solved, "That a Peer of Scotland, claim- | distinction would have been done away. But the British peerage now consists of two distinct orders of men, having different rights, and standing in very different situations indeed. The one retains all the privileges of peerage, sits in parliament, whose authority now extends over the whole united kingdom. The other has the inferior rights of the peerage throughout the whole kingdom, but is abridged of the most valuable right of all-an hereditary seat in parliament. They are therefore, in fact, two distinct orders of men, though called by the same name; the one having individually a share in the legisla ture, the other only a virtual share by representation. No line of distinction can be more strongly drawn. ing to sit in the House of Peers by virtue of a patent passed under the great seal of Great Britain, and who now sits in the Parliament of Great Britain, has no right to vote in the election of the sixteen peers." The two noble lords in question confessedly stood in that situation to which the resolution applies; and he who has not a right to vote, à fortiori cannot be elected. The determination was as solemn, as deliberate a one as any that stands on the records of Parliament. It rejected the vote of a person intimately connected with the lord treasurer, Godolphin. I barely mention this circumstance, said he, without laying any stress upon it. The resolution passed at a time when all that related to the Union was fresh in every man's memory, and the true meaning and intention of that great treaty were generally known. It passed in the presence of many of those who had been commissioners on both sides, actors in that great scene, and the Journals show that there was not a single protest. It has been constantly acted under, has stood unquestioned, unshaken, for near fourscore years. Such a precedent has all the weight and authority that can belong to any precedent what-presentation is so far from being inherent ever; and powerful indeed is the weight and authority of such precedents upon the mind of every considerate man, who knows the mischief of fluctuation, and the numberless benefits which arise from certainty of law, and stability and uniformity of decision. The question, then, fairly stated, is this, What, according to the true meaning and intention of the Union, is to be the condition of him, who passes from the one order to the other, from the representative to the hereditary class? Why, clearly this he acquires all the rights of an hereditary seat, and the rights of representation cease, as appertaining exclusively to that condition in which he no longer remains. The committee well know, that the right of re in peers as such, that it was strenuously contended at the Union, that it was inconsistent with and repugnant to the nature of peerage. It certainly is a right incidental to the change of situation made by the Treaty of Union. From the situation in which that Treaty placed them, the He then observed, that although he two noble lords have emerged by the faargued from this resolution, though it af- vour of the Crown, and are raised to those forded a very strong, and, he thought, rights, to that condition in the parliament irresistible argument in support of the of Great Britain, which, in the parlia motion, yet the motion itself went to the ment of Scotland, every Scotch Peer ensingle point of representation. The pre-joyed. When we chose them, added he, sent question is simply this, whether the two noble lords, by the change in their situation, do or do not cease to be our representatives? As in the Act of Union, and in the subsequent Act of the 6th of queen Anne, there are no express words that go directly to the point, it must be a question of construction upon the real intent and meaning of that part of the Treaty, to be decided by the rules of fair interpretation, and by the general nature and principles of representation, applied to the particular case. By an article in the Treaty of Union, the peers of the two countries, now made one, are to be comprehended under one general name. Had it conferred equality of right, all line of they were in the same situation with ourselves; they were fellow sufferers. Being no longer in that situation, they can no longer be entitled to a share of that compensation, which was great to the aggregate body, for the loss it sustained. They now sit here in their own right; they cannot therefore sit in ours. They cannot be temporary representatives in a place where they have an indefeasible right to appear for themselves. We are proud of every connexion with them, but what is incompatible with their condition and ours. We hope these two noble lords, and all those who were formerly of our number, retain their former zeal for the mainte nance of our rights. We hope they who have reached the shore will not be indiffe- | rent to the condition of those whom they have left behind. by the number of peers created since that He concluded with saying, that he was persuaded their lordships would upon all occasions, be disposed to interpret every article of the Treaty of Union in the fairest and most liberal manner; that fair interests of many, prejudicial to the real interests of none. The principles laid down in the preamble to the famous PeerHe then stated particularly, the case of age Bill was, that the proportion estaJames duke of Athol, upon whom an Eng-blished at the Union was become unequal Alish honour devolved in 1736, and who continued to sit in parliament as duke of Athol and baron Strange. He observed, that there never had been any decision, any question, any even the smallest diseussion upon the subject. The whole had +passed sub silentio. Why it did so, is, perhaps, at this distant period, rather to be conjectured than known. It probably was thought a thing of little consequence, +as there was very little chance that a similar case, that of an old English honour devolving upon a Scotch Peer, should happen again. The case now in question could not happen under the then circumstances. The Scotch peerage were then smarting under the wound, which the rash and violent hand of party gave in the case of the duke of Brandon in 1711. In that 7 situation of things, the peerage of Scot-ness and liberality, which apply particu land might think it a point of little moment; but the case is very different now the Scotch Peers are restored to their rights the right of prerogative is restored. The royal favour may now flow in that channel, as freely as in any other. It was for many years totally obstructed by that resolution, on which, said he, I mean not to dwell; I could wish it buried in everlasting oblivion, were it not that that oblivion would extinguish the praise and honour due to those by whom the effect of that resolution was done away. I am persuaded that the same fairness and liberality of sentiment which governed upon that occasion, will govern now. I apply myself with equal confidence to every side of the House, persuaded that the justice of the cause will plead with equal force in the breasts of all. I have purposely waved, said he, all considerations of policy, as the cause stands in need of no such collateral aid. But thus much I may say, the best, the wisest and most dignified policy will choose to do that which is attended with no possible inconvenience, rather than hurt the rights and wound the feelings of a considerable and respectable body of men; and if there were any shadow of doubt in this business, which, he protested, after the fullest consideration, he could not perceive; yet surely, even in that case, the fairest and most upright mind might incline towards that decision which is favourable to the larly to the interpretation of such a convention as the Union necessarily was. From the very nature of it, one of the contracting parties must, for the subsequent performance of the engagement, rely upon the honour and good faith of the other contracting party. This consideration will have more weight with the House than any stipulation that could be inserted in a Convention between two nations who remained independent, and in a condition to support their respective rights, and whose mutual interests had led them to the conclusion of a Treaty so advantageous to both. This fairness and liberality of interpretation, which belongs to the whole Treaty, can apply to no part of it more properly than to that which respects the peerage of Scotland. The change the Union made in their condition is known to you all. I hope, said he, you will keep in constant remembrance this day, that, before an event so beneficial to both countries could take place, the Peers of Scotland had great difficulties to conquer ;—— to the attainment of that desirable end, they made as large a sacrifice as ever was made by men. Had they retained their hereditary seats in parliament, at the expense of half their property, they had made a happy and noble exchange. No man can deserve an hereditary seat in the great council of a free nation, who does not consider it as the first of all rights, the most valuable of all possessions. That right, that inestimable possession, for rea- | have the power of calling up to that House, sons of public utility, our ancestors were men of large property and estate, men who contented to forego. In a word, they did distinguished themselves in the profession that which has ever been counted a mark of the law, the army, and the navy, men of exalted virtue-They chose rather to whose public services in the other House be little in a great state, than great in a of Parliament entitled them to honours small one. Deciding on the rights of the and rewards, and more especially Peers descendants of men so circumstanced, you of Scotland, descended most of them from would be disposed rather to extend than old and noble families, who, consequently, diminish those rights. We ask no exten- could add the lustre of ancestry to their sion; we demand nothing but what the other eminent qualifications; for, whatever Union gave. All we desire is, that you might be said of ancestry, no man despised will not, in contradiction to the clear and it, but he who had none to value himobvious meaning of that agreement, to the self upon; and no man made it his pride, sense entertained and declared of it by but he who had nothing better to boast of. those by whom it was framed, and in con- On the present occasion, he congratulated tradiction to the clearest principles of re- their lordships on the accession to the presentation, abridge our rights, by cur- British Peerage of the two noble lords, tailing the slender compensation allotted not more dignified by birth, than by their us, for the greatest loss which men who character and their merit. With regard have any dignity can sustain. The noble to the distinction so forcibly drawn by the viscount concluded with moving, "That noble viscount between individuals and it is the opinion of this committee, that virtual representation, it was a discriminathe earl of Abercorn, who was chosen to tion almost too evident to require farther be of the number of the sixteen peers, elucidation; but if it were supposed that who, by the Treaty of Union, are to re- a member of the other House being called present the peerage of Scotland in parlia- up by patent to a seat among their lordment, having been created viscount Ha- ships, should, nevertheless, insist upon milton, by letters patent under the great keeping his seat as a representative of the seal of Great Britain, doth thereby cease people at the same time, a stronger into sit in this House as a representative of stance of the truth of the argument, and the peerage of Scotland." of the absurdity of the fact upon which it rested, could scarcely be given; yet, as extreme cases sometimes removed all doubt, his lordship said he would beg leave to bring forward as a supposition, that when the Act of Union first passed, the Queen had chosen immediately afterwards to create the whole of the sixteen Scotch Peers British Dukes. Was there one of their lordships who would not in that case have agreed, that the Peerage of Scotland had a right to complain, that their representatives had betrayed their trust, and bartered their Scottish titles for English honours? So extreme a case, undoubtedly, was not likely to happen; but it put the question in so forcible a light, that after having so stated it hypothetically, he trusted their lordships would with him concur with the motion, and that the proper forms would in consequence be forthwith complied with, which were necessary to be resorted to previous to the Peerage of Scotland proceeding to an election of two new representatives in the room of the earl of Abercorn, now lord viscount Hamilton, and the duke of Queensberry, now earl Douglas. The Bishop of Landaff [Dr. Watson] declared, that had the question appeared to him of nice legal discussion, he would not have presumed to trouble their lordships with any sentiments which he might entertain respecting it; since no man knew less of the law and its distinctions than he could pretend to be conversant with but he was sufficiently informed of the history of the transactions on which the present question was grounded, to be satisfied that a moderate portion of plain common sense was equal to its comprehension. He imagined that there could scarcely be two opinions on the motion. It was clear, from the noble viscount's accurate and perspicuous reasoning, that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to bestow English honours upon two Scotch Peers. That he conceived to be an infraction of the Treaty of Union; but then, it was an infraction on the part of England, as the honours conferred were English; Scotland consequently could not find fault, nor did he mean to complain. On the contrary, he thought it extremely right that his Majesty, the source and fountain of favour and of distinction, should The Earl of Moreton observed, that notwithstanding the great abilities and authority of the noble viscount, and the right reverend prelate, he thought it his duty to declare, his mind revolted at the motion; and the more he endeavoured to investigate it, and ascertain its precise tendency, the more he was confirmed in his first opinion, and the less inclined he found himself to abandon the judgment which he had adopted. He proceeded to state his construction of that section of the Act of Union that refers to the case; and contended, that unless they were rendered legally incapable of representing the Scotch Peerage during any part of a session, they were, by their constitution, elected to serve the whole session out till the Parliament either naturally expired or was dissolved. The Earl of Fauconberg supported the motion, assigning his reasons for thinking their lordships bound in justice to declare two vacancies in the number of representative Peers of Scotland. He concluded with declaring, that he thought this country indebted to Scotland; and he heartily wished that he could say as much of another part of the British dominions. The Earl of Hopetoun went through the history of the parliamentary transactions at forming the Treaty of Union, and stated the reasons why the acts were left as they were. The Lord Chancellor opposed the motion, as going upon a principle not recognized by the Treaty of Union. He solemnly conjured their lordships to consider how much their dignity, their honour, and their character, were concerned in keeping their tribunal pure, untainted, and unsuspected. He spoke of the humiliating degradation which must inevitably ensue, if they deviated from the strict line of their duty in the delivery of a decision in a case, which, though of great weight and importance, was nevertheless connected with future elections, by recalling to their minds the degree of rankness and corruption, which the tribunal of another place had arrived at, in determining cases of election, insomuch that it had been at last found absolutely necessary to take the jurisdiction out of their hands. He declared that he could not avoid mentioning, in terms of praise, the unimpeached rectitude of the proceedings of the new court to which he alluded, and the justice of their decisions in general. Their lordships were not to listen to arguments grounded on supposed or real in convenience to this or that set of men; nor were they to consider what an act of parliament should have been, but what it was. They were bound to abide by it, and to comply with its letter. He added, that he must take the liberty of reprehending the noble viscount for using the sort of argument with which he had introduced his motion; and he declared that the right reverend prelate should have taken care to have read the articles of the Treaty of Union, before he had ventured to let loose his opinions upon the subject. He insisted upon it, that the giving an English title to a Scotch peer, could not take away or diminish any one function previously possessed by a Scotch peer; and that he was as fully capacitated to continue the representative of Scotland after receiving an English honour as before. He instanced the case of the duke of Richmond, who, as duke of Lennox, was entitled to and enjoyed all the privileges of a Scotch duke. He stated the facts which distinguished the Act which passed in Scotland prefatory to the Act of Union, and after describing the various circumstances of the whole transaction, summed up a long argument, with laying down certain legal premises, which he challenged any noble lord to contest with him. He argued that as the acts of constituting what is generally termed the Treaty of Union stood, nothing short of a legal incapacity, (which letters patent creating a Scotch lord an English peer, he contended were not) could put any of the sixteen Scotch peers out of the situation of representative peers, till the Parliament should be dissolved. Lord Loughborough said, that from the word 'tribunal,' and the manner in which the learned lord had prefaced his speech, he had been inclined to imagine he had mistaken the question before the House, and that it was a judicial instead of a political and preliminary proceeding. Under this impulse, he had looked to the table, to see if any petition had been presented, and turned his eyes to the bar, to observe if the counsel and agents were below it. Nothing could be more distant in its nature from a judicial proceeding than that under consideration; not that he had any, the smallest objection to having it judicially treated, if the learned lord thought proper. All he desired was, that a clear, unembarrassed, simple, obvious proposition, which the minds of every order of men were fully competent to comprehend and to decide, should not be wrapped up and disguised from their lordships view, by the mode of treating it. His noble friend who made the motion, distinctly told their lordships the nature of the case which was submitted to their judgment and their justice; the right reverend prelate opposite to him, and the noble earl (of Hopetoun) had also fully explained it. Let these explanations be considered, and let the true spirit of the Treaty of Union be applied to it, and there was not one of their lordships, he conceived, could hesitate a moment what part to take. Let them ask themselves, what possible injury they could do by voting for the motion? Would they diminish any noble lord's rank, curtail his powers, or in any one shape whatever trench upon his privileges? On the other hand, what unnecessary injustice would they not commit, if they decided against the motion? Did the Treaty of Union, or did it not, clearly, explicitly, and undeniably mean that Scotland should send sixteen peers, as the representatives of her peerage, to the House of Lords? He ever would maintain that the intention and spirit of every statute, the penal statutes alone excepted, were to be looked to for the construction. In penal statutes, the strict letter of the Act must be followed. But in a case like the present, the intention and spirit of the Treaty of Union were to be taken, as the best guide to the right construction. His lordship entered into a definition of the statutes alluded to; mentioned what the peculiar elective principle of the law of election in Scotland was combated the Lord Chancellor's legal arguments,-expatiated on the case of the dukes of Dover, Athol, &c. and answered what the Lord Chancellor had said respecting the duke of Richmond, and the rights to which his title of duke of Lennox entitled him as a Scotch peer. The question being called for, their lordships divided: Contents, 52; Not-Contents, 38. The committee being resumed, lord Stormont's second motion, relating to the duke of Queensberry, was carried without a division. Debate in the Commons on the Lottery Regulation Bill.] Feb. 2. Mr. Rose presented to the House, “a Bill for amending and rendering more effectual the laws now in being, for suppressing unlawful Lotteries, and regulating the sales of Lottery Tickets." He begged leave to call the most serious attention of the House to the circumstance, that as a result of the present existing law, the jurisdiction was lodged in the hands of justices of the peace; and that therefore, one great object of the present Bill was to change the jurisdiction, and vest it with the judges of the courts at Westminster. As the law stood, a justice of the peace on complaint being made of an offence against the Act, issued his summons, calling upon the offender to appear before him, and hear and answer the charge. The offenders generally employed counsel, and often defeated the object of the Act, and it was in their power to do it in this simple way :-If a summons was issued from a magistrate in the city, the offender had only to move into Westminster to evade the summons, and defy the power of the magistrate, and so vice versa. The Bill therefore enacted, that a party charged with an offence against the laws in being, should be liable to be apprehended by a capias, and brought before a judge; and if he could not in stantly and upon the spot procure bail, it would follow, that by virtue of the Act of the 17th of the late King, he must suffer all the pains and penalties inflicted upon rogues and vagabonds.-The Bill was read a first and second time. Feb. 5. The House went into a Com. mittee on the Bill. When they came to the clause legalizing the insurance of whole tickets under certain restrictions, Mr. Alderman Newnham expressed his fears, that the Bill went to authorize a species of gambling highly prejudicial to the lower class of the people. Mr. Rose acknowledged, that games of chance ought to be stopped as far as it was practicable, but that the present restraining Lottery Act was in most instances invaded. The process was as yet by warrant from a justice of the peace, directed to a constable, to distrain the goods on the premises. The return to this warrant was generally nulla bona, as the officekeeper had only to change his settlement. By the present Bill, a capias would issue in the first instance, and the party become held to bail for 500l. The sale and value of tickets would be increased, which of course would prove an advantage. Mr. Francis observed, that he could not avoid expressing, in the strongest terms, his censure against the indecisive, loose, and inefficacious manner in which this Bill appeared to point at the extirpation of the very serious and alarming evil of lottery gambling. He did not see the |