"Language is the most diftinguishing accomplishment of man; and an accurate acquaintance with its principles is a more im. portant fpeculative duty than is generally fuppofed. Being the medium by which, in this world, minds hold intercourfe with each other, and reciprocally communicate knowledge; ignorance of its nature has given rife to very grofs errors, and even to great moral calamities, of which I fhall now take notice.

"The fimpleft form or branch of language, as already ftated, is that by which particular words or appellations are made to reprefent particular objects. This fimplicity has induced mankind, whenever it was poffible, to give the form of names, or fubftantive nouns, to their expreffions. I have already mentioned, that not only claffes of objects have been treated in this way, by the contrivance of fuch words as a tree, a house, an animal; but also that adjective nouns, or words expreffive of the difference between objects, have received this form by the invention of fuch words as goodness, juftice, wifdom, and others of a like nature., Even verbs, or words expreffive of action, have been converted into the form of fubftantive nouns or names; by means of fuch words as motion, life, duration, exiftence, extenfion, for the fake of enabling us to talk in a fhort and fimple manner of claffes of exertion, without alluding to any particular exertion.

Very extraordinary effects have arifen from this practice of converting all words into the form of substantive nouns or names. As fubftantive nouns or names were originally used to denote particular exifting objects, a notion gradually crept into men's minds, that all words, bearing this form, muft reprefent particular objects actually exifting in nature. The poets made a notable use of this notion. They amufed their hearers or their readers by reprefenting the words war, wifdom, love, revenge, and others, as beings endued with intelligence, and as performing an important part in the bufinefs of this world. War was a terrible being, who stirred up ftrife between nations, and prefided over battles. Wisdom was a beautiful virgin clothed in armour, who fprung from the brain of Jupiter, the father of Gods and men. Thus the poets perfonified all the most remarkable of thofe fecondary fubftantive nouns, which had been formed from adjective nouns or verbs, or had been adopted as names of claffes of events; and thus they truly gave

to airy nothing,

A local habitation and a name.

"Had matters been carried no farther, little harm would have enfued. But mankind began gradually to believe that the entertaining and marvellous ftories told them by their poets about thefe fictitious beings were all true. Artists flattered this popular delufion, by pro. ducing beautiful pictures and ftatues of thofe creatures of imagina. tion, Temples were at last built to their honour; priests were confecrated;

confecrated; a fyftem of fuperftitious idolatry banished from the human mind all difcernment of truth and the people worshipped mere vocables [words] under the figure of beautiful paintings and itatues of male and female deities.

"The delufion, under a different form, reached the philofophers themselves. Suppofing that every word which bears the form of a name or fubftantive noun, muft reprefent a particular object, it became a very puzzling queftion, what particular object we fpeak of when we ufe fuch words as a tree, goodnefs, motion? or what idea is prefent to the mind when we think of a tree, or of goodnefs in general, and not of any particular tree, or particular example of goodness ?

"The Platonifts fuppofed that there are certain uncreated effences of things, which exifted from all eternity in the Divine Mind; and that thefe effences are the objects of thought, or the things fignified by general terms.

"The followers of Ariftotle believed the exiftence of fomething like the Platonic effences, which they called fubftantial forms; which they faid are continually flying off from all bodies, and which form the objects of thought, when we ufe general expreffions.

The

"At laft, during the dark ages, there arofe a new fect of philofophers, led by Peter Abelard, whofe misfortunes have been rendered interefting by the talents of Mr. Pope. followers of this new fect afferted, that when we think of a ge. neral term, we think only of the term or word itself. They were called [Nominalifts], in oppofition to the followers of Ariftotle and Plato, who were called [Realifts]. The Nominalists were nearly in the right; for when we think of the num ber nine, in general, without thinking of any fet of objects in particular, it is obvious that we do not think of any object that exifts in nature, but merely of a word which may be used to avoid a tedious enumeration of particulars. If at any time we proceed farther than this, it is only to recollect fome of the particular objects that we fuppofe the speaker to include under the general term, that we may be the more certain of his meaning. Thus when a tree in general is fpoken of, without reference to any particular tree, we fatisfy ourselves with calling. into the memory an indiftinct image of a trunk and branches." P. 116.

We are compelled to fay, that in his difquifitions concerning tafte, Mr. Forfyth is by no means fo fuccefsful as in what he has advanced concerning the origin of abstract and general terms. This, indeed, must be acknowledged to be a difficult fubject, but confiderable light has been. thrown upon it by late writers. We did not, therefore, expect to find, in a modern difquifition on the philofophy

of

of mind the exploded doctrine, that the beautiful in objects of tafte arifes from their fitnefs for their several ends, or perfection in their respective kinds.

"On examining the various objects of tafte," fays this author, "it will be found that what is called their beauty is only another name for their perfection. It confifts of [in] the skill and energy, or [in] the degree of intellectual excellence, that appears difplayed on any occafion, or in the formation of any object. An object is called beautiful when it is excellent of its kind, or when a high degree of wisdom appears to have been exerted in its production." P. 134.

Had this author ftudied Mr. Burke, as every writer on the fubject of tafte certainly ought to do, he would have found in that accomplished scholar's Effay on the Sublime and Beautiful, a complete refutation of the doctrine which he here fupports. "The ftomach, the lungs, the liver," obferves Mr. Burke," are incomparably well adapted to their purposes, yet they are far from having any beauty. According to the principle of fitnefs, or perfection in its kind," he obferves," that the wedge-like fnout of the fwine, with its tough cartilage at the end, the little funk eyes, and the whole make of the head, fo well adapted to its offices of digging and rooting, would be extremely beautiful. The great bag hanging to the bill of a pelican, a thing highly ufeful to this animal, would likewife be a beauty in our eyes. The hedge-hog, fo well fecured againft affaults by his prickly hide, and the porcupine, with his miffile quills, would be confidered as creatures of no fmall elegance. Yet while we refuse beauty to thefe, we uniformly afcribe it to the brilliant plumage of the peacock, and the elegant form of the dove; although we do not difcover the purposes which thefe are calculated to answer."

Mr. Forfyth, indeed, has fufficient hardihood to abide by all the confequences of his hypothefis; and, with true knight-errantry, to maintain the beauty of every thing which may be said to poffefs a fitnefs for its particular end.

"Almost every art of every kind," fays he, "however homely its object may be, is, in fome refpects, to be confidered. as a fine art; inafmuch as its productions are, in certain circumftances, accounted beautiful. We every day hear of beautiful chairs, tables, broad-cloth, carts, ploughs, coaches, and, in fhort, whatever is employed for utility or pleafure, at times receives this appellation. Mathematicians tell us of beautiful demonftrations; and anatomifts talk with great ease of elegant and beautiful anatomical preparations. Even a dunghill may,

perhaps,

perhaps, appear beautiful in its proper place and feafon; and an intelligent agriculturift would probably regard a farm-yard in which it should be wanting, as deformed and defective on that very account.". P. 129.

This is altogther unanswerable ;-if Mr. Forfyth is a ferious admirer of the beauty of a dunghill, it would be as fruitless to endeavour to reafon him out of his liking, as it was with that young man mentioned by Sterne, who took it into his head to fall in love with his grandmother. In fuch a defperate cafe as this, it may indeed be faid-" De guftibus non eft difputandum.'

Mr. Forsyth carries his faith in the charms of fitness farther than, we believe, it was ever carried before; for it ferves him not only to account for our approbation of the beautiful, but likewife for the pleafure with which we view thofe objects called fublime." If," fays he, "the excellence of an object is uncommonly great, fo as to require a confiderable effort to difcern its whole worth, and all the fkill and power which are manifefted by means of it, fuch an object is faid to be more than beautiful-it is fublime." P. 135.

We had always been taught to confider the qualities of beauty and fublimity as things effentially different, nay even oppofites in their nature; and for this opinion we have no contemptible authority, namely, that of Mr. Burke himself, who thus contrafts the beautiful and the fublime. "Sublime objects," fays he, "are vaft in their dimenfions, beautiful ones comparatively fmall: beauty fhould be fmooth and polifhed; the great, rugged and negligent; beauty fhould thun the right line, yet deviates from it infenfibly; the great, in many cafes, loves the right line, and when it deviates, it often makes a strong deviation; beauty fhould not be obfcure, the great ought to be dark and gloomy; beauty fhould be light and delicate, the great ought to be folid and even maffive." All thefe diverfities, however, are overlooked by Mr. Forfyth, in his fondness for confound. ing together things of oppofite qualities. But, we truft, it is altogether unneceffary to waite time in expofing the abfurdity of fuch a view of the fubject.

We haften to take notice of the third and last part of Mr. Forfyth's work, which treats of Religion, or duty towards God; the clafs of focial duty being referved as matter for future lucubration. We are forry that we cannot praise Mr. Forfyth's theology any more than his morality: for, on both fubjects, we conceive his opinions

to

to be equally irreconcileable with truth, and hostile to the beft interests of the human fpecies.

Having, in the first chapter of this part, declaimed against the pernicious effects of fuperftition, or enthufiaftic devotion, the author proceeds, in chapter 2d, to examine the arguments for the existence and attributes of the Deity. Mr. Forfyth argues ftrenuoufly for the existence of a fupreme firft caufe, and states, fairly enough, the common reafonings in fupport of that great truth: but when he proceeds in the next place to "confider the character or peculiar qualities" of the Supreme Power, we are compelled to exclaim, his God is not our God. The rule by which he guides himself in this investigation is, "to afcribe no quality or characteristic to the Supreme Intelligence that does not appear in his works; and, at the fame time, to afcribe to him every quality that he has actually difplayed in them. P. 370. And to this rule no reafonable exception can be taken. But what is the refult of his inveftigation, guided by fuch a principle? 1ft. From the unity of defign every where manifefted in the works of nature, we may certainly infer the unity of the artift. 2dly. From the invariable operation of the original laws of nature we may conclude, that "one of the most remarkable circumstances in the characters of the Maker of the world is, the ftedfaftnefs of his exertions, and the unchangeablenefs of his purpofes. 3dly. Another of the qualities of the Supreme Mind appears to be the love of variety. 4thly. The Deity is omnifcient and omniprefent. But 5thly, "It is evident," according to our author, that what we call the benevolent affections, which arife in us from the ha bitual remembrance of pleafures enjoyed in fociety, cannot belong to his nature." The production of intelligence in his creatures is always his principal aim, to which their pleasures are continually facrificed. What we call good. nefs or benevolence, therefore, cannot be regarded as a pris mary or ruling principle of action with the Deity, nor can it, perhaps, be laid with propriety, that he loves his crea tures." P. 370.

cr

In what he has here written, Mr. Forfyth has certainly forgotten the wife admonition of Seneca-" Debemus difputare verecundè de natura Deoruin, ne affirmamus aliquid temerè." He likewife differs very much from that philos fopher in his fentiments concerning the benevolence of the Supreme Power. "Quis eft," fays Seneca, qui non fenferit munificentiam Deorum? Nemo eft expers beneficiorum cœleftium: nemo eft, ad quem non aliquid manaverit ex fonte illo Benigniffimo." (De benef. c. iv. 4.) We are much