unity of the Divine Nature, and the Persons to be as so many individuals." This they repeat often, and ́refer to Curcellæus's undeniable proofs of it; of which Bishop Stillingfleet taking notice, did, in his indication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, ch. 6, answer and refute particularly all the instances brought by Curcellæus, in a large discourse from p. 76 to p. 100, bringing, as he expresses it himself, undeniable proofs that Curcellæus had mistaken their meaning. * Notwithstanding this, what does the foresaid author do, but three years after the publication of Stillingfleet's book, writing some Critical Epistles, loads them with the same slanders repeated, without taking any notice that they had been answered, saying "That the Nicene fathers thought the Divine Nature is no otherwise one than specifically, but that it is in number threefold; as Petavius, Curcellæus, Cudworth, and others have proyed by such arguments, as that there can nothing be said in answer to them.' 99 In another of the said epistles †, he repeats the same slander, and would father it on some learned men in England. He says, "Learned men in England, and elsewhere, do not forbear to say openly, that the Nicene fathers believed three eternal and equal essences in God; and not one God in number." Hav. ing mentioned that several Protestant churches have received the Nicene Creed into their public confessions, he adds," If then they will stand to this part of their confession, they must own that they believe three eternal natures, and renounce the numerical unity of God; or if they will not do that, they must expunge that article of their confessioa, in which they own the Nicene faith." These letters he ventures to send into England, directed to bishops there, who he must needs think abominated such exorbitant sayings, and who could easily, if he had had the prudence to consult them first, have Epist. 3. ad Episcop. Sarisb. pag. 108. satisfied him that one of their brethren had long ago answered all those proofs of Curcellæus, with which he made such a noise; Petavius's and Cudworth's instances being not so considerable, nor so maliciously urged. Our church is not wont to take such affronts, and continue silent under them, unless when the party is accounted of so little credit as to be not worth the answering. The learned men therein (and especially the most learned person against whom these epistles were directed) would probably have spent some pains to vindicate the church of Christ from so foul a slander, but that they thought the falsehood of this imputation of the fathers had been already sufficiently shewn. Here I did in the first edition take notice, that some passages written a great while ago by a right reverend bishop (of which others also had taken notice before) did seem to incline to this opinion of Mr. Le Clerc concerning the fathers; of which I have no more to say than what I have said in the Preface to this edition. Mr. Le Clerc brings some pretended proofs of the Tritheism of the antients, of his own collection; of which Bishop Stillingfleet took no notice, they being not in Curcellæus. They are sayings, or pieces of sayings, of the fathers, so partially picked out and unfairly represented, that at that rate one might abuse and misrepresent any writer, even the Scripture itself. He mentions in the words before recited, a scrap of a sentence of Tertullian [100] in his book against Praxeas, c. 25. The whole sentence runs thus: "Ita connexus Patris in Filio, & Filii in paracleto trés efficit, cohærentes alterum ex altero; qui tres unum sunt, non unus; quomodo dictum est, Ego & Pater unum sumus; ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem." Thus the connection of ⚫ the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Holy Spirit, makes, that there are three that cohere in one andther; which three are unum, one substance, not unus, one person; as it is said, I and the Father are unum, one substance; to denote the unity of substance, not the singularity of number, that is (as Mr. Le Clerc says) the substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is specifically one, but numerically three. But that is (as any one else will say) to denote the unity of substance, not the singularity of number of the persons; or, that the persons are not numerically one, though the substance is; for it is to be noted, that this book was written against that error of Praxeas, whereby he taught that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one Person; to confirm which he brought that place of Scripture, I and the Father are one. Tertullian tells him, our Saviour's word there is unum, which denotes one substance; not unus, which would not have denoted one person. Though the design of the book be, as I said, to maintain that side of the question, that there are in some sense three in the Godhead (as Praxeas had maintained the contrary, carrying the arguments for the unity farther than he ought) yet even in this book there are more than twenty passages in which Tertullian aims to express, as well as he can (for they had not thep so determinate a use of words) a numerical unity of the substance or essence; particularly this passage *: .... "Igitur unus Deus Pater, & alius absque eo non est; quod ipse inferens non Filium negat, sed alium Deum; cæterum alius à patre filius nou est. . . . . Atqui si nominasset illum, separasset, ita dicens; alius præter me non est, nisi Filius meus. Alium enim Filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Puta solem dicere; ego Sol, & alius præter me non est, nisi radius meus; nonne denotasses vanitatem, quasi non & radius in sole deputetur ?" So there is one God the Father, and there is no other beside him; which he affirming, does not exclude his Son, but any other God; and the Son is not another from the Father. . . . . It would have Chap, 18, been to separate [or distinguish] him, if he had named him, and had said, There is no other beside me, except my Son; it had been to make his Son another, whom he had excepted out of those that are others: Suppose the Sun should say, I am the Sun, and there is no other beside me, except my light [or ruy], would you not judge it absurd, as if 'the light were not counted to the Sun itself?" To mention one passage more of the said book, ch. 29, where he is answering the argument of Praxeas, who had said, that since the essence [or substance] of the Father and the Son is one and the same, the Son could not suffer but the Father must suffer too. And where Tertullian, if he had thought the essence of the Son to be only specifically the same with that of the Father, and not numerically, could not have forborné to answer so. But he answers thus: That the Divine Nature did not suffer at all; but if it had, that arguiment would not have concluded. "Nam & fluvius, si aliqua turbulentia contaminatur; quanquam una substantia de fonte decurrat nec secernatur à fonte; tamen fluvii injuria non pertinebit ad fontein; et licet aqua fontis sit quæ patiatur in fluvio; dum non in fonte patitur, sed in fluvio; non fons patitur, sed flus vius qui ex fonte est. Ita etsi Spiritus Dei quid pati posset in Filio; quia tamen non in Patre pateretur; sed in Filio; Pater passus non videretur. Sed sufficit nihil Spiritum Dei passum suo nomine." For if a stream be puddled with any disturbance, though it be the same substance that runs from the spring, and be not distinct from the spring, yet the 'hurt of the stream will not affect the spring; and though it be the water of the spring which suffers in the stream, yet so long as it suffers in the stream, and not in the spring, the spring does not suffer, but the stream which is derived from the spring; so though the Spirit [or Deity] of God could suffer any thing in the Son, yet so long as it suffered not in the Father, but the Son, the Father would not be 'said to suffer. But it is sufficient [to take off your 'argument] that the Divinity suffered not at all in its own nature.' If he had thought the essence to be only specifically the same, he would not have gone so far for an answer; the aim thereof is to shew, that though it he numerically the same in both persons, yet something might be said of one of them, which could not be said of the other. But in other books the same writer affirms the numerical unity of essence more plainly, and in the terms of the question, though not then in common use; for in his Apology, ch. 21, he says that the Aoyos is de Spiritu Spiritus, & de Deo Deus: Modulo alter, non numero. Spirit of Spirit, and God of God: another in mode, but not in number.' The same expression of modulo alius ab alio, is also in the book against Praxeas, c. 9, and to the same purpose, ch. 14. It is therefore plain that Tertullian thought, that in some sense the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are numerically one, which must be in respect of the substance; for as for the Persons, the design of his whole book against Praxeas, is to maintain that they are three in number. Mr. Le Clerc does also endeavour to make his advantage of Gregory Nazianzen, with whom Curcellæus had not meddled. He pretended to write the Life of this father *. One may easily see through his pretended reasons for it, and perceive that the design was to represent him as a Tritheist. There are so many sayings of his wrested, and some false, translated for that purpose [260]. It is true that Gregory, in those voluminous disputations of his against the Arians and Sabelliaus, having no adversaries of the tritheistical opinion, and not fearing to be himself suspected of it, has some expressions in his arguments and explications unguarded on that side, yet so as that he still speaks with abhorrence of the belief of three Gods. It is a known rule of charity, that no consequences drawn *Bibliot. tom. 19. |