bifhops upon any clergymen officiating in their church; for this author himfelf allows (p. 4.) that he might be permitted in their communion to ufe the English liturgy in all the offices of the church; and we know that there is one bishop in Scotland, who, as he was ordained a priest in England, continues to use, without the fmalleft variation, the liturgy of his mother church.

The doctor, however, objects to the ufe of two liturgies in the fame church as a practice productive of confufion inftead of unity; but is he not aware that in the primitive church, where there was no confufion, each diocefe had its own liturgy, agreeing indeed in fenfe, but differing in various expreffions, from the liturgies of other diocefes? Is he not aware that if Charles the First had accomplished his object, and the church then established in Scotland had continued on the footing on which his Majefty had laboured to place her, he would himfelf, when in that part of the united kingdom, have been compelled by law to make use of that vary liturgy to which he now objects?

We have dwelt longer on this appendix, than its importance perhaps may feem to deferve; but the piety and worth of its author excited in us a strong defire to point out the fallaciousness of thofe arguments, by which he seems to have reconciled his own mind to a conduct that, we think, cannot be defended, and which we truft that a lover of truth, as we take Dr. Grant to be, will fee the propriety of relinquifhing.

The cafe of chaplains to English factories in foreign countries, mentioned in the ninth page, bears no refemblance to that of Dr. Grant, and fuch other epifcopal clergymen as officiate in Scotland, in fubordination to no bifhop; for foreign countries are not fubject to the King of Great Britain, nor would Popish or Lutheran bifhops receive Englith clergymen into their communion but on terms very different from thofe propofed by the bifhops in Scotland.

As British fubjects it is our inclination as well as our duty to fupport with our utmost abilities the religious estabfifhments of every part of the united kingdom; as confcientious members of the church of England we naturally prefer the epifcopal to the prefbyterian form of church government; but as Chriftians, defirous of putting on that charity which is the bond of perfectnefs, we perceive nothing to hinder the epifcopal church tolerated in Scotland from maintaining her own principles, and at the fame time uniting with the prefbyterian church established by law, to check the progrefs of those torrents of irreligion and fanati

cifm which have long disturbed the peace of fociety, and threatened both churches with deftruction. To this good work the Scotch Epifcopalians muft, however, lend a very feeble aid, fo long as they continue divided among themfelves about trifles; and therefore it may become them to weigh well the import of what St. Paul fays (Rom. xvi. 17, 18.) of the authors of all fuch divifions.

ART. V. The Principles of Moral Science. By Robert Forfyth, Efq. Advocate. Vol. I. 8vo. 520 pp. 10s. 6d. Bell and Bradfute, Edinburgh. Longman, &c. London.

1805.

FEW fubjects of fpeculation can be more truly interefting to the human mind, than an investigation of the principles of moral fcience. Man, not unfrequently, affumes to himself the peculiar prerogative of being a rational animal; but he is, perhaps, yet more accurately characterized by being called a moral animal. The more dignified orders of the brutes certainly poffefs fomething nearly approaching to reafon;t in none of them can we trace any thing refembling a moral faculty. They are formed blindly to obey the impulfe of every appetite, and every headftrong principle; while man feels it right to reftrain, and wrong to indulge, to their full extent, certain powerful propenfities of his nature. To him, therefore, alone, can be applied the attributes of merit and demerit, of virtue and vice; and of him alone can it be faid, that he neglects or performs his duty.

It is not then furprifing that the principles of morality fhould have engaged the attention of inquifitive men in all ages. Upon this fubject the celebrated fchools of ancient Greece exerciled all their philofophical ingenuity. Their fucceffors among the Romans were not lefs ardent in the fame field of inquiry; nor have the moderns ceased to labour affiduously on this interefting topic. Yet it is certainly fomewhat furprifing that upon a fubject of this nature, which appears fo completely to lie within the fcope of common obfervation, fo great a diverfity of opinion fhould have prevailed.

If we confult the writings of the celebrated philofophers of antiquity, we fhall find nearly as many different opinions concerning the principles of morality, as there were different fects or fchools. A Platonist, a Peripatetic, a Stoic, and

an

an Epicurean, will each afcribe our moral approbation to a different source. If we have recourse to the moderns, our perplexity, inftead of being diminished, will be increased. A difciple of Hobbes will inform us that morality is nothing more than a strict obedience to the laws of the land. A difciple of Mandeville, of Hume, or of Helvetius, will maintain, that the moral man is he who takes the best care of his own intereft; while a follower of Shaftsbury or Hutchefon will difclaim every kind of morality, but that which fprings from pure benevolence. One philofopher will tell you that morality confifts in acting according to right reafon, and the eternal fitnefs of things: another will not condefcend to place it on any other footing than an inplicit obedience to the direct will of God.

It is remarked by Dr. Butler, in his Analogy, as a thing not a little fingular, that while men have fettled, with remarkable precifion, the laws by which the planets are retained in their orbits, and are made to revolve with order and harmony in their ftated courfes, they are unable to fettle the principles by which their own actions are governed; or the motives by which they are guided in their most important and interefting concerns. Among the various reafons that might be affigned for this curious fact, there is one which has, doubtless, no fmall thare in producing the effect. When, men are engaged in enquiries which are merely fpeculative, they are not liable to be misled by paflion or interest. The defires and emotions are completely filled, and reafon is allowed to take an unbialled view of the various fides of the question. But when the active principles of human nature are the object of invefligation, the feelings of the enquirer are powerfully interefted: he himfelf becomes, a party in the question at iffee; and he is but too apt to exhibit his fubject through that peculiar medium which is beft fuited to his own views. It is thus that, in the fyftem of one phi lofopher, man is degraded into a merely fenfual and selfinterefted being; while, in the fyftem of another, he is ex-alted to the rank of a demigod.

Among the various passions and feelings by which men are in danger of being biaffed in conducting fuch enquiries, there is one of very notorious influence, that is, the love of fingularity. Many a paradox in morals, and we may add, ` in metaphyfics, and even in phyfics, have fprung from this fource alone. The feet of the Sceptics has probably been guided by this principle, much more than they are them felves aware, or at least than they would be willing to

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avow

avow; and many a dangerous opinion has been broached, from no other motive, than a defire of appearing fuperior in ingenuity to the ordinary run of men, and of being free from all the contamination of vulgar prejudices. We are inclined to think, that the prefent author is among the number of those who feek after the fame arifing from the invention of an ingenious paradox: and that fome of the opinions which he has brought forward, are not fo much the refult of conviction, as of a defire to fay new things upon an old fubject. What thefe opinions are, and by what arguments they are fupported, we fhall now proceed

to examine.

This first volume of Mr. Forfyth's Principles of Moral Science is divided into three parts. The first is intitled, "General Principles," the fecond, "Of the Private Duties of Men," and the third, "Of Religion." The subject of Man's Public or Social Duties is probably referved for another volume. The first chapter of the first part is intitled, "Of the ultimate Object of Human Purfuit ;" and here we find the author at once advancing his claims to a very important difcovery. If we are to give credit to his profeffions, he has completely fucceeded in detecting the ftumbling-block, which flood in the way of all former enquirers into this fubject; and has been fo fortunate as to difcover the clue which can alone fuccefsfully lead us through the labyrinth.

"The general opinion," fays Mr. Forfyth, "upon the fubject is this, that the great object which nature and reafon teach men to purfue in this world, is felicity or happiness; meaning by happiness a continual fucceffion of pleafing thoughts, emotions, and fenfations. This opinion was entertained by all the ancient philofophers, although they differed widely about the best means of purfuing happiness. This opinion has also been entertained by the ableft, or at least the most popular modern writers; but they have endeavoured to engraft upon it a fyftem of universal benevolence, and have afferted, that the great object of every man's purfuit ought to be, to promote the individual and general happinefs of the human race. According to this fyftem, therefore, that action is the beft which produces, or has a tendency to produce, the greatest portion of felicity in the world; and that action is the worft which produces, or has a tendency to produce, the greateft portion of mifery." P. 3.

This doctrine, that felicity or happiness is a desirable thing, and that the practice of benevolence is commendable, by no means pleases Mr. F.; on the contrary, he treats it as a mere vulgar error. The following is the fingular dogma which he wishes to fubftitute in its ftead.

"It appears to me," fays he, " that the great object which the human race ought to purfue, and the attainment of which they ought to regard as the business of their lives, is not to produce happiness, pleasure, or felicity in themselves or others; but that, on the contrary, the end for which they were formed, and which alone they can purfue with fuccefs, is the improvement of their whole intellectual faculties, whether fpeculative or active. In one word, it is the bufinefs of man, in this world, to endeavour to become an excellent being, poffeffing high powers of energy and intelligence. This is his chief good; and ought to be the great and ultimate object of his purfuit, to which every other confideration ought to be sacrificed." P. 9.

This is certainly a very original discovery. All men, it feems, from the creation of the world to the present day, have been seeking after that which it is contrary to their very nature, and to the intention of their Creator, that they fhould defire. For that all men, fince the creation of the world, have been seeking after happiness, according to their feveral views of it, is a fact too notorious to admit of a doubt; and that they will continue to do fo, notwithstanding the arguments of Mr. Forfyth, may be very safely aífumed as certain. For what is meant by happiness? Nothing more than a ftate of pofitive enjoyment; or a condition, preferable in fome certain particulars, to all other conditions. While, therefore, man is capable of difcerning pleafure from pain; while it is the impulfe of his nature to feek after what is agreeable, and to fhun what is evil; happiness must be the great object of his wifhes, and of his conftant purfuit. He may indeed form a very falfe efti mate of that which conftitutes happinefs: and he may eagerly feek after objects which are very far from contributing to his true enjoyment; but it is impoffible for a rational being. to form any other defire than that of being happy; and it is the business of the found moralift to point out wherein true happiness confifts, and the moft probable means of attaining it. As to the "high powers of energy and intelligence," which Mr. Forfyth recommends, as the only rational object of human purfuit, the true value which thefe powers poffefs in the fcale of our acquirements, may be fairly afcribed to the influence which they have on our happiness,