66 ties-reafon, imagination, and memory. It is "with temerity of conjecture, and obfcurity of language, that Bacon afcribes to the mind powers or faculties. The doctrine of causes and effects is founded folely upon the frequent recur rence of particular affociations." P. 170. Philofophers have only juppofed the existence of powers, by which they accounted for mutations in bodies." P. 173. To fuppofe the existence of power at all, may, perhaps, be nothing elle than the hypothefts of men, who admit the occult operation of fomething which is no object of understanding, for the purpose of accounting for events." P. 180. Thefe expreffions cannot be misunderstood, nor do they leave room for the reader to doubt whether the author be not aware of the tendency of his own fyftem; but we have inadvertently paffed over a paffage in which that tendency is almost directly avowed, and which therefore we shall even yet lay before the reader. "When men firft affumed the existence of power, in order to account for events, they feem always to have afcribed it to fome being poffeffing will and intelligence. So evident, however, is the truth, that every diftinct effect requires a diftinct cause, and fo difficult is it for us to difcard this affociation, that human fancy has in every age been bufy in feeking for active principles, to which have been afcribed both ordinary and extraordinary events. In the first periods of fociety, rude and unlettered nations attributed every circumftance, for which they could not otherwife account, to the agency of vifible or invifible beings, whom they called GoDs, and adored either from fear or from gratitude. The firit opinions of men were tranfmitted to their pofterity; and among the most refined people, the traces of ancient polytheifm may ftill be found. Philofophers themselves have not difdained to employ, under other names, the useful machinery fupplied by vulgar creeds. Genii, Demons, and younger Gods, were beings whofe exiftence was acknowledged by the Platonifts; and the appellations only of these beings have been changed by other fetaries, who speak of powers, dominions, and thrones." Pp. 175, 176. Mr. D., perhaps, did not recollect that the fetaries who fpeak of powers, dominions, and thrones," are the " people called Chriftians *; and it was becaufe Bacon was one of thefe people, he admitted that of which this author fays, "I may be permitted to exprefs fome furprise at the facility with which the great teacher of the inductive me *See St. Paul's Epiftle to the Coloffians, ch. i. ver. 16. P. 177. thod has admitted the doctrine of the rational foul being a fubftance which poffeffes certain powers or faculties." "It is likewife furprifing (he adds, p. 183) that none of thofe authors, who have fince pretended to follow the inductive method, fhould have been aware that, in allowing the exiftence either of mental or of phyfical powers, they were adopting doctrines which had been taught by men who had not found out the right way which leads to truth." These unfortunate men, as we are informed in the preceding part of the chapter, are Plato and Aristotle, with all their followers. But may not the reader be permitted to exprefs fome furprile at the facility with which Mr. Drummond perfuades himself that a difcovery which efcaped the fagacity of Plato and Ariftotle, and Bacon, and Locke, and Newton, was referved for him? or that he fhould for a moment suppose, that he, and Hume, and Helvetius, have penetrated farther into the fecrets of nature than all the other men who have lived fince the beginning of the world? "But by what authority (afks Mr. D.) does the philofopher conclude that he poffeffes mental powers or faculties? Because, anfwers he, I reafon, imagine, and remember; I compare, com. bine, and recall ideas; I act as my choice directs me, and communicate motion to external things. Now, let me again ask the philofopher if he have confidered whether or not this mode of reafoning be that which Bacon recommended? He does not fhew how he has obtained his middle axioms; but fuddenly affumes the existence of a general principle, which is power. He at once afferts that there is power, for he fays at once, I aft, and will, and regulate the fucceffion of my ideas. Thus he takes the thing for granted, and then explains how it is to be applied; he flies from fenfe and particulars, to fomething which is general; he does not mark the steps by which he arrives at that universal principle by which he accounts for every thing." P. 184. To call this trifling, might be deemed unphilofophical; but what fhould we think of the man who could thus reafon against the truth of Euclid's firft Axiom ? "By what authority does the mathematician conclude that things equal to one and the fame thing are equal to one another? Becaufe, anfwers he, I difcern that any two magnitudes found to be each equal to a third, are equal to one another; and confidering well the nature of the relation of equality, which I acquired in the ufual way, I find myfelf compelled to conclude that, univerfally and without regard to figure or any other cir cumftance, cumftance, all things that are equal to one and the fame thing must be equal to one another. Now, let me again afk the mathematician, if he have confidered whether or not this mode of reafoning be that which Bacon recommended? He does not fhow how he has obtained his middle axioms; but fuddenly affumes the truth of a general propofition, which is, that all things, whether in heaven, earth, or hell, which are equal to one and the fame thing, are equal to one another. He at once afferts this to be an univerfal and neceffary truth; for, fays he at once, I have found it to be true in all particular cafes; and by a law of my nature, I am compelled to believe that it cannot be in any cafe falfe. Thus he takes the propofition for granted, and then employs it in mathematical demonstration-he fies from fenfe and particulars, to fomething which is general-he does not mark the steps by which he arrives at that univerfal principle, by which he continues to render demonstration perfpicuous, and at the fame time concise.” This would undoubtedly be trifling; and yet it has, if we mistake not, a ftriking refemblance to the prefent author's reasoning, on the principle of induction, against the reality of power. But he has another argument, which we shall examine, because it may mislead the unwary, and has been rafhly thought by fome of our correfpondents to have been adopted by ourfelves *. "The readiness with which fome orthodox writers admit the interference of power, and affume its exiftence upon every oc cafion, appears unaccountable, when it is confidered that this hypothefts is peculiarly favourable to the advocates for the doc. trine of univerfal neceffity. Now, if this doctrine be true, religion and morality, as commonly taught, are fhaken to their foundation. The Atheist requires no more than the exiftence of that blind fate, which produces and caufes all things; and the -fceptic, who will never affent to fuch a prefumptuous dogma as this is, will yet triumph in remarking the futile and incon fiftent reasonings of those who, after having ignorantly granted the data on which it was founded, would then arbitrarily deny it, as falfe and impoffible." "It is a law of the Ariftotelian philofophy, that whatever exifts in energy has always exifted in capacity. In admitting the common opinion, concerning the production of every thing by power, it feems difficult to reject this law. But if it be true, then, as Ariftotle likewife teaches, all things which exift potentially muft exift actually, at fome period or another. * Brit. Crit. vol. xxvi. p. 38, &c. M 4 Whatever Whatever is, is confequently by neceflity; for it has had its potential existence from eternity, by which is implied its neceffary actual exiftence. Thus there is no being that could have prevented the exiftence of another; and the inference to be drawn from this laft propofition needs not to be stated.” Pp. 187, 188. If any of our readers be very defirous to fee the Stagyrite vindicated from the charge of Atheifm, thus rafhly-we had almoft faid ignorantly-brought against him, he will find that vindication complete in Cudworth's Intellectual Syftem of the Univerfe. It is our business to obferve that Mr. D. confounds power with phyfical caufe or force; and that the power which orthodox writers admit, is utterly incompatible with univerfal neceffity. "Power, to produce any effect, fays Dr. Reid, implies power not to produce it. We can conceive no way in which power may be deter mined to one of these rather than the other, in a being that has no will;" and the fame notion of power is held by every orthodox writer with whom we are acquainted, and indeed by all mankind, except Mr. Hume, and a few blind admirers of that fubtle Sceptic. That every change of ftate implies the agency of power fomewhere, is a felf-evident truth; and that phyfical caufes are utterly inconceivable, but as the inftruments of fome fupreme mind endowed with will and intelligence, is univerfally admitted by all who have thought duly on the fubject. Hence it is often faid by orthodox writers, that the relation between caufe and effect is neceffary, and that it implies an operating principle in the cause; but, in using this expreffion, the meaning of fuch writers is very different from that which the prefent author attributes to them. We know not one orthodox writer, nor any found philofopher, whether orthodox or not, who maintains that the relations between phyfical caufes and effects are so necessary that they could not have been otherwife than they are; or that, from the appearance of the caufe, the effect may be predicted with certainty equal to that of mathematical truth. But we are ourselves convinced that a change or event as certainly implies the agency of mind fomewhere, and at fome time, as the exiflence of a right angled plane triangle implies the relation of equality between the fquare of the hypothenufe and the fum of the fquares of the other two fides; and we have no hesitation to fay, that he who main. tains the contrary, holds, whether intentionally or not, the first principle of Atheism. But as the agency of mind im plies, in the very notion of it, will and intelligence, it is directly contrary to that blind fate with which it is fo unaccountably confounded by the author now under confideration. The Ariftotelian maxim, that "whatever exifts in energy has always exifted in capacity," is an incontrovertible truth, implying nothing more than that every thing which actually exifts has always been poffible; but the abfurd inference which Mr. D. draws from this maxim, conjoined with the common opinion concerning the production of every thing by power, does not follow, fince the common opinion of power implies volition and intelligence. From cenfuring the philofophy of Bacon, this author, with ftill more peculiar modefty, proceeds to reprefent the Principia of Newton as a fyftem of Atheifm! It will be naturally afked, Does he understand that work? In our opinion, he certainly does not; or he could not have represented the attraction of gravitation as a material force. He feems, though he gives feveral quotations from the Principia, to have studied the fyftem in the French fchool; but if he will condefcend to take a leffon from his own countryman, the late Dr. Robifon of Edinburgh, he may perhaps difcover that all the affertions of Delaplace have not the force of demonftration, and be induced once more to change his opinion of the tendency of the Newtonian doctrines. In the mean time, we beg leave to inform him that Cudworth died the very year after the publication of the Principia, and long before the publication of the Optics; that he cannot therefore be quoted with any propriety as a Newtonian; and that it appears from the Intellectual Syftem itfelf, that Cudworth was a follower rather of Ariftotle and Plato than of any modern fyftem-builder. The philofophy of Spinofa is here reviewed in the form of a dialogue; but Theophilus, who reprefents the Chriftian philofopher, declaims where he ought to have reafoned; and even the arguments of Hylus want fomething of the plaufibility of thofe employed by his prototype. He ftrives, indeed, to prefs Cudworth himfelf, the greatest of all * An apology is due to our readers for having delayed fo long to make them acquainted with that celebrated profeffor's Elements of Mechanical Philofophy; but we have heard that a fecond volume is in the prefs, and if it appears foon we shall review both volumes together, when we fhall find an opportunity to vindicate the doctrines of Newton from the mifreprefentations that have been given of them in the French school. Spinofa's |