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was a system of expedients and corrup- vested in us by Parliament. The ordering tion. I shall examine his pretended rea- and management of the territorial revesons for abolishing the provincial councils, nues was taken out of the hands of the when I come to consider the appointment Governor-general and Council, and transof the committee of revenue, which he ferred to Mr. Hastings alone by his own created in the place of them. In April vote. General Clavering and I opposed 1775, Mr. Hastings declared under his it firmly, and even refused to sign the hand, that the ascertaining of the value orders. I shall not go farther into this of the several districts had been suffi- transaction at present, because there is ciently accomplished. [6th Report, App. already a very minute discussion of it reNo. 12.] We had then been ten years ported to you by the select committee; in possession of the Dewanny, and cer- and the minutes, which passed between tainly by that time ought to have known Mr. Hastings and me upon this subject, what the country was capable of produ- have been published. The opinion of the cing on any reasonable principle of taxa- Court of Directors will be sufficient to give tion. But, no sooner was colonel Monson you a distinct, general idea of the nature of dead, than Mr. Hastings set up a new in- the measure, as well as what they thought quisition into the property of the people. of it. [General letter, 4th July 1777, par. To give a colour to this measure, he pre- 38, 6th Report, App. No. 11.] After tended that, in order to form a new set- expressing their apprehensions of the contlement of the provinces, it would be sequence of a sudden transition from one necessary to be previously furnished with mode to another, they declare that "the accurate states of the value of the lands." | conduct of the majority of the council, [Revenue Consultation, 1st Nov. 1776: (Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell,) on the 6th Report, App. No. 15.] To obtain occasion, has been such as must have this information, he sent an army of inqui- their utter disapprobation." They reprositors, with the title of Aumeens, and bate the idea of delegating separate amounting to many hundreds, all over powers to Mr. Hastings. They hold it to the country, though he himself had on be illegal: they prohibit all such separate various occasions declared, that he did control in future, and they condemn the not like the deputation of Aumeens; that appointment of Gunga Govind Sing, they were not to be trusted, and that he "whose dismission from the Calcutta was confident that no dependance could be committee had rendered him an improper put in that mode of inquiry." [Vide person to transact affairs of such moment general Clavering's letter of 9th Jan. 1777. to the Company." In regard to the idea App. to 6th Report, No. 16.] These men of deputing natives on occasional investinevertheless, collected from the dregs of gations, they say, "we are really astoCalcutta, and instructed by Gunga Go- nished at such a proposition;" and they vind Sing their chief, a person of whom I conclude with the following declaration. shall have much to say, were armed with [General letter 30th January 1778, unlimited power to force every landholder par. 61.] in the country, by imprisonment and corporal punishment, to deliver up the titles of his estate and all the accounts of his receipts and profits. [App. to 11th Report, O.] The provincial councils, by whom such a business, if necessary, ought to have been conducted, were superseded and set aside, and an officer created on purpose to manage it, who were to issue all their orders in the name of Mr. Hastings, to whose immediate charge the control of it was committed. [Revenue Consultation, 1st Nov. 1776: 6th Report, App. No. 15.] By this bold measure, voted by two members of the council, and carried by the casting voice of one of them, against the vote and protest of the other two, general Clavering and I were, in effect, dispossessed of the powers

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"As the whole of the measure is equally repugnant to our ideas of humanity and sound policy, we have only to add that, if one part of the Governorgeneral's plans be more exceptionable than the rest, it is that order, which enjoins the provincial chiefs and councils, on any complaint made by any aumeen, to support and enforce the authority of the said aumeen, by compelling the attendance of such native revenue officers, as the aumeen may require, and by arresting and punishing those who should dare to oppose or disobey what is styled, by the Governor-general and Mr. Barwell, the orders of Government in those instances." These letters are signed by Mr. Smith and Mr. Devaynes, members of this House, as well as leading persons in the direction.-The provincial councils were

formed by Mr. Hastings in November
1773. [Appendix to 6th Report, No. 11.]
In April 1775, he declared that, "with
respect to the mode of managing the re-
venue and the administration of justice,
none occurred to him so good as the sys-
tem, which was already established, of
provincial councils." In the year follow-petual by law; and that then he abolished
ing he repeatedly and urgently advised
the Court of Directors to obtain the sanc-
tion of Parliament for the confirmation of
a plan, in which the establishment of the
provincial councils was specially pro-
vided for and confirmed. You have seen
to what purposes he applied the institu-
tion, and what use he made of it, while
he suffered it to subsist. But these were
petty objects in comparison with the
great scheme which he had in contem-
plation, and which he waited only for my
departure to carry into executiom. I ad-
mit, what Mr. Hastings never would ad-
mit, that the plan of the provincial coun-
cils was liable to material objections. But
it had this good effect at least, that, as
long as the management of the collections
was in their hands, it was very difficult
for the government at Calcutta to sell the
country by wholesale. No secret bargain
could take effect, while those councils had
a local establishment and any degree of
power in the districts. How to get rid of
them was the difficulty, or rather it would
have been a difficulty to any man, but Mr.
Hastings. He says, " that the institution
was merely temporary, and preparatory only
to that system which he adopted in 1781."
[Defence, p. 57.] In 1773 he recalled
the collectors, whom he had appointed
but the year before, to make way for the
provincial councils; that is, he substituted
one temporary plan in the place of ano-
ther. This second was declaredly formed
for the purpose of introducing a third:
and this last was to be introduced by an
easy and gradual change, so as to avoid
the effects of too sudden an innovation."
[6th Report, p. 4.] What his original in-
tention might be, with respect to the con-
tinuance of the councils, I know not. It
is difficult to conceive, how any reason-
able man could form so extensive an ar-
rangement, and create so many establish-
ments for the conduct of a business, in
which he confesses that innovations are
particularly inconvenient, with no other
view but to destroy them; or, in what
manner be meant to dispose of such a
number of the Company's servants, when
he took away their employments. He

says, the councils "were intended to be
gradually withdrawn, as experience might
render them no longer necessary.'
[Letter 5th of May, 1781.] The fact is,
that he suffered them to subsist above
seven years, and, in that time, repeatedly
recommended the system to be made per-

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them, not gradually, but at once-by a sudden, single act of power. But, "why they were permitted to remain during so long a course as seven years, in contradiction of their professed institution," he says, " it is unnecessary to mention!" It is certainly true, that existence must precede dissolution. He who builds, of course has something to pull down. But, in what rational sense the establishment of these offices could be a preparatory step to destroying them, is a question, which I must abandon, as he has done, without attempting to explain it. He was so eager to ac complish his purpose, that he would not suffer the councils to finish the collections and close the accounts of the current year, which ended in April, but obliged them to relinquish their charge in the beginning of February. To this absurd precipitation, I attribute the balances on the settlement of that year. A change of hands, at such a period, must have been made on purpose to create confusion, and to shelter the embezzlements of the new farmers. Such violent proceedings are incompatible with the idea of a gradual introduction of a new system. His whole conduct, on the face of it, is nothing but a series of contradictions. Let us sce how he accounts for it. He says in his Defence, "I am free to acknowledge that, after the establishment of the supreme council, of which I had no idea in Nov. 1773, I did deliver it as my opinion upon record, and in an address to the Court of Directors, that the system of the provincial councils was the best that could have been adopted." From these words he leads you to conclude, though he has not directly affirmed it, that it was the establishment of the Governor-general and council in October 1774, that determined him to adhere to the provincial councils; but he has stated no reason why our appointment should have had that effect. The two institutions had no sort of relation to each other. Each of them was separately created, the former in England, the latter in Bengal, without even a knowledge of the existence of the other. But it seems, "at a subsequent period, upon

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I come now to the Committee of Revenue; that perfect, permanent plan, which Mr. Hastings had in contemplation in 1773, and which, it seems, he never lost sight of, though he suffered it to lie dormant till 1781. In less than a month after I left Bengal, he declared his resolution to intrust four of the Company's servants, stationed at Calcutta, with the charge and management of the public revenues, "and to invest them, (6th Report, p.4.) " in the fullest manner, with all the powers and authority, which the Governor-general and Council possessed in that department, and which they should not reserve exclu

the factions that divided each council and the declining state of the revenne, he altered his opinion. The inability of the provincial councils, from the decline of the revenues, was a sufficient reason for abolishing them." I reserve what I have to say on the state of the revenues, for a separate discussion, in which I mean to show, that they were far from being improved by abolishing the provincial councils. At the end of seven years, he discovers that these councils were divided into factions, and that they were unable to collect the revenues. Sir, I affirm, as matter of fact, that there were no factions in the councils, and that, under his despo-sively to themselves." In fact they retic government, there could be none, unless they were fomented by himself. A factious spirit may be imputed to persons, but not to a system. If it existed among the members of those councils, he had full, he had absolute power to correct it, by removing the offenders. According to Mr. Hastings, the members of the councils were factious and incapable. Yet these gentlemen were the most experienced servants the Company had in the revenue department. While I was in Bengal, he never expressed an opinion to their disadvantage; and, even when he dismissed them, he told the Directors, [5th May 1781] that the "justice due to their servants, who were removed for no fault of theirs, but for the public convenience, had induced him to continue their allowances, until other offices could be provided for them." So he destroys a general institution, which he assures you was the best that could ce adopted, because the members of it, who had committed no fault, were factious and incapable. If it really deserved that sentence, and if all that he says now were literally true, if the plan of the provincial councils, which in 1775 was the best that could have been adopted, was so bad in 1781 that no change of hands could correct it, I should be glad to know, how such a system could be a preparatory step to a good one? But, while the councils subsisted, did he accuse them of any offence? Never. Did he charge them with inability? Never. At the moment of destroying them, he says, they had committed no fault. Five years after sentence and execution, he tells you, for the first time, that they were factious and incapable. Did he give them pensions, because they had been factious? Did he create new offices for them, because they were incapable?

served none. All the members of the pro-
vincial councils were recalled, except the
chiefs, and except the collectors of the
separate districts, both of whom, though
left in the temporary charge of their re-
spective stations, were also to be recalled.
On the professed principles of this plan
(Vide letter of 5th May, 1781.) the whole
business of the revenue department was
to be executed by the new committee.
The office of superintendant of the khalsa
records was abolished. That of the roy-
royan was reduced to a sinecure; and the
canongoes were reinstated in all their func-
tions and powers. By the regulating act
of 1773, the ordering, management, and
government of all the territorial revenues
were vested in the Governor-general and
Council, without any power of transferring
that trust and duty to any other person.
They are delegates themselves, and cannot
delegate. If they can do it in one depart-
ment, why not in every other? Why not
transfer the civil government to a com-
mittee? Why not command the army by a
committee? The committee of revenue
was not merely a ministerial or executive
office, as he now endeavours to represent
it. [Defence, p. 77.] He could not have
intended it to be so, without contradicting
an opinion, deliberately urged and insisted
on by himself on a former occasion: [28th
July 1772.] that "there must be a con-
trolling power in this department; that it
cannot be partially delegated; but, in
whatever hands it is lodged, it must be
absolute and independent." The new
committee were accordingly invested, in
the fullest manner, with all the powers and
authority of government; at least, he tells
you so. On the face of the plan, there is
no exception or reserve of any power
whatever in the Governor-general and
Council, unless the committee think fit to

rest with the board of revenue.”* I submit it to your judgment, whether these reasons, for not delegating the immediate control of the revenue department to an inferior board, be of a temporary nature; whether they only belong to some particu

apply to them for order, on what they | In effect, all authority and command wi themselves may deem extraordinary occurrences. To judge of the case and of the necessity of reporting it, is left wholly to their own discretion. It is stated in the charge, that the reasons assigned by Mr. Hastings for instituting this committee, are incompatible with those which helar occasion, or whether they are valid professed when he abolished the subordinate council of revenue at Muxadavad, in 1773. His opinion of the danger and impropiety of trusting the control of the revenue department out of the immediate charge of the Governor and Council, before the Act of 1773 had made all such delegation illegal, is supported by arguments, which I defy him to answer. His own words on this occasion, which I shall beg leave to read to the House, are the best evidence of the total want of princiciple that runs through his actions, and that whatever he says is for the service of the moment, and never thought of afterwards.

"In the consideration of the subject before us, the first point of inquiry is, Whether the business of the Dewannee shall be conducted as it hath hitherto been, in part by the agency of the Company's inferior servants, constituting a board of revenue at Moorshedabad, or be put under the immediate control of the members of the administration. We shall not hesitate to determine in favour of the latter. The revenue is, beyond all question, the first object of government; that, on which all the rest depend, and to which every other should be made subservient. There must be a controlling power in this department. It cannot be partially delegated; but, in whatever hands it is lodged, it must be absolute and independent. But the superior council, which is constitutionally the controlling power, having no cognizance nor connexion with the inferior department, can have no knowledge of what is transacted, but from the information of the board of revenue, which, however fair and impartial, cannot possibly convey that intimate intelligence, which arises from daily practice and a direct communication with the servants of the revenue. Without such an intelligence, what authority can the administration possess in the affairs of the collections, or with what confidence can they issue any order for their improvement, impressed as they must be with the consciousness that they are but imperfect judges of matters, on which they dictate to others better informed?

and coercive at all times and in all circumstances. In February 1781, the supreme council consisted but of two members present, Mr. Hastings and Mr. Wheler. A friend of Mr. Hastings [major Scott, 6th Report, p. 9.] has stated in evidence to your select committee, "that Mr. Wheler fully concurred in the plan, as Mr. Hastings informed him;" whereas the charge affirms, that Mr. Hastings is solely answerable for the same. In opposition to this evidence, which, in effect, is nothing more than a declaration of Mr. Hastings himself, Mr. Moore has declared at your bar, that Mr. Wheler told him, "he had done all he could to prevent it; that the plan had been three times shown to him, and three times had it been altered on objections made by him; that ultimately he did not concur, but did not oppose because it was to no purpose." Mr. Moore's evidence on this subject is confirmed by Mr. Young, who says, he knew Mr. Wheler's private sentiments to be against abolishing the provincial councils. But the following passage, in one of his letters to me, [dated 15th May 1781,] puts that question out of doubt. "For your better information, I inclose the plan itself, by which you will clearly perceive that whatever good may be derived to the Company, it will hereafter be attended with the peculiar inconvenience of keeping the revenue business at a distance from the present or future members of the supreme board, so effectually, that such as shall henceforth be appointed, not having a previous knowledge of the business of the revenue department, will in future be unable to acquire it." Now, Sir, I charge the whole measure to have been illegal ab initio, and I charge Mr. Hastings with being the sole author of it for purposes of his own. He abolished the provincial councils because they were not manageable; because they interfered with his power, and were an obstacle to the execution of his corrupt designs. By

Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit of the 28th July 1772. Vide further Report from the Committee of Secrecy in 1775, p. 21.

Because Gunga Govind Sing was the dewan. By vacating the office of royroyan, another troublesome check was removed, and the power of both offices united in the hands of Gunga Govind Sing. The committee tell you so themselves. One of their regulations expressly provides, [6th Report, App. No. 3.] " that the royroyan shall not be allowed to interfere in the business transacted by the dewan of the committee, as such interference would occasion frequent disputes and great delay in the business, which each would ascribe to the other." The truth is, that the royroyan, by virtue of his office, was a control over the dewan. It was part of his duty to superintend the conduct of all the dewans. By removing checks, you may prevent disputes, but what security have you against fraud? If the principle be a good one, the management of your revenues ought to be vested in a single office, and that office held by a single person. You will find that it was so in effect. In November 1772, Mr. Hastings declared," that the utility of the canongoes was almost totally suppressed, from the change which had taken place in the revenue system." Why were they reestablished in 1781? was it to check the accounts of the dewan? That was indeed originally their duty. But who is to perform it now? No other than Gunga Govind Sing, who, in quality of naib canongoe, checks his own accounts as dewan, The sole object of these three operations was to throw unbounded and uncontrollable power into the hands of one man, in whose person were united all the great offices of the revenue, wisely established to be checks upon one another. He was at the same moment, to all real effect and purpose, superintendant of the khalsa, royroyan, canongoe, and dewan of the three provinces. Sir John Macpherson gives him the title of "Native Chancellor of the Exchequer." But he was much more. He was the adviser and minister of Mr. Hastings in all his measures, and his agent in all his secret transactions. Concerning this man, as well as concerning the choice of the members of the committee, I shall have many observations to offer you. But I would first consider them in their collective capacity; on what principles they were constituted, and what measures they pursued. One of the fundamental regulations, laid down for their conduct, is remarkable. "If the members differed in opinion upon any questions, the

committing the management of the revenues ostensibly to four persons, appointed by himself, the principal of whom (Mr. Anderson) scarce ever acted, he did, in effect, unite and vest it in his own person. You will soon see what end was to be answered by this extraordinary assumption of power. On the professed principles of the plan, the chiefs of the late councils, and the collectors of the separate districts ought to have been recalled. Yet not only they were never recalled, but many more were afterwards appointed; [Vide Mr. Stewart's Minute of 10th May 1785.] that is, he abolished the collective body of the provincial councils, but kept all his friends and favourites in their employments, and gave pensions to the rest. So that, while he was borrowing money at eight per cent. for current services, he loaded the government with the expense of two complete revenue establishments. Yet, by this plan, he said he hoped "to effect a saving of lacks to the Company." What do you suppose could be meant by abolishing the office of superintendant of the Khalsa, one of the most useful and important in the revenue department, the duties and services of which he said "would continue to be equally necessary," [Letter 5th May, 1781, par. 23.] and which he therefore transferred to another officer with another title? The committee themselves say [6th Report, Appendix, No. 3.] that, for carrying into execution their several duties, the former establishment of the Khalsa, with some few variations, would now also be requisite." If so, why remove the superintendant? the reason is palpable. He was determined, at all events, to get rid of Mr. Ducarel, who was appointed by the Court of Directors, who had held the office four years, whose experience, integrity, and abilities would have made him a dangerous witness of the things that were in agitation. If Mr. Ducarel's services were no longer necessary at the head of the Khalsa, why was he not appointed a member of the committee? Mr. Anderson was employed elsewhere. Mr. Shore's qualifications are not disputed. But, I am sure that no man who knows any thing of the Company's service in Bengal, will affirm that Mr. Charters, Mr. Croftes, or Mr. Evelyn, had any title to be preferred to him. In point of rank, he was senior to them all. Why was the royroyan dismissed from attending the committee of revenue, where alone his attendance could be wanted?

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