neth. And no wonder that the will of God fhould be the main fpring that fets all inferior wheels in motion, and should likewife be the rule by which he goes in all his dealings with his creatures; fince nothing out of God, i. e. exterior to himself, can poffibly induce him to will or nill one thing, rather than another. Deny this, and you, at one ftroke, deftroy his immutability and independency: fince he can never be independent, who acts pro re nata, as emergency requires, and whofe will is fufpended on that of others; nor unchangeable, whofe purposes vary and take all fhapes, according as the perfons or things vary, who are the objects of thofe purposes. The only reafon, then, that can be affigned, why the Deity does this, or omits that, is, because it is his own free pleasure. Luther *, in anfwer to that question, "Whence it was, that Adam was permitted to fall, and corrupt his whole pofterity; when God could have prevented his falling," &c. fays, "God is a being, whofe will acknowledges no caufe: neither is it for us to prefcribe rules to his fovereign pleasure, or call him to account for what he does. He has neither fuperior nor equal: and his will is the rule of all things. He did not therefore will fuch and fuch things, because they were in themselves right, and he was bound to will them; but they are therefore equitable and right, because he wills them. The will of man, indeed, may be influenced and moved; but God's will never can. To affert the contrary, is to undeify him." Bucer likewife obferves, "God has no other motive for what he does, than ipfa voluntas, his own mere will; which will is fo far from being unrighteous, that it is jus tice itself."

Pof. 8. Since, as was lately obferved, the determining will of God, being omnipotent, cannot be obftructed or made void; it follows, that he never

did, nor does he now, will that every individual of mankind fhould be faved.

If this was his will, not one fingle foul could ever be loft; (for who hath refifted his will?) and he would furely afford all men thofe effectual means of falvation, without which it cannot be had. Now, God could afford thefe means as eafily to all mankind, as to fome only: but experience proves that he does not; and the reafon is equally plain, namely, that he will not for whatfoever the Lord pleaseth, that does he in heaven and on earth. It is faid indeed, by the apostle, that God would have all men faved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; i. e. as Austin *, confiftently with other Scriptures, explains the paffage," God will fave fome out of the whole race of mankind," that is, perfons of all nations, kindreds and tongues. Nay, he will fave all men, i. e. as the fame father obferves, "every kind of men, or men of every kind," namely, the whole election of grace, be they bond or free, noble or ignoble, rich or poor, male or female. Add to this, that it evidently militates against the majefty, omnipotence, and fupremacy of God, to fuppofe that he can either will any thing in vain, or that any thing can take effect against his will therefore Bucer obferves, very rightly, ad Rom. ix. "God doth not will the falvation of reprobates; feeing he hath not chofen them, neither created them to that end." Confonant to which are those words of Luther, "This mightily offends our rational nature, that God fhould, of his own mere, unbiaffed will, leave fome men to themselves, harden them, and then condemn them: but he has given abundant demonftration, and does continually, that this is really the cafe; namely, that the fole caufe, why fome are faved, and others perifh, proceeds from his willing the falvation of the former, and the perdition of the latter,

* Enchir. c. 103. & de Corr. & Gr. c. 14. + De Serv. Arb. c. 161. accord

according to that of Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardneth."

Pof. 9. As God doth not will that each individual of mankind fhould be faved; fo neither did he will that Chrift fhould properly and immediately die for each individual of mankind: whence it follows, that, though the blood of Chrift, from its own intrinfic dignity, was fufficient for the redemption of all men; yet, in confequence of his Father's appointment, he shed it intentionally, and therefore effectually and immediately, for the elect only.

This is felf-evident. God, as we have before proved, wills not the falvation of every man: but he gave his Son to die for them whofe falvation he willed; therefore his Son did not die for every man. All thofe, for whom Chrift died, are faved; and the divine juftice indifpenfably requires, that to them the benefits of his death fhould be imparted: but only the elect are faved; they only partake of thofe benefits; confequently, for them only he died and intercedes. The apoftle, Rom. viii. afks, Who fhall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? it is God that juftifies, i. e. his elect, exclufively of others who is he that condemneth? It is Chrift that died for them, exclufively of others. The plain meaning of the paffage is, that thofe, whom God juftifies, and for whom Chrift died (juftification and redemption being of exactly the fame extent), cannot be condemned. Thele privileges are exprefsly restrained to the elect: therefore, God juftifies and Chrift died for them alone.

In the fame chapter, Paul afks; He that fpared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, [i. e. for all us elect perfons] how fhall he not, with him, alfo freely give us all things? i. e. falvation, and all things neceffary to it. Now, it is certain, that these are not given to every individual; and yet if Paul Yays true, they are given to all thofe for whom

O 3

whom Chrift was delivered to death: confequently, he was not delivered to death for every individual. To the fame purpofe St. Auftin argues, in Johan. tract. 45. col. 335. Hence that faying of Ambrofe*, "ft non credis, non tibi paffus eft, i. e. if you are an unbeliever, Chrift did not die for you." Meaning, that whoever is left under the power of final unbelief,. is thereby evidenced to be one of thofe for whom Chrift did not die: but that all, for whom he fuffered, shall be, in this life, sooner or later, indued with faith. The Church of Smyrna, in their letter to the diocefes of Pontus, infift every where on the doctrine of fpecial redemption. Bucer, in all parts of his works, obferves, that "Chrift died reftrictively for the elect only; but for them univerfally."

Pof. 10. From what has been laid down, it follows, that Auftin, Luther, Bucer, the fcholaftic divines, and other learned writers, are not to be blamed for afferting that "God may, in fome fense, be faid to will the being and commiffion of fin." For, was this contrary to his determining will of permiffion, either he would not be omnipotent, or fin could have no place in the world: but he is omnipotent, and fin has place in the world; which it could not have, if God willed otherwise; for who hath refifted his will? Rom. ix. No one can deny that God permits fin: but he neither permits it ignorantly, nor unwillingly; therefore, knowingly and willingly. Vid. Auft. Enchir. c. 96. Luther ftedfaftly maintains this in his book De Serv. Arbitr. and Bucer in Rom. i. However, it should be carefully noticed, (1.) That God's permiffion of fin does not arife from his taking delight in it: on the contrary, fin, as fin, is, the abominable thing that his foul hateth: and his efficacious permiffion

Ambrof. Tom. 2. de fid. ad Grat. 1. 4. c.
c. i.
+ Vid. Eufeb. Hift. 1. 4. c. 10.

of

of it is for wife and good purposes. Whence that obfervation of Austin*, "God, who is no lefs omnipotent, than he is fupremely and perfectly holy, would never have permitted evil to enter among his works, but in order that he might do good even with that evil," i. e. over-rule it for good in the end. (2.) That God's free and voluntary permiffion of fin lays no man under any forcible or compulfive neceffity of committing it: confequently, the Deity can by no means be termed the author of moral evil; to which he is not, in the proper fenfe of the word, acceffary, but only remotely or negatively fo, inafmuch as he could, if he pleafed, abfolutely prevent it.

We should, therefore, be careful not to give up the omnipotence of God, under a pretence of exalting his holiness: he is infinite in both, and therefore neither fhould be fet afide or obfcured. To fay that God abfolutely nills the being and commiffion of fin, while experience convinces us that fin is acted every day, is to reprefent the Deity as a weak, impotent being, who would fain have things go otherwife than they do, but cannot accomplish his defire. On the other hand, to fay that he willeth fin, doth not in the leaft detract from the holinefs and rectitude of his nature; becaufe, whatever God wills, as well as whatever he does, cannot be eventually evil: materially evil it may be; but, as was just said, it must, ultimately, be directed to fome wife and just end, otherwife he could not will it: for his will is righteous and good, and the fole rule of right and wrong, as is often obferved by Auftin, Luther, and others.

Pof. 11. In confequence of God's immutable will and infallible foreknowledge, whatever things come to pafs, come to pafs neceffarily; though, with refpect to fecond caufes, and us men, many things