having receivers and collectors of the Union throughout the country, would be no serious objection, although it might at first furnish a topic of declamation to many unfriendly dispositions. It would, certainly, tend to procure for the Union better lights, than they now possess, and these persons would always be at hand to explain the operations of Congress, so as to avoid this representation and consequent disaffection. By this means. also the collection of taxes might go on for the ensuing year, at the same time with the enumeration of the people, and the one would be completed in season to regulate the other. The appropriation of this tax might be first to the current service; but in this place it is proper to observe, that the civil list might be paid by taxes on legal proceedings in the national courts, and from the post office, so that those, who derive the immediate and evident benefit from government, would immediately and evidently contribute to its support. The military and naval establishments, with what relates to them, would by this means be first in the appropriation of the direct tax. And therefore these important services would certainly be provided for. The second appropriation might be to pay the interest of the debt above mentioned from the union to the several States. This circumstance would greatly facilitate and accelerate the collection. The balance, if any, might go to the aggregate fund. Lastly, this aggregate fund, which should contain the remainder of all receipts, whether ordinary or extraordinary, ought to be chargeable with the interest of the domestic debt, and the balance, after deducting contingent expenses, should be applied as a sinking fund, in discharge of the public debts generally. The mode of this application is also an object of administration. But it may not be amiss to observe here, that in proportion as the public debt shall be lessened, and by the extension of commerce the public revenue increased, a part of the duties may be applied to the construction and support of a Navy, for the protection of that commerce on which it depends. Success in matters of administration must depend on the powers and abilities of the administrators to take advantage of circumstances as they arise, and use them for the public benefit. But setting aside all question as to integrity, and notwithstanding the good effect of ministerial responsibility, the conciliation of public confidence is so important, that it will always be wise to guard in such manner against abuses, as that the public mind may be tranquillized. On no subject perhaps can it be more needful to take precautions of this sort, than on that of finance both for the public security and for the reputation of the Ministers. It might therefore be wise to provide, that the terms on which loans are to be made, and the manner of making them, should be discussed and decided on, not only by the officers of the Finance department, but by the President and the other principal officers of State, such as the Secretary at War, and of Foreign Affairs. These taken together might be very safely entrusted with the appropriation of the revenue to purposes generally described in the law, and as their determinations would be secret, the public would derive every advantage of wisdom, activity, and integrity from such an arrangement. And in the same view of this great subject it occurs, that as some matters must, after all possible care in the framing of instructions, be left to the discretion of the agent or Minister employed in Europe, it would not perhaps be quite useless to direct, that in affairs of major importance, he should consult with the other public Ministers abroad. But as this is more properly within the purview of the Administration, than of the Legislature, the idea shall not be pursued. The absorption of those unfunded effects, which are at present in circulation, appears to be a measure of indispensable necessity to the establishment of public credit, but the ways and means are not very evident. To purchase them up might be well, when funds are at command for that purpose, but a formal act of the Legislature to that effect would defeat itself, and at the same time be charged by some with injustice, which charge, whether well or ill founded, will always be both unpleasant and injurious. To receive them on loan would increase the public debt considerably, and prove of but little relief to the holders, who having only small sums would be obliged to sell to those who have money, and who would by that means profit considerably by their dispersed and indigent situation. Perhaps it might be well to make them receivable in the direct taxes, at the rate of one half the amount annually for two years, and the administration above mentioned under general powers might in the mean time apply the surplus of any loans abroad, and also the effects of any anticipations which would be obtained, in purchasing them up, which, after a provision made for them, would be a justifiable procedure. Every saving resulting therefrom would be felt within two years at farthest, and the taking of them out of circulation would be felt immediately. To prevent, at the same time, any material defecit of the revenue, the estimates for the service of the first two years should bear, each, one half of this unfunded debt, and afterwards a like amount might be carried annually to the head of Marine, and thus this operation would only postpone for a little time the naval establishments of the United States. A third object of administration is mentioned above, viz. the application of a sinking fund to the discharge of the public debts. Perhaps America offers the fairest field for this business of any country on earth, especially if the above hints should be converted into any regular plan. The debt due by the States would in such case be represented by a debt due to them from the Union. Every purchase therefore of stock from the State creditors would enable a set off by the Union in alleviation of its debt to the State, and as the only revenue which would prove deficient would be that, which this last debt would be founded upon, and as this deficiency could only arise from the neglect of the States themselves, the Administration of the Union would on every principle be justifiable in beginning their operations at that end. From looking back on this sketch, a general and consoling idea arises, viz. that the people of the United States by paying to the public treasury one fortieth of the annual produce of their property and their industry, and by allowing one shilling on the pound on their consumption of foreign productions, which is in effect a bounty on domestic manufactures, would establish their credit on the most solid foundation, bind their union by the most indissoluble ties, quiet the apprehensions by which they have so long been agitated, and secure, as far as human prudence can do it, the future enjoyment of freedom and happiness. |