though we be found to differ often in opinion from the author. To himself we make no apology; for he would not be a true member of the Academy, were he to feel the fmalleft uneafinefs at our differing from him as widely as he has differed from others. We have indeed found in his work many pofitions which appear to us erroneous; but juftice requires of us to fay, that his bias toward immaterialifm is much lefs dangerous, than that mechanical and chemical mania which has infected the prefent race of philofophers, and pretends to account for every phænomenon of mind by unfeen æthers, the vibration of nerves, or elective attractions!

The volume before us is only part of a great work, of which the plan and the extent are not ftated in the preface. Of these therefore we shall at present say nothing. The part which is publifhed confifts of two books, in the former of which various questions are difcuffed in the manner of the Academy, and in the latter is taken a review of feveral cele brated fyflems of philofophy. Perhaps the first of the two published books is the most important, though the second may generally be found the moft amufing; and therefore to the firit we fhall devete moft attention.

The queftion firft difcuffed is, "Whether we have any notion of power;" and as the author labours to prove that we have not, the reader will hardly be furprised at our having, in the courfe of the difcuffion, met with feveral po fitions, to which we cannot affent, and with not a few which we do not understand. The author is undoubtedly mistaken when he fays, that metaphyficians commonly fuppofe, or take for granted, that the mind is an incorporeal fubftance; endowed with numerous qualities, faculties, and attributes; and fufceptible both of action and paffion.") The common people indeed take for granted, that the mind, is what they call Spirit; but when their notions of spirit are inquired into, it is found that by the word they means not an incorporeal fubftance, but a kind of aerial or etherial fluid, which, in the opinion of the metaphysician, is as corporeal as the table at which he writes. It is not until he has compared the known attributes of mind, with the known qualities of body, and feen that the former have no refemblance whatever to the latter, that the metaphysician infers that the mind is an incorporeal fubftance. Whether the inference be fairly drawn is not the queftion at present before us. That question is stated in the following terms.

"Before accounting for all mental phænomena, by fuppofing the existence of a number of intellectual faculties, it might have

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been perhaps worthy of philofophical accuracy to have examined, and to have explained (if it could be done) the nature of power, Is power a caufe or an effect? Philofophers do not appear to have decided this question. Sometimes they speak of power, as if it were the principle which had occafioned all things, and by which the universe itself was produced; at other times they feem to confider it, as having refulted from fome being al, ready exifting; nor do they inform us, in what way they underftand how any thing can exift, without the previous exertion of power. Is it poffible to reconcile thefe different opinions? Power cannot be at once the principle and the attribute of being. It cannot be both the confequence and the origin of existing fubftance that by which all things were caufed, and yet that, which fomething was necessary to caufe," P. 5.

It is not at all furprising to us, that philofophers have not decided, or attempted o decide, a question which we did not, till now, fuppofe it poffible for any philofopher to afk. Before Mr. Drummond had put to others the queftion-" Is power a cause or an effect ?"-it would certainly have been worthy, as he fays, of philofophical accuracy, to afk himself, whether an efficient caufe be conceivable by him who has no notion of power?

But have not philofophers contradicted themselves when treating of power? Perhaps fome of them have; but we perceive nothing like a contradiction in the different opinions attributed to them in this extract. The power of God may be, and certainly is, the principle by which the universe was produced; and yet the power of men may have refulted, and certainly did refult, from the power of God already exifting. Philofophers do not indeed inform us bow any thing can exift without a previous exertion of power; nor do fuch of them as are fober pretend to fay how any thing exifts by a previous exertion of power. That many things do exift by a previous exertion even of human power, which, without that exertion, would not have exifted, daily experience renders incontrovertible; and that fome all-powerful being has exifted for ever without the previous exertion of any other power, is a truth fufceptible of the most rigid demonftration (if a philofopher of the academy will admit that any thing is fufceptible of demonftration;) but no men of found mind will attempt to explain the how of any kind of existence. It is indeed felfevident, that the very fame power cannot be at once the principle and the attribute of the fame being: it cannot be both the confequence and the origin of the fame exifting subAance; but why power, the attribute of one being, may not be the principle or efficient caufe of another being, we are

yet

Pet to learn. Is not the power of any piece of machinery* (a fleam-engine for inftance) the confequence of the laws of nature, and the mental powers of men? and are not the laws of nature, and the powers of men, derived from the eternally exifting power of God? But, continues the author,

"If we confider power as the caufe, by which we are ultimately to account for all effects, we muft acknowledge that it is itself a boundary, which we cannot pafs-a principle, before which nothing can be placed. Where there are separate powers, then, there are feparate principles; and a principle is that, which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing. Principio autem nulla eft orige (fays Cicero) nam ex principio oriuntur omnia, ipfum autem nullâ ex re; nec enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.'

Let not the reader be mifled by the authority of Cicero,: for the quotation from him, when read with the context, is foreign from the fubject under difcuffion by our author.. Cicero is treating of the human foul, and gives from Plato the following argument, to prove it not barely immortal, butabsolutely eternal, a parte ante as well as ad partem poft.

"Quod femper movetur, æternum eft; quod autem motum affert alicui, quodque ipfum agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat neceffe eft: folum igitur quod fe ipfum movet, quia nunquam deferitur à fe nunquam ne moveri quidem definit; quin etiam cæteris quæ moventur, hic fons, hoc principium eft movendi: principii autem nulla eft origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia; ipfum autem nulla ex re alia nafci poteft; nec enim effet principium, quod gigneretur aliunde: quod fi nunquam oritur, ne occidit quidem unquam: nam principium extinétuin nec ipfum ab alio renafcetur, nec a fe aliud creabit; fi quidem neceffe eft a principio oriri omnia. Ita fit, ut motus principium id fit, quod ipfum a fe movetur; id autem nec nafci poteft nec mori: vel concidat omne cœlum, omnifque natura confiftat neceffe eft, nec vim ullam nansciscatur,, quæ a primo impulfu moveatur. Cum pateat igitur, æternum id effe, quod fe ipfum moveat, quis eft, qui hanc naturam animis effe tributam neget? Inanimum eft omne, quod pulfu agitatur externo, quod autem eft animal, id motu cietur interiore et fuo: nam hæc eft propria natura animi, atque vis: quæ fi eft una ex omnibus, quæ fe ipfam femper moveat: neque nata certe est, et æterna eft +.”

The power of machinery is a metaphorical expreffion; but it is in common ufe, and will not be here mifunderstood by him who is not determined to misunderstand us.

+ Tufcul. Quæft. lib. 1. c. 23. et Sem. Scipionis, § 8.

That there must be fome eternal principle, the fource of motion, Cicero has here fufficiently proved, though he was unquestionably mistaken when he supposed that principle to be in perpetual motion-itself; but he has not proved, nor can the prefent author prove, that the power of felf-motion, within certain limits, may not be communicated by that eternal principle to other beings, who, though they have had a beginning, may be confidered as fecondary principles, because they too produce effects; and therefore the conclufion, that the human foul must be eternal, is not more impious than it is abfurd. The power of God, by which we ultimately account for all effects, is certainly, to use the words of our author, a boundary which we cannot pafs-a principle before which nothing can be placed; but in the reafoning of Cicero, there is nothing to compel us to admit, that if men be poffeffed of power, that power likewise must be derived from nothing, and held of nothing!

As to felf-motion (fays Warburton*, commenting on this paffage) the word is equivocal, and may either fignify the power given to a being to begin motion, or a power inherent and effential to a being who has all things within itself, and receives nothing from without. Now we have shown that Plato and his followers ufed felf-motion, when applied to the foul, in this latter fenfe, and from thence inferred a NECES SARY immortality in that being which had it, an immortality which implied increation and felf-exiflence t. That this was the fenfe in which Cicero used the word is indisputable from his faying, "cum poteft igitur, æternum id efle, quod fe ipfum moveat;" and again, "quæ fe ipfam femper moveat; neque nata certe eft, et æterna eft;" but, with all due deference to the great orator, we have no hesitation to fay, that this is no fair inference, because it takes for granted what can never be proved, that the power of beginning motion cannot be communicated.

But what has all this to do with the queftion agitated by Mr. Drummond concerning our notion of power? It is his,

* Div. Leg. book iii. feet. 3.

+ We recommend this subject to the study of that prefbyter, who is fo highly offended at the account given by us of the confe quences of the firft tranfgreffion. If he pay due attention to it, he may perhaps difcover, that the notions entertained by too many Chriftians of the immortality of man, bear a stronger likeness to the doctrines of Cicero, and other Platonifts, than to thofe of the gofpel; and that we fpoke not without book, when we called thofe who held fuch notions, "femi,pagan philofophers."

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object to prove, that we can have no fuch notion, because he thinks we cannot fay whether power be a caufe or an effect, a fubftance or an attribute. The reafoning of Cicero, on the other hand, evidently fuppofes power to be the attribute of fome eternal being, which perpetually moves itself, and is the fource and principle of all other motions; and it is this powerful being, and not power in the abftract, which he calls" principium e quo oriuntur omnia," But, fays Mr. Drummond,

"According to this manner of confidering power, it is abfolutely contradictory to maintain the unity of the mind, and yet to fuppofe the existence of diftinct intellectual faculties, or powers. If the primary cause in one feries be different from the primary caufe in another, we cannot refer both thefe feries to the fame prin ciple. If we trace an action to the will, a recollection to the memory, or a judgment to the understanding, how fhall we pretend that there is yet a more remote principle? By what inference fhall we conclude, that the power of imagination is derived from any thing elfe; or that the faculty of comprehenfion is the delegate of any fuperior intelligence? All these feparate powers are primary caufes; at least they are fo to our understandings, if we can trace only to them any series of causes and effects." P. 6.

Will Mr. Drummond forgive us, if we fay that these appear to us like the obfervations of a man who has read more than he has thought, and to whom metaphysical speculations have not long been familiar? We do indeed talk of the distinct faculties of understanding, memory, and will; and not only in popu lar language, but in the language of even fome metaphyficians, thefe faculties are reprefented as if they were fo many diftinct beings; but this is no man's real opinion. It is the fame individual mind, which understands, remembers, and wills. In like manner we talk of inertia*, extenfion, figure, and weight, as fo many diftinét qualities of body; and yet every body, however minute, is conceived as having all thefe qualities. The fame individual body is conceived, nor can it be conceived otherwife, as at once inert, extended, of fome figure, and heavy; while fome philofophers †, who

We choose to say inertia, because the common phrafe vis inertia fuggefts a notion diametrically the reverse of that which was intended by the author of that phrase.

+ Bofcovich and his followers, among whom may be reckoned the late profeffor Robifon, of Edinburgh, and perhaps Dr. Thomson, the author of the defervedly admired fyftem of chemistry.