffibility of their having, any place in the divine being. We therefore conclude that he is, in all refpects, bely, as well as just and good.

There are, alfo, fome evidences of the juftice and mercy of God in the courfe of providence. The conftitution of human nature and of the world is fuch, that men cannot long perfift in any fpecies of wickedness without being fufferers in confequence of it. Intemperance lays the foundation for many painful and dangerous difeafes. Every fpecies of malevolence and inhumanity confifts of uneafy fenfations, and expofes the përfon in whom they are predominant to the hatred and ill offices of his fellow creatures. Want of veracity destroys a man's credit in society; and all vices may make men fubject to contempt, or diflike; whereas the habitual practice of the contrary virtues promotes health of body and peace of mind; and, in general, they insure to him the esteem and good offices of all those with whom he is connected.

Now,

Now, fince thefe evils which attend upon vice, and this happiness which results from virtue, are the divine appointment (fince they take place in confequence of his conftitution of the course of nature) they may be confidered as the natural. punishments of vice, and the natural rewards of virtue, diftributed according to the rules of juftice and equity, and intended to inculcate the most useful moral leffons on all his intelligent offspring, the fubjects of his moral government.

We, alfo, fee fomething like the exercife of mercy in the conduct of the divine providence ; fince the natural punishments of vice feldom take place immediately, but leave a man room to recollect, and recover himfelf; and, if, after a man has been addicted to vice, he become truly reformed, the inconveniences he has brought upon himself are, in general, either removed, or mitigated; fo that he finds his condition the better for it.

-It may, alfo, according to the reasoning applied in a former cafe, be confidered as an argument for all the perfections of God, that we are so formed, that we cannot but approve of, and esteem every branch of virtue. For it cannot be fuppofed that our maker would have formed us in fuch a manner, as that he himself should be the object of our diflike and abhorrence. Our natural love of goodnefs and virtue, therefore, is a proof that every branch of it enters into the character of the divine

being, and confequently that thofe qualities are the objects of his favour and approbation.

Since, however, all the moral perfections of God are derived from his benevolence; fo that holiness, justice, mercy, and truth, are in him only modifications, as it were, of fimple goodnefs; we fhould endeavour to conceive of him, as much as poffible, according to his real nature; confidering benevolence as his fole ruling principle, and the proper fpring of all his actions. This is, alfo, the most honourable and the most amiable light in which we can view him, remembering that goodness neceffarily implies what we call justice, though its natural form be that of mercy.

Upon the whole, it must be acknowledged, that it is but a very imperfect idea that we can form of the moral perfections of God from the light of nature. It hardly amounts to what may be called an idea of his character. We know nothing of God by the light of nature but through the medium of his works, and these are such as we cannot fully comprehend; both the efficient and the final caufes being, in many cafes, unknown to us: whereas the clearer ideas we have of the characters of men, are acquired, from a reflection upon fuch parts of their conduct as we can both fully comprehend, and are capable of ourselves; fo that we can tell precisely how we should feel and be dif

pofed,

The

pofed, if we acted in the fame manner. knowledge, also, of the manner in which men exprefs themselves, upon known occafions, is a great help to us in judging of what they feel, and confe quently in investigating their proper character; and this is an advantage of which we are entirely deftitute with respect to God, on the principles of the light of nature.

It is from revelation chiefly, if not only, that we get a jukt idea of what we may call the proper character of the divine being. There we may both hear his declarations, and fee various fpecimens of his conduct, with respect to a variety of perfons and occafions; by which means we have the best opportunity of entering, as it were, into his fentiments, perceiving his difpofition, learn◄ ing what are the objects of his approbation or diflike, in fhort, of gaining a proper and diftinct idea of his moral character.

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