compense a character so illustrious, repu- | putation and glory should eagerly step forward; and if the patriotic father deservedly beheld the laurels thickening all around him, amidst the brilliant successes of those warlike enterprises which arose upon the basis of his sagacious counsels, not less abundantly should wreaths of olive gather about the person of his equally aspiring descendant, whom the rectitude of his heart, and the force of his own abilities, each animated by the recollection of paternal instructions, and more by attachments to his country, had stimulated to the happiest cultivation of all the arts of peace. Mr. Fox rose and declared, that there was not in the Speech nor in the Address one sentiment which he did not fully agree with, nor which he was not ready to avow. Indeed, he should have been exceedingly sorry had there been occasion for any difference of opinion respecting an Address beginning with expressions of congratulation to his Majesty, upon an event, in the failure of which every man, of every party and description, both within and without those walls, must be of one and the same mind, and must cordially and sincerely join in the most heartfelt joy and satisfaction. He was glad, therefore, that the Address had been so properly worded, that it did not call for opposition or objection of any sort, since, without pledging the House to an approbation of the treaty of commerce, or to any future vote upon the subject, it barely returned thanks for his Majesty's gracious communication of the fact, and promised to consider it, when properly before the House, with the attention which a matter of such infinite importance well deserved. That being the case, and as from the subject of the early part of the Address, it must be to be wished, that such an address should pass nemine contradicente, he assured the House he would not object to it; and that, in all probability, he should have contented himself with giving his silent vote on the question then before the House, had not something fallen from the noble lord and the hon. gentleman who moved and seconded the Address, and particularly from the latter, that looked so like grasping at general principles, as the principles upon which the commercial treaty was to be maintained, that he thought it necessary to rise then, and in as few words as possible, take some notice of those principles, which he would do in a general manner, without entering at all into detail upon the treaty, which he was well aware was neither properly before the House, nor then under discussion, but which he should give his sentiments upon at a future opportunity. The noble lord who moved the Address, and the hon. gentleman who seconded it, had contrasted the uncertainty of war with the solid advantages of peace, and the substantial benefits of commerce with the destructive means of conquest, as if it were a fact, that this country had ever gone to war for the sake of extending dominion, or gratifying a lust of power, and an inordinate ambition. The fact, he declared, was notoriously otherwise; and he was enough of an Englishman to rise in vindication of his country, and assert in that assembly, and he would assert the same in an assembly appointed to hear the cause of nations, were it possible for such an assembly to exist, that in all our wars-all our late wars at leastthis country had not gone to war for the sake of ambition, nor with a view to acquire extension of dominion, but had been forced to take up arms either in her own defence, or for the sake of defending the liber-. ties, and balance of power of Europe, endangered by the overweening power of France, and her alarming endeavours to grasp at the government of all the European powers of this quarter of the globe. This, any one who looked into the history of this country, would find to be the true state of the case; he therefore denied, in the most unequivocal manner, that any insinuations to the prejudice of this country, as if she had heretofore gone to war for the mere sake of triumph and of conquest, had any, the smallest foundation in truth. Every man knew, that peace was preferable to war; commerce preferable to conquest: it would be highly preposterous to advance an opposite opinion; and upon that principle had the government of this country been uniformly conducted for the last century. After dwelling upon these points for some time with his usual warmth and energy, Mr. Fox adverted to the treaty with France, upon which, he said, he had not yet made up his mind; nor was it possible for him so to do, until the treaty was not only properly before the House, but until he had heard from his Majesty's ministers a full explanation of the real character of the measure. He was not yet aware whether it was to be considered A as a treaty having a political tendency, and calculated to operate in the manner of an alliance with France, or whether it was to be considered as a treaty merely commercial, and as having no other effect than the establishment of a commercial intercourse with the neighbouring kingdom. In one or other of these lights the treaty must have been made, and in one or other of these lights must ministers mean that it should be regarded; but then it could be considered in one of these lights only, and not in both. One of them must be denied, and the other avowed; one defended, and the other disclaimed. Not meaning to go into the treaty then, and not having the information that ministers possessed, it was not in his power to say which of the two descriptions was the proper one: but thus much he was willing to say beforehand, and without any farther information on the subject; namely, that he should be much better pleased if ministers were to declare that they meant it merely as a commercial treaty, and that France understood it as such, and as such only. In that case ministers would have to prove, that it did not provide a new channel of commerce at the expense of all the other ancient channels, which this kingdom had long been in possession of, and which had been found to be sources of commercial wealth and prosperity. If, on the other hand, ministers avowed that the treaty was meant as a political measure, and that they had in view that sort of connexion that should render it more difficult for France and this country to go to war than heretofore, they then would have to shew strong and satisfactory reasons for their having pursued and concluded a measure so new in the annals of this country, and of such infinite magnitude and importance. Mr. Fox took a general view of the conduct of France towards this country, and towards all the powers of Europe. He desired it to be remembered, that France had only changed her means-not her end. Her object had uniformly been the same, though her system of acting was different. In the reign of Louis the 14th, the aim of France was open and avowed; the means she employed to attain her end, offensive, arrogant, and shameless. She had seen her error, and acted upon principles of a wiser policy; her means were now more mild, more amiable, more benevolent. They did her humanity credit; they allured, they conciliated, they worked her purpose secretly, but securely. Formerly, oppression and power were her engines; engines offensive to all who beheld their unjustifiable exercise, and such as could not fail to rouse general indignation, and animate to resistance every power that had a spark of spirit, of generosity, or of goodness in its composition. Hence the weak found advocates, the oppressed protection; and hence the daring attempts at universal monarchy, made by Louis the 14th, were opposed, baffled, repelled, and frustrated. What was the engine with which France operated her wished-for end at this time? Influence! that secret and almost resistless power; that power with which ambition gains its purpose, almost imperceptibly, but much more effectually than with any other. At this time, too, it ought, Mr. Fox said, to be held in mind, that Louis the 16th possessed abundantly more power than ever Louis the 14th could boast of; and that superiority, great as it was, would in all probability be considerably heightened very shortly. At such a moment, then, was it right to enter into a connexion, by treaty, with the Christian King? How was it to be accounted for, but by supposing that there were in this country some men so dazzled with the splendour of Louis the 16th, so conscious of the eminence of power which France had lately attained, that they sunk before it, and, lost in their own despondency, thought it right for us, diminished as our splendour was, in comparison with the aggrandizement of our continental neighbour, to seize the earliest moment of making terms with her, forming a connexion by treaty, and by that means artfully securing a claim to her protection? Far was it from him, to intend to charge the right hon. gentleman opposite to him, with entertaining such abject opinions, or with thinking of abandoning all expectation of the possibility of France being once more humbled; but, he was persuaded there were men in the country, so lost to the memory of its former greatness, as to feel in the manner he had mentioned, and to advise and act upon the littleness of their own minds. Having put this forcibly, Mr. Fox asked to what motives were we to ascribe the sudden civility of France towards us? Was it to be considered as a proof of her moderation? Had she entered into the treaty with a view to give the lie to the old and rooted opinions of philosophy, that it was a principle inherent in human nature to be eager to acquire more, in proportion as a great deal more than could have been expected, was already acquired? Did she mean to clear up her character at once, and do away the libellous charge so long alleged against her, that she was actuated by overweening ambition, and an insatiable thirst after extension of power? Glorious conduct, if such was its principle and its motive! Matchless self-denial! to abjure the acquirement of almost irresistible power, when it was rendered so easy. But, could any man in his senses believe in the splendid illusion? Could any statesman think that moderation, at a moment when moderation seemed least necessary, was the real and true motive that had induced France, to put us in a state that had the appearance of rendering all future hostilities between her and Great Britain almost impossible to happen? Let those who thought so, recollect that, paradoxical as the assertion might appear, the Cabinet of France had been the most consistent in its conduct of any that ever existed. Notwithstanding the genius and character of the French, as a people; notwithstanding the levity of their manners, the fickleness of their minds, the constitutional mutability of their conduct; the Cabinet of France, as a cabinet, had uniformly acted upon the same principle, aiming at the same end, and only changing the means of attaining that end, as the necessity of the times, and as the suggestion of a wiser policy dictated. If ministers supposed that France acted upon a principle of sincerity and friendship towards us, let them point out the proofs of that friendship. The way to judge of the friendly intentions of those with whom we negociate, was not, he said, by looking to the manner of their negociating with us, but their conduct with other powers, as far as it regarded our interests. Ministers might, as yet, be said to be in the honeymoon of their connexion with France. Had they, during that period, felt the influence of France greatly operating in our favour with those powers with whom we were negociating treaties? Did it manifest itself in the court of Portugal, in the court of Spain, or in the court of Petersburgh? Were the symptoms of it strongly traceable at any one of these courts? Where else was a symptom of it to be found? At this time France, that formerly was celebrated for having the most powerful army of any European power, had an army the fourth only upon the continent; Prussia, the Emperor, and Russia, had much greater armies. What was the reason of this? The reason was obvious. France relied for her security on other means of defence-on the influence she possessed with the neighbouring powers, and the alliances she had formed. Those circumstances enabled her to diminish her land force, to reduce her army, and direct all her attention to her marine. Was her doing so a favourable symptom to this country? Did it indicate any extraordinary proportion of partiality towards Great Britain? The hon. gentleman, who had with considerable ability, and much to his own credit, seconded the Address, had laid down a position, the language of which was more elegant than the sentiment, he feared, was just. He had said, that in abandoning the monopoly of our trade with America, and opening a commercial intercourse with France, we gave up a precarious and ill-paid annuity, for a feesimple, with prompt and constant payment. The expression was captivating, and the style of it beautiful; no wonder, therefore, that the House appeared to feel it, and gave tokens of their satisfaction. But, was the position true? Could the benefits that might result from our commercial intercourse, whatever they might turn out, be compared to a fee-simple, with prompt payment? Surely not. What was to insure us the stability and permanency of peace? A commercial treaty with France? No means, Mr. Fox said, appeared to him less likely to procure such an effect. Instead of a fee-simple, with constant payment, the more apt comparison would be an annuity, the payment of which was liable to frequent interruption. Did history encourage us to expect a long duration of peace? or were we weak enough to imagine that France, from her present enjoyment of uncommon power, was therefore less likely to break with us? Let former precedents teach a better prudence. Refer to the records of the best and most authentic historians, and it would be found that France was most inclined to preserve peace, when she was most humiliated and degraded. This country had been often charged with having borne herself arrogantly and dictatorially after the close of a triumphant war; but, had it ever been said, that success checked the pride, or reduced the overweening ambition of France? Past experience proved, that whenever France saw this country weak, and thought her incapable of effectually! resisting, she seized the opportunity, and aimed at effecting her long-desired destruction. What prompted her to comménce her hostile attacks at the beginning of the war preceding the last? The occasion was flattering, it promised easy success, and the opportunity was irresistible. A similar opportunity would, doubtless, produce similar consequences. It was idle, therefore, to suppose that France, who had really had such frequent reason to consider Great Britain as her most powerful rival, and had received so many checks from her, that she had long wished to annihilate her as a state whose enmity was to be dreaded, would all of a sudden forget her resentment, and, just at that moment when there appeared to be the least rational motive to prompt her, abandon a purpose she had long and formly endeavoured to achieve. In order more strikingly to elucidate this argument, Mr. Fox said, possibly the present connexion with France might operate to the destruction of all our former connexions with other powers so far, that when, at a future period, France might think it worth her while to break with us, we should find ourselves destitute of friends, and universally abandoned. Two years, he observed, had been given in the definitive treaty as the period, by the end of which a commercial treaty with France was obliged to be concluded, clearly that ministers might have time to look about them, to see how old treaties stood with other powers, and to conclude such new ones as appeared most likely to conduce to the interest of Great Britain, before they entered into any treaty with France. He said, he might possibly be misrepreuni-sented both at home and abroad, as a man so far prepossessed by illiberal and vulgar prejudices against France, as to wish never to enter into any connexion with her. Be that as it might, he should not easily forget that those prejudices against France, and that jealousy, which had for years prevailed, of her ambition, had been productive of no bad consequences to this country; on the contrary, that the wars grounded on our alarms at her stretches after inordinate power, and the jealousy which we had entertained of her desire to overturn the balance of power in Europe, had made this country great and glorious. He adverted to the peace of Utrecht, and talked of the bugbear that the ministers of that day had set up to frighten the people into a belief that peace was absolutely necessary, namely, the probability of the House of Austria requiring an improper share of power. He alluded also to the circumstances that characterized the history of Holland, and its present situation, and future prospects. Mr. Fox observed, that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to declare in his speech, that a copy of the Treaty should be laid before the House. That instrument alone, he believed, would neither enable the House nor himself to form any decision upon the propriety of the Treaty. Before the House could justify any vote upon the subject, they would undoubtedly expect to hear from his Majesty's ministers, the state of the various other treaties at this time negociating. At present, there were more in agitation than this country perhaps ever had at one time before-the treaty with Russia, the treaty with Spain, and the treaty with Portugal. As ministers had, a twelvemonth ago, boasted of the facility with which the treaty with Russia might be brought to a conclusion, he presumed, that it either was concluded, or so near conclusion, that it might fairly be considered the same as concluded; he would therefore say nothing upon this part of the subject. But it was material to know in what situation the treaty with Portugal stood. Perhaps the present treaty with France virtually annulled and abrogated the treaty with Portugal, commonly known by the name of the Methuen Treaty. It was also important to know how the treaty stood with Spain; because, if the House meant to act as statesmen on the occasion, it was impossible for them to come to any decision respecting the treaty with France, without being fully apprized of the relative situation of every other existing treaty, or treaty that was at present negociating. [VOL. XXVI. ] Speaking of the convention with Spain, for carrying into effect the sixth article of the treaty of peace, he said he did not see, nor could he admit the necessity for entering into any such convention: that the article was sufficiently intelligible, and had ever appeared so to him, though he was aware there had been some doubts stated respecting its proper construction: that the country to be evacuated under the convention was a part of the Musquito coast, that never had, before the treaty, been considered as belonging to the crown of Spain: and that instead of being a mere spot for the cutting of logwood, it was an [Q] . actual British colony. To oblige the inhabitants and settlers, therefore, to evacuate it by February, would be an act of the most horrible injustice, because it would be to oblige them to quit their possessions before they could reap the fruits of their industry, which must, in that case, be left in the ground. Mr. Fox descanted upon this for a considerable time, and asked, for what purpose such a cession could have been made? He should have supposed, he said, that if England had a treaty in hand with the Court of Madrid, and a cession to make which that court was desirous of having made to her, it would have been political to have held back the boon that Spain was anxious to obtain, till after the objects of our wishes, as stipulated for in the treaty negociating, were complied with. Possibly, the cession was made before-hand, in order to put Spain in a humour to grant us what we wanted with the greater cheerfulness. After animadverting upon this matter with obvious irony, and touching upon a variety of particular matters, to which the treaty with France appeared to him to have a natural and necessary reference, Mr. Fox declared, that he joined most heartily in the congratulation of his Majesty, on an event, that nothing but the phrenzy of a lunatic could have induced, and which it became the character of the nation to act upon exactly as they had done. Having mentioned this in a style that spoke the master of the art of oratory, and intreated the pardon of the House for having taken up so much of their time, which he declared he would not have done had he not thought it necessary to repel the French mode of talking that had fallen from the noble lord who moved, and the hon. gentleman who seconded the Address, and to rescue the nation from being thought liable to such reflections, Mr. Fox concluded with giving an affirmative to the Address. Mr. Pitt expressed his heartfelt satisfaction at discovering that the address would meet with the unanimous concurrence of the House. It would, indeed, have been singularly unfortunate, if an address, commencing as that now under discussion commenced, with the congratulations of the House on his Majesty's most fortunate escape, from an attempt so pregnant with ruin to the country, should be carried otherwise than with one concurring voice. He had equally expected that every other part of the Address would meet with unanimous consent; but he confessed he had not looked for such arguments in support of that unanimity as the right hon. gentleman had thought proper to use. He supposed he must impute it to his own want of clearness and comprehension; but he must allow, that, as far as any thing that had fallen from the right hon. gentleman could have any effect on his mind, it would be to induce him to negative a considerable part of the Address: for the right hon. gentleman had set out with declaring his intention to acquiesce in the motion; and though he had, in the conclusion of his speech, repeated his intention, yet the whole of the intermediate part of what he had said, went to combat the principles of the very measure which he declared himself ready to support. The right hon. gentleman had begun with acknowledging what no man but himself could well think of denying, that the position of his hon. friend who seconded the motion, that peace was preferable to war, and commerce more desirable than conquest, was substantially reasonable and true; and yet he had, with the most elaborate eloquence, endeavoured to prove the direct reverse of each of those propositions. He had laboured also to vindicate this country from the imputation of a too great readiness to engage in schemes of ambition and conquest, and to neglect her commercial concerns, and those benefits that might be derived from peace; but there was no occasion for any such vindication, because the treaty went only to carry into effect the principles of that pacific disposition which the right hon. gentleman had attributed to the general politics of this country, and not to impede and disturb them. The right hon. gentleman had taken great pains to clear himself of the imputation of being governed by vulgar and illiberal prejudices. Such a vindication of himself was surely unnecessary; for, as to illiberal prejudices, no person could charge them on a man of his experience and understanding; and there was no ground whatever for accusing him of vulgar prejudices, as his opinions were so far from being vulgar, that he believed he was the only person in the whole kingdom who entertained them. Might he take the liberty to ask the right hon. gentleman, whether, when using the word jealousy,' he was desirous of recommending to this country such a species of political jealousy as should be either mad or blind; such a |