is not too strong a statement, we need not pause to discuss; but the former assertion we must consider. "The only question" is not, as Dr. Herbert claims, "How has the progressive differentiation of the organic world come about? "The other question that he regards as settled is still a question. We must still ask, Is the progressive differentiation of the organic world a universal fact? And this inquiry depends on the former. That is, the inquiry whether evolution be a universal process depends to a large degree on the admittedly unanswered inquiry as to the theory of this process. In a word, facts cannot be considered apart from their meaning. We cannot understand a fact until we discern its meaning. To affirm that it illustrates a certain process we must have a true theory of that process. The various organic forms might illustrate creation according to type as well as evolution one out of another. Or they might illustrate, as the reviewer believes that they do, the employment of both methods; but what they will illustrate will depend on our theory. Apart from a reasonable theory they may not rationally be conceived as illustrating anything; and, as we have seen, the theories of the process of evolution thus far proposed are rational only in the sense that they are successively destructive.

3. Is not our author correct in the closing sentences of his admirable book when he says "It is in the field of metaphysics rather than that of biology that the riddle of evolution will have to find its final solution"? Doubtless, our solution would not be his, but we are at one in holding that we must seek it beyond the pale of pure science. Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series-Vol. XIII. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirtyfourth Session, 1912-1913. Published by Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1913. 8vo; PP. 375. Ten Shillings and Sixpence net.

This volume, as compact and well printed as ever, contains the following papers: I.-On the Notion of Cause. By Bertrand Russell; II. The Nature of Willing. By G. Dawes Hicks; III.-Purpose and Evolution. By Arthur Lynch; IV.-A New Logic. By E. E. Constance Jones; V.—Intuitional Thinking. By Frank Granger; VI.— What Bergson means by "Interpenetration." By Miss Karin Costelloe; VII. The Analysis of Volition: Treated as a Study of Psychological Principles and Methods. By R. F. A. Hoernlé; VIII.-Does Consciousness Evolve? By L. P. Jacks; IX.-Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, with some of its Ulterior Bearings. By William W. Carlile; X.-The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. By Miss L. S. Stebbing; XI.-Symposium-Can there be anything obscure or implicit in a Mental State? By Henry Barker, G. F. Stout, and R. F. A. Hoernlé; XII.-Memory and Consciousness. By Arthur Robinson; XIII.-The Philosophy of Probability. By A. Wolf.

These able papers are all so good that, as usual, the reviewer hesi

tates to discriminate among them.. He may say, however, that the discussion "On the Notion of Cause" and that on "The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge," he has read with peculiar interest, if not, in the case of the former at any rate, with entire agreement. Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

Personality. By F. B. JEVONS, Litt.D. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. ix, 167.

This book consists of four lectures given in the summer of 1912 at Oxford in the Vacation Term for Biblical Study. They undertake the task of vindicating the reality and of (in part) defining the nature of Personality. The method pursued is logical analysis of the several points of view which dispense with the idea of Personality with the result of an ever growing strength of demonstration that in the very effort to deny Personality Personality is assumed.

Mr. Edward Clodd supplies the text for the first lecture with his attempt to postulate a pre-animistic stage for human development, in which men did not yet personify the "powers" with which they felt themselves in contact: they had as yet no conception of "a person at ali, in any sense of the word". Dr. Jevons has no difficulty in showing that the conception of impersonal powers presupposes that of person. He is willing to allow that not primitive man alone but the most advanced science-even that science called Psychology-can get along without the conception of personality, on one condition. That condition is that it will consent to be purely descriptive. As soon as we insist on "accounting for things" another situation is reached; and if science is "causal thinking," we may add (though Dr. Jevons would probably not press this) and "causal thinking" demands the postulation of adequate causes for the whole as well as the part, the discovery of Personality back of not only our activities but those of the world-all is unavoidable. In the second lecture there is very amusingly shown the inconsequence of William James' reasoning that Personality and Personal Identity are "inferences" and wrong inferences at that. The very alternative suppositions with which we start out,-'I am the same I that I was yesterday,' and 'I am not the same I that I was yesterday,' already assume both the Personality and the Personal Identity, which it is their purpose to bring to the question. The I of to-day and the I of yesterday are summoned before the court of the I of both to-day and yesterday. We cannot even raise the question of Personality or Personal Identity without presupposing it and demonstrating it by the very raising of the question. From James' thought without a thinker we advance in the third lecture to Bergson's change with nothing to change. Here Dr. Jevons is at his best. Bergson's method is incisively shown to differ in nothing from that of his predecessors from Hume down: he merely in the course of his argument somehow drops out the subject. Resolving it into its parts he bids you look at the parts-with the implication that their existence as parts excludes the existence of the whole of which they are parts. "The truth is,"

remarks Dr. Jevons finally (in two senses), "that it is impossible to resolve the 'me' into something else which is not me. If the something else is not 'me,' it is not me-and I have not been resolved into it."

So far Dr. Jevons' argument seems to us as cogent as it is clever. The final lecture which is entitled "Personality and Individuality" and in which the social aspects of Personality are discussed appeals to us much less strongly. Perhaps the reason is that the aspect of the general subject here treated lends itself ill to Dr. Jevons' method of logical analysis and reductio ad absurdum. We have no impulse to recoil from the propositions maintained. "It is maintained," says Dr. Jevons in his preface, “that persons are not individuals, in the sense of closed systems, but are at once subjects cognizant of objects, and objects presented to other subjects; but the principle of unity which holds persons together, and the impulse towards unity with one's neighbor and one's God, is love." But the development of these propositions leaves us cold. We find ourselves fancying that we are being treated only to plays on words, wondering whether Dr. Jevons has not merely a crotchet to defend, feeling that, however true the propositions put forward may be, they have no organic support in the general line of reasoning. Possibly we simply do not easily think on the lines of Mr. Bosanquet's teaching.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

De Pragmatische Philosophie van William James, en haar Begrip van Waarheid. Door Dr. J. G. UBBINK. Arnheim: A. Tamminga. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiii, 377. Full analytical Table of Contents, and extensive annotated Bibliography.

Dr. Ubbink's Doctorate thesis, published in the autumn of 1912, bore the title of The Pragmatism of William James. It met with so much acceptance that it is now reissued in this goodly volume under the amended title of The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James and its Notion of Truth.

In Dr. Ubbink's view it is its notion of Truth which provides the hinge of William James' system, and he therefore makes James' Doctrine of Truth the center of his discussion. The book consists of an Introduction and eight chapters. These chapters bear the following titles: William James as Author; The Method and Results of James' Scientific Work; The Will to Believe; Pragmatism and its New Notion of Truth; Origin and Relations of the Pragmatistic Notion of Truth; The New Notion of Truth, its Origin and Principle Criticized; Pragmatism and Religion; the Metaphysics of Pragmatism. Three of the seven chapters, it will be seen, are devoted to James' notion of Truth; they in turn carefully ascertain his meaning, seek to discover the origin and relations of the conception, and offer criticisms upon it. The two elements which enter into James' conception of Truth are pointed out as, (1) its subsumption under the broader category of the good ("truth is one species of good and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coördinate with it") and (2) its reduction to a mere transitory phase in a process of action, which for

the time brings satisfaction ("the truth of an idea is not a stagnant present interest in it: truth happens to an idea"). "Accordingly," writes Dr. Ubbink, "when we keep all this well in view, we must speak of truth thus: 'the most true' (not, the true: it is not absolute but relative) 'we shall' (not, we may: not to-day but only in the future, not to-day before the action but only after the experiment, after the occurrence itself) 'call the idea, theory, or world-view which leads us' (not which corresponds or shall correspond with a reality), 'to the human action most satisfactory to the man' (and not, indifferently whether it is pleasant or unpleasant to the man)" (p. 177). Reluctantly therefore he agrees with the criticism of Hoekstra: "What is useful to man varies day by day, and if, as James says, the truth is what is useful, there is no longer any constant truth but only contingent truths. The truth does not exist; there is only a body of truths which serve for given occasions. Truth becomes, 'is in the making.' By Pragmatism, the sharp antithesis between truth and falsehood is in principle abolished and the essential distinction between them is reduced to a matter of degree. It teaches, indeed, that truth is what is good. In this definition the deepest root of Pragmatism is laid bare, and at the same time its pŵтov Yeûdos is brought to light." Dr. Ubbink, having quoted this judgment of Hoekstra's approvingly, adds: "And yet! Nowhere does James give the impression of having wished to deny the truth. Never does he give evidence of proceeding from such sceptical and cynical aims. And therefore in my judgment the fault must be sought more deeply." He finds it in a general exaggerated evolutionism and the transference of the notion of the eternal becoming to spheres in which it has no fitness. The critical chapter is very sharply written and issues in the conclusion that the whole idea of truth on which James' entire system turns not only is completely untenable but is crassly self-contradictory.

The characteristics of Dr. Ubbink's treatise which most strike the reader are its thoroughness and the richness of the literature which it surveys. Not only has all that James wrote been carefully explored, but pretty nearly everything of importance which has been written about him has been noted and considered. The book serves the purpose therefore not only of an estimate of James' teachings themselves, but also of a report upon the wide-spread discussion which they have aroused. This side of its usefulness is enhanced by the very full Bibliography, with brief characterizations, which is added. Princeton. BENJAMIN B. Warfield.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

A Handbook of Christian Apologetics. By ALFRED ERNEST GARVIE, M.A. (Oxon.), D.D. (Glas.), Principal of New College, University of London, Author of "The Ritschlian Theology," "Studies in The Inner Life of Jesus," "The Christian Certainty amid the Modern

Perplexity," "Studies of Paul and His Gospel," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. xii, 241.

This is the last volume to be issued of the series known as the "International Theological Library." This fact defines its aim and indicates its method; for that library was meant to be "a series of textbooks for students of Theology, and yet a systematic exposition of the several departments of theological science for all intelligent persons." It also sets and assures a high standard of excellence; for however one may differ from the positions taken by some of the writers of this series, all must admit that they form a distinguished company of theological scholars.

Dr. Garvie's argument for Christianity is simple and clear. He ignores entirely the old classification of the evidences into external, internal, collateral, etc.—as it seems to us with some loss of comprehensiveness and cumulative effect-, and he seeks continuity by discussing in succession the great doctrines of the Christian religion. Thus after an introductory chapter on "The Purpose" and the "Problems of Apologetics," he considers in turn: "Religion and Revelation," "Inspiration and Miracle," "The Lord Jesus Christ," "The Christian Salvation," "The Christian View of God," "The Christian View of Man," "The Christian Ideal,” and “The Christian Hope." A "selected Bibliography" follows, and the book closes with an "Index."

"In accordance with the author's idea of the task of Apologetics as commendation rather than defense, less attention is given to meeting objections than to presenting the attractions of the Christian Gospel." This is done in a winning way. The writer's style could not be more in harmony with his purpose. It is the best illustration of his own words: "The manner of Christian Apologetics should be appropriate to the matter and the method. A gospel of grace should be commended and defended graciously." We confess that sometimes it seems to us to be done—we do not say too fairly,—but just a little too graciously. When the issues at stake are the most tremendous conceivable, it is sometimes well that they should be presented more sharply than would be done in a parlor meeting. This, however, must not mislead any. The tone of the book is as serious throughout as it is gracious. Nor is its method, on the whole, concessive. It gives up much that the reviewer himself would earnestly contend for; but this is not because the author would meet his opponents more than half way, it is because the Christianity which he holds seems to the reviewer to be, even in its utmost extent, comparatively attenuated. As the expositor of Ritschl, while not agreeing with him at all or, perhaps, at most points, he would appear to have been so influenced by him as to have lost his grasp on much that many regard as belonging to the Christian faith.

It would be impossible within the limits of this notice even to indicate the various respects in which the reviewer fears that this is the case. He may refer, and briefly, only to the following: